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significantly higher likelihood of conviction, and a higher penalty. But why do such disparities
exist? Conventional explanations point to differences among sovereigns' legal rules, resources,
and dockets. These understandings, while valid, neglect to account for a less tangible source of
federal criminal power: legitimacy. "Legitimacy" refers to the concept, refined through decades
of empirical research, that citizens comply with the law, and defer to and cooperate with legal
authority, when they perceive both the laws and the authorities to be fair. A legitimacy-based
exploration of the federal criminal justice system significantly enriches our understanding of the
sources of federal criminal enforcement power. Distilling those sources, moreover, reveals
surprising and counterintuitive implications: to emulate the sources of federal legitimacy in local
systems, we need more localized criminal justice.
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INTRODUCTION
In litigation, forum matters. Nowhere is that more true than in criminal
litigation, where the choice of court in which to prosecute - state or federal - is
perhaps the single most significant factor influencing a case's outcome. All else
being equal, a defendant prosecuted in federal court is more likely to be
convicted, and to receive a longer sentence of imprisonment, than if prosecuted
for the same conduct in state court.' The disparity has received particular
attention in the area of so-called "street crimes" -the drug, gun, and violent
offenses that make up the bulk of urban criminal felony dockets -because these
are the sorts of crimes that many argue have historically been (and should
continue to be) left largely to the states.2 For all the focus on the merits and
equities of federal prosecution of street crime, though, there has been no
concerted exploration of the antecedent question: why do the disparities exist
in the first place?
The question is important because interpretations of forum disparities
inform our understanding of the sources of federal criminal enforcement
power. To date, scholars have treated these disparities largely as the product of
tangible differences: in sovereigns' legal rules (whether substantive,
1. See Steven D. Clymer, Unequal Justice: The Federalization of Criminal Law, 70 S. CAL. L. REv.
643, 668-69 (1997) ("Notwithstanding some significant exceptions, defendants typically
fare considerably worse when prosecuted in federal court. .. . [This] disparity . . . is a
hallmark of federalization."); Daniel C. Richman, The Changing Boundaries Between Federal
and Local Law Enforcement, in 2 OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2000, BOUNDARY CHANGES IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE ORGANIZATIONS 81, 95
(2000), http://www.ncjrs.gov/criminaLjustice20oo/voL2/o2d2.pdf; infra note 149 and
cross-references cited therein.
2. See, e.g., Gerald G. Ashdown, Federalism, Federalization, and the Politics of Crime, 98 W. VA. L.
REV. 789, 789-90, 812-13 (1996); John S. Baker, Jr., State Police Powers and the Federalization
ofLocal Crime, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 673, 673-74, 678 (1999); Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet
Too Few: New Principles to Define the Proper Limits for Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 46
HASTINGS L.J. 979, 979-81 (1995); Clymer, supra note i, at 645-46. The historical claim is,
however, debatable. The federal governments involvement in violent crime began around
the-time of the New Deal, precisely as the federal government began to intervene in many
other areas previously considered the proper province of state and local officials but which,
today, are readily accepted as proper subjects of federal control. See Daniel Richman, The
Past, Present, and Future of Violent Crime Federalism, 34 CRIME & JUST. 377, 387 (2006)
(noting that the notorious kidnapping of Charles Lindbergh's son in 1932 began "a wave of
congressional enactments targeting criminal behavior that had hitherto been the exclusive
province of state and local enforcers"). Nevertheless, federal involvement in street crime did
increase significantly beginning in the 1960s, see id. at 382, 390-400, and it is this relatively
more recent policy shift that has generated criticism.
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procedural, or constitutional), in resources, and in caseloads. These
interpretations have framed our analysis of criminal federalism on issues
ranging from the "federalization" of criminal law to the allocation of
enforcement power and the exercise of federal enforcement discretion.3
The conventional interpretations of forum disparities are accurate, but
incomplete. This Article seeks to supplement them with a different
framework-one focused not on rules or resource allocations but rather on
citizens' perceptions of legal authority. The work primarily of social
psychologists, criminologists and criminal law theorists, this framework-
broadly-termed, "legitimacy" -posits that a system perceived as providing fair
process and just laws promotes compliance with the law and respect for and
deference to law enforcement authorities.4 The impressive body of empirical
and theoretical work on legitimacy has not yet been mined for its potential to
explain forum disparities in criminal adjudication.
This Article undertakes that effort. It offers a fresh look at the causes of
forum disparities in street crimes, an alternative framework for understanding
them, and a new agenda for inquiry. These disparities manifest not just
differences in legal rules and resource allocations but also how actors within
the respective criminal justice systems -primarily witnesses, juries, and
judges -perceive the system's legitimacy. Exploring forum disparities through
the lens of legitimacy enriches our understanding of the sources of federal
criminal power. And the policymaking implications are surprising and
counterintuitive: by distilling the sources of federal legitimacy, we see the need
for more localized criminal justice.
The need to engage these matters is urgent because the stakes are high -for
defendants, victims, and the communities affected by street crime. Consider
the following:
* A defendant has been arrested forty-four times for various offenses,
including narcotics trafficking, gun possession, robbery, and
3. See, e.g., Beale, supra note 2, at 998-99; Clymer, supra note i, at 669-75; Daniel C. Richman,
"Project Exile" and the Allocation of Federal Law Enforcement Authority, 43 AIuz. L. REV. 369,
398 (2001); Michael A. Simons, Prosecutorial Discretion and Prosecution Guidelines: A Case
Study in Controlling Federalization, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 893, 916-17 (2000); Tom Stacy & Kim
Dayton, The Underfederalization of Crime, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 247, 286, 295 (1997);
William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARv. L. REv. 1969, 2027-29 (2oo8).
4. See PAUL H. ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW: WHO SHouLD BE
PUNISHED How MUCH? (2008); PAUL H. ROBINsON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY
AND BLAME: COMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1995); TOM R. TYLER, WHY
PEOPLE OBEY THE LAw (Princeton Univ. Press 20o6) (1990).
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shooting. He has been prosecuted in his local county court for each
of the forty-four arrests -sometimes facing substantial terms of
imprisonment under state law-yet never once convicted. On his
forty-fifth arrest, he is prosecuted for robbery and gun possession in
federal court, where he is convicted and receives a sentence of
thirty-two years' imprisonment.s
* A defendant has thirty-one convictions in state court, including two
prior felony convictions for robbery. He also has numerous arrests
that resulted in dismissals, including arrests for two robberies for
which local grand juries refused to return indictments. A federal
grand jury later returns indictments on those very same two
robberies, along with five others; a federal petit jury convicts the
defendant of those crimes; and a federal judge sentences him to
thirty years' imprisonment.6
* A twenty-three-year-old defendant has eight prior criminal
convictions, including separate convictions for illegal gun
possession and for aggravated assault with a firearm on a police
officer. He has never served more than eighty days in jail for any
one offense. His ninth conviction, for possessing a firearm as a
convicted felon, occurs in federal court. The federal judge sentences
him to more than seven years' imprisonment.7
These cases are extreme examples of what has aptly been called "unequal
justice."' The phenomenon has directed a great deal of scholarly attention to
the federalization of crime and the proper exercise of federal enforcement
discretion.9 Nowhere in this literature, though, do scholars truly grapple with
the reasons for these forum disparities. Explanations serve largely as premises
s. See Nathan Gorenstein, Man Who Avoided Conviction Despite 44 Arrests Now Faces 32-Year
Term, PHILA. INQUIRER, Feb. 2, 2012, http://articles.philly.coM/2o2-o2-o2/news/31o16967
1conviction-rate-robbery-cases-court-system; John Sullivan, Emilie Lounsberry & Dylan
Purcell, Gun Arrests Galore, No Convictions at All, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 16, 2009,
http://articles.philly.comV2oo9-12-i6/news/2498854i-i-robbery-victim-mandatory-minimum
-five-year-sentence-gun-crime (detailing the defendant's criminal record).
6. See Brief of Appellee United States of America at 26, 37-39, United States v. Andrews, 270 F.
App'x s (2d Cir. 20o8) (No. o6-4240) (on file with author).
7. See United States v. Thomas, 447 F. App'x 568, 569 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam); Brief for
Appellee, the United States of America at 7-11, Thomas, 447 F. App'x 568 (No. 11-30148),
2011 WL 2527772, at *7-11 (detailing the defendant's criminal record).
8. Clymer, supra note i; Stuntz, supra note 3.
9. See sources cited supra note 3.
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for other debates, rather than starting points for independent inquiry. We are
told that federal sentencing statutes and guidelines are more severe, and less
malleable, than their state counterparts.o Federal evidentiary and procedural
rules are more favorable to the prosecution." The federal government has
substantially greater resources to expend on each case." Federal prosecutors
can be more selective in deciding which cases to bring.'3
Each of these points has merit, and, collectively, they go a long way
towards explaining forum disparities in street-crime cases. But a number of
criminal enforcement phenomena illuminate their limitations. How, for
instance, do we explain why federal prosecutors, who generally intervene in
street-crime cases to secure a higher penalty, bring cases even when federal
penalties are less severe than applicable state penalties?4 Why have Virginia's
firearms laws, which effectively replicate federal penalties, not replicated
federal outcomes in firearms cases?'5 What does it mean to say that federal
procedural and evidentiary rules are more favorable to the prosecution -does
lo. See Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and the Politics ofSentencing, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 1276, 1312-
14 (2005); Beale, supra note 2, at 998-99; Clymer, supra note i, at 674-75; Michael M.
O'Hear, National Uniformity/Local Uniformity: Reconsidering the Use of Departures to Reduce
Federal-State Sentencing Disparities, 87 IOWA L. REv. 721, 730-32 (2002); Simons, supra note 3,
at 916-17; Stacy & Dayton, supra note 3, at 286-87; Ronald Wright, Federal or State? Sorting
as a Sentencing Choice, CRIM. JUST., Summer 2oo6, at 16, 17.
ii. See Baker, supra note 2, at 685-86, 703-o6; Clymer, supra note 1, at 669-73; John C. Jeffries,
Jr. & John Gleeson, The Federalization of Organized Crime: Advantages of Federal Prosecution,
46 HASTINGS L.J. 1095, 1103-17 (1995).
12. See Richman, supra note 3, at 397 (observing that a lower ratio of cases per prosecutor is
among federal prosecutors' advantages relative to their local counterparts); Stacy & Dayton,
supra note 3, at 294 (noting that as compared to the federal government, states "are
especially inclined to underinvest" in street crime enforcement because it particularly afflicts
poor urban neighborhoods); Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in
Federal Criminal Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 117-21, 134-37 (2005) (arguing that as case
volume per federal prosecutor has fallen over the last five decades, acquittal rates have
generally gone down, but acknowledging that the reasons for this correlation are unclear).
13. See Susan R. Klein & Ingrid B. Grobey, Debunking Claims of Over-Federalization of Criminal
Law, 62 EMORY L.J. 1, 10 (2012) (attributing the high federal guilty plea rate to the fact that
federal prosecutors have the luxury of charging "only rock-solid cases[,] as they can decline
most cases safely in the knowledge that state and local actors must pursue them");
Richman, supra note 1, at 95 ("Without the political obligations of State authorities to
maintain order within a territorial jurisdiction and to prosecute every provable serious
offense, Federal agencies are largely free to invest strategically in the cases they do take.").
14. See infra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 68-79 and accompanying text.
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lowering the evidentiary or procedural hurdles to bringing cases necessarily
make it easier to win those cases? Resources and selectivity in charging are
critical, to be sure; but what, exactly, do federal prosecutors select for, and
when and why do resources matter? To address the disparities between federal
and local prosecution of street crime, we must broaden our understanding of
the sources of federal prosecutorial power.
Legitimacy encapsulates the theoretical principle that citizens comply with
laws, and defer to and cooperate with legal authorities, when they perceive
both the laws and the authorities to be fair."1 It is the deference and
cooperation aspects of legitimacy that I engage here.17 Deference to and
cooperation with law enforcement impact case outcomes." Case outcomes, in
turn, reflect legitimacy. If witnesses will not testify; if juries do not credit the
prosecution's evidence; if sentences prescribed by a legislature or sentencing
commission seem off-kilter in relation to a community's views, then
prosecutors and judges must, and will, resolve the individual cases before them
in light of those realities.
16. For a more thorough statement of legitimacy principles, see Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan,
Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do People Help the Police Fight Crime in Their Communities?,
6 OHIO ST. J. CluM. L. 231, 234 (20o8).
17. Much of the literature on legitimacy has focused on legitimacy's impact on compliance, that
is, willingness to obey the laws and legal authorities. In that vein, inverse correlations have
been shown between citizens' trust in the federal government and rates of street crime and
homicide. See GARY LAFREE, LOSING LEGITIMACY: STREET ClIME AND THE DECLINE OF
SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN AMERICA 91-113 (1998); RANDOLPH ROTH, AMERICAN HOMICIDE
448-52 (2009). Because federal and state laws with respect to street crime are by now nearly
co-extensive, see Richman, supra note 1, at 82, 90-91, there is no way to evaluate whether the
federal criminal justice system in particular promotes heightened compliance with the
criminal law (and thus lower crime rates). My aim instead is to explore legitimacy's
potential influence on deference to and cooperation with federal authorities in the
prosecution of cases-primarily deference and cooperation of witnesses, jurors, and
judges -and to theorize how such cooperation and deference might help, in part, to explain
outcome disparities between the state and federal forums in criminal prosecutions.
18. See Josh Bowers & Paul H. Robinson, Perceptions ofFairness and justice: The Shared Aims and
Occasional Conflicts of Legitimacy and Moral Credibility, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 211, 217
(2012) ("To the extent that people see the system as in conflict with their judgments of
justice, [] acquiescence and cooperation is likely to fade and be replaced with resistance and
subversion. . . . Witnesses may lose an incentive to offer their information or testimony.
Citizens may fail to report crimes in the first instance. Jurors may disregard their jury
instructions. Police officers, prosecutors, and judges may make up their own rules. And
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A legitimacy-based account of the federal criminal justice system broadens
our understanding beyond the tangible, to encompass less overt sources of
federal power. It opens new avenues of inquiry: about the foundations of
citizens' trust in the law, the law's enforcers, and the institutions of legal
authority; the relationship between law and social norms; citizens'
identification with the governing authority; and the place of the jury within the
larger electorate. Exploring the sources of federal legitimacy, moreover, reveals
surprising implications for criminal federalism: the interactions that may
matter most to legitimacy are not those between the federal government and
states, but those between states and their localities.
For all the scholarly focus on legitimacy on the one hand and federal
prosecution of street crime on the other, we have yet to bridge these two strains
of literature. That is, we have yet to consider legitimacy's role in federal street
crime enforcement. We should. If legitimacy partly explains the outcome
disparities between state and federal forums, we must reconceptualize these
disparities as more than just reflections of different sovereigns' legal rules or
resource allocations. In many respects, they are that; but the disparities also
reflect something else, something that cannot be remedied merely by a change
in laws, or rules, or budgets. And so we need to begin asking new questions:
not only about how allocations of power in the criminal justice system
(between sovereigns as well as between legislators, courts, and law enforcers)
affect citizens' trust in the system, but also about how the need for citizens'
trust should inform how we allocate power.
This Article unfolds in four parts. Part I tests the limits of conventional
explanations of forum disparities in street crime prosecution. Part II provides
the conceptual framework of legitimacy theory in criminal justice and describes
legitimacy's significance in criminal adjudication. Part III explores federal
prosecution of street crime through this framework, examining the legitimacy-
enhancing features of federal criminal enforcement. These features do not
make it "more legitimate" in a normative sense, and this Article makes no claim
in that regard. The focus here is on perceptions of legitimacy-in the eyes of
jurors, witnesses, and judges. Part IV takes on the normative implications.
Criminal federalism inquiries, particularly in the context of street crime, have
largely focused on how criminal power should be allocated between state and
federal sovereigns. Yet if forum disparities in prosecutions of street crimes arise
at least in part from a legitimacy gap, then we should also be asking an entirely
different question: how can we translate the legitimacy-enhancing features of
the federal system into local justice systems? Unpacking the sources of federal
legitimacy reveals that, counterintuitively, the best way to emulate these
sources in local systems is by enhancing localism- through greater
2243
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accountability, participation, and local voice in both criminal lawmaking and
law enforcement.
To be clear, the goal of this endeavor is not to emulate federal conviction
rates or penalties, but rather to emulate those features of the federal system
that serve, in part, to align written and applied law. Enhancing localism in
urban criminal justice systems will help close the distance between written and
applied law in those systems. And it will do so in a way that is more
substantively just, because it will derive from the trust and cooperation of
citizens most affected by street crimes and their enforcement. Attention to
localism in urban criminal justice systems will thus enhance substantive justice
not only in those systems, but overall: greater legitimacy in local urban justice
systems will lessen the perceived need for federal prosecution of street crime
and the relatively harsh penalties that come with it.19
It should be noted that this Article applies theories derived from empirical
research in one area (local urban justice systems) to another (the federal justice
system) in which similar empirical work has not yet been done.2 o In this sense,
the Article sets forth a research agenda for further work. It is my hope that this
agenda encourages us to think more broadly about the sources of federal
enforcement power in street crime and, perhaps, beyond.
I. CONVENTIONAL ACCOUNTS OF FORUM DISPARITIES AND THEIR
LIMITS
Over the last five decades, federal criminal law has vastly expanded, and the
bulk of that expansion has been in the area of violent crimes and narcotics." In
the late 196os and early 1970s, Congress passed three pieces of criminal
legislation that would prove to become staples of federal violent crime and
narcotics prosecutions: the Gun Control Act of 1968, which marked the
beginning of a sustained federal legislative effort at controlling gun crime;2 the
Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act, enacted to respond to mob
ig. This is not to say that federal penalties for street crime are necessarily substantively unjust
(although one could certainly make a strong argument that they are unjust in certain cases
and even whole categories of cases). My point here, rather, is that penalties are most apt to
be substantively just when supported by the communities most affected by the crime and its
punishment.
20. See infra note 150.
21. Richman, supra note i, at 88-91.
22. Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213.
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crime but soon discovered by prosecutors as a potent tool for prosecuting
violent inner city gangs;1 and the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act of 1970, which began the federal government's foray into criminal
drug enforcement." A series of amendments to the drug laws over the next
several decades saw marked increases in the types of drugs and drug-related
conduct subject to federal criminal prosecution and in the penalties associated
with federal drug crimes." Recidivist enhancements became a common feature
of federal drug, gun, and violent crime penalties.21
Over this period, and with increasing intensity over the last two decades,
federal prosecutors have used these and other laws to prosecute street crime.
The enforcement effort has received sustained attention from the Department
of Justice, with particularly vigorous contributions coming from those U.S.
Attorney's Offices in districts that encompass inner cities with high levels of
gun and drug crime. And with rare exceptions, the courts have acceded to the
federal government's authority in this area in the face of federalism-based
challenges.
23. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, Title IX, 84 Stat. 941.
24. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236.
25. The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976, among
other things strengthened the penalties for certain drug offenses, established mandatory
minimum sentences for certain gun crimes, and overhauled the federal sentencing system,
abolishing parole and creating a sentencing commission directed to establish mandatory
guidelines for all federal criminal defendants. In 1986 and 1988, Congress passed two Anti-
Drug Abuse Acts, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 1oo Stat. 3207, and Pub. L. No. 1oo-690, 102 Stat.
4181, each of which added additional mandatory minimum sentences for certain drug-
trafficking offenses, particularly those related to crack cocaine. The Comprehensive Crime
Control Act of 199o, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789, further increased drug penalties.
26. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c) (2012) (federal "three strikes" statute, described infra note 42); 18
U.S.C. § 924(e) (mandating a minimum of is years' imprisonment for defendants convicted
of any of nine offenses, including illegal gun possession, who have three prior convictions
for certain drug-trafficking or violent crimes). Certain federal narcotics-trafficking penalties
give prosecutors discretion to double penalties for defendants previously convicted of a
felony drug trafficking crime. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 84 1(b)(i), 851.
27. By the term "street crime," here and throughout this Article, I refer to gun offenses,
narcotics offenses, and episodic violent crimes such as robbery and homicide. Street crimes
may be perpetrated by individuals acting alone or as part of organized criminal activity
(such as gang and drug-trafficking operations). I exclude from this term international
(cross-border) narcotics trafficking.
28. See generally Richman, supra note 1, at 88-90 (citing cases). United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549 (1995), has proven one of the few exceptions. Richman, supra note i, at 90 (describing
Lopez as "little more than a speed bump" in the Court's acquiescence in the "complete
2245
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This relatively recent federal prosecutorial focus has generated much
academic commentary, most of it negative, concerning the propriety of federal
enforcement of what have traditionally been considered "local" crimes. The
debate has largely proceeded within the familiar federalism framework, with
some commentators arguing for increased federal intervention and a vocal
majority decrying the federal government's infringement on local police
powers. 9 The participants in this particular federalism debate, though, do not
line up along the typical political divisions.3 o And that is because, unlike other
federal interventions in the criminal justice system-for instance, habeas
corpus proceedings, the procedural constraints imposed on states by the
Warren Court, or § 1983 actions against law enforcement officers - this federal
intervention has resulted in substantially less favorable outcomes for criminal
defendants. On the whole, federal prosecution results in a more certain
conviction and a likely higher sentence than a defendant would receive were he
prosecuted in a local county courthouse.31 It is, in fact, this salient feature that
drives much of the academic debate.32
It is also what drives federal prosecutions. Unlike large-scale white-collar or
regulatory crimes, which typically require expertise and resources more
available at the federal level, the default forum for street crimes is local. The
corollary to this division of labor is that when the local district attorney can
provide a prosecution that is equally or nearly as effective as would occur in
federal court, in the form of a high likelihood of conviction and a substantial
sentence, federal prosecution offers little value-added.
federalization of criminal law"). Although United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000),
and Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000), are often cited as Lopez's jurisprudential
analogues, they are not. The Court in Morrison struck down a civil remedy under the
Violence Against Women Act; several federal courts of appeals have upheld the
constitutionality of that Act's criminal provisions without disturbance. E.g., United States v.
Page, 167 F.3d 325, 325 (6th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1003 (1999); see United
States v. Larsen, 615 F.3d 780, 786 (7th Cir. 2010) (joining "the Second, Fourth, Fifth, and
Sixth Circuits in holding that the [criminal-penalty provision] is a valid exercise of
Congress's power under the Commerce Clause to regulate the channels or instrumentalities
of, or persons in, interstate commerce"). And in Jones, the Court excluded private residences
from the federal arson statute as a matter of statutory interpretation, not constitutional
limitation.
29. See sources cited supra notes 2-3, 10-13.
30. See Rory K. Little, Myths and Principles of Federalization, 46 HASTINGS L. J. 1029, 1065-66
(1995)-
31. See sources cited supra note i.
32. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 2-3, 10-13.
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The disparity between federal and local enforcement of street crime, then,
matters not just from an equity perspective but from an instrumental
perspective as well: generally speaking, it is this disparity that drives federal
intervention. And yet there has been relatively little attention paid to the
possible explanations for it. The disparity has been the starting point for
academic commentary, rather than its focus. What attention it has received has
been mostly geared towards marshaling arguments in favor of, or against,
federal intervention. Proponents of federal intervention argue that federal
procedural rules, ample investigative resources, and enforcement discretion
give prosecutors important tools for prosecuting violent crime.33 Opponents
argue that the outcome disparity violates the Equal Protection Clause or, at
least, offends common notions of equity, and that federal intervention
constitutes an end-run around state legislatures' sentencing preferences. 4
In all of these arguments, the reasons for the disparities are largely
presumed: federal sentences for gun and drug crimes are in most instances
harsher and less malleable than their state counterparts; federal rules of
criminal procedure are generally more favorable to prosecutors; and federal
prosecutors have vastly more resources to devote to each case, as well as the
luxury of choosing which cases they will bring.35 Each of these points is correct,
and, collectively, they do a great deal of work in explaining criminal forum
disparities. They do not, though, go the distance in explaining the extent and
depth of the outcome disparities that exist. Let us examine why.
A. The Penalties Explanation
The leading explanation for the disparity between federal and local
outcomes in street crime prosecution is relatively more stringent federal
penalties, which we are told affect outcomes in two ways. First, harsher and
more compulsory federal statutory penalties explain the substantially higher
federal conviction rate: high penalties pressure defendants to plead guilty in
exchange for lower sentences, resulting in more guilty pleas, fewer trials, and
therefore fewer acquittals.36 Second, higher federal statutory penalties result in
longer federal sentences.37
33. See Jeffries & Gleeson, supra note 11; Stacy & Dayton, supra note 3, at 286-87.
34. E.g., Beale, supra note 2; Clymer, supra note 1; O'Hear, supra note io.
35. See supra notes 1-3, 10-13.
36. See Clymer, supra note i; Wayne A. Logan, Erie and Federal Criminal Courts, 63 VAND. L.
REv. 1243, 1270 (2oo); Wright, supra note lo, at 84-86, 129-34; see also Stacy & Dayton,
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The theory is not wrong, but it has several important limitations. First, it is
not always the case that penalties for prosecuted federal crimes are higher than
those under applicable state law. Second, even when federal penalties are
higher than their state counterparts, this difference alone does not account for
the depth of the outcome disparities we see. Third, federal case disposition data
reveals a somewhat more complicated relationship between penalties and
conviction rates.
Begin with the first limitation. It is undoubtedly correct that in many
circumstances the federal penalty for a crime is significantly harsher than the
state penalty for essentially the same crime." But that is not always the case,
and, critically, it is not the case in a number of areas in which we see robust
federal enforcement. A corollary to the history of escalating federal penalties for
drug and gun crimes is the history of escalating state penalties for such crimes,
a history that has been largely overlooked in the violent-crime federalism
debates.39
New York's Rockefeller Drug Laws, passed in 1973, were at the time the
nation's harshest. The penalties, which remained in effect until amendments in
2004 and 2009, included mandatory minimums that exceeded those under
applicable federal law.4 0 Other states soon followed suit. Michigan and Florida
are just two examples of states whose drug penalties eclipsed their federal
supra note 3, at 286-87 (noting that relatively harsher federal sentences induce defendants to
cooperate). Cooperation almost always entails pleading guilty to charged crimes (and
sometimes also admitting to uncharged crimes).
37. Barkow, supra note io, at 1312-14 n.169; Clymer, supra note i; Stacy & Dayton, supra note 3,
at 286-87.
38. See, e.g., O'Hear, supra note io, at 731-32; Simons, supra note 3, at 916-19.
39. Even when commentators have acknowledged instances in which state penalties are harsher
than federal counterparts, they have assumed that, in those instances, federal prosecutors
defer to state prosecution. See, e.g., Clymer, supra note 1, at 669 n.128. In fact, though,
federal prosecutors do prosecute even in instances where the applicable state statute would
(if applied) result in a harsher sentence. See infra notes So-51 and accompanying text.
40. For instance, prior to 2004, a first-time offender found in possession of four ounces
(approximately 113 grams) of any controlled substance other than marijuana faced a
mandatory minimum term of fifteen years. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.21, 60.05, 70.0(3)
(McKinney 1995), amended by 2004 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1474 (McKinney). Under federal law,
the highest mandatory minimum penalty for a first-time felony drug offense was (and still
is) ten years. See 21 U.S.C. § 84 1(b)(i)(A) (2012). Then-mandatory federal sentencing
guidelines for such an offense ranged from 27 to 71 months for cocaine and 63 to 150 months
for heroin, depending on the offender's criminal history. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL §5 2D1.l(c)(11), 2D1.(c)(7) & Sentencing Table (2003).
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counterparts for decades.41 Beginning in the 1990s, many states passed "three
strikes" statutes that applied to defendants with substantially less severe
criminal histories than did the federal "three strikes" statute, or even the federal
Armed Career Criminal statute.42 Among them were California and Louisiana,
which mandated life imprisonment upon conviction of, respectively, any third
felony crime43 or certain narcotics-trafficking crimes or "crimes of violence,"
broadly defined to include such offenses as purse-snatching." California's law
41. From 1973 to 1998, Michigan's notorious "65o-lifer law" (the subject of an unsuccessful
Eighth Amendment challenge in Harmelin v. Michigan, so U.S. 957 (1991)) imposed
mandatory lifetime imprisonment without parole for possession of at least 650 grams of
cocaine; from 1998 to 2002, the statute imposed a mandatory term of twenty years, and it
was not until 2003 that Michigan abolished mandatory terms for drug offenses. MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 333.7401 (1997), amended by 1998 Mich. Legis. Serv. 319 (West), amended by
2002 Mich. Legis. Serv. 665 (West). Florida's drug trafficking statute, still in effect,
mandates a sentence of seven years for possession of at least 200 grams of cocaine, fifteen
years for at least 14 grams of heroin or 400 grams of cocaine, twenty-five years for at least 28
grams of heroin, and mandatory life for more than 30 kilograms of heroin or 150 kilograms
of cocaine. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 893.135(l)(b)-(c) (West 2012). First-time offenders and
even some second-time offenders subject to these statutes would face lower mandatory
penalties under federal law. See 21 U.S.C. § 84 1(b)(i) (mandating a sentence of ten years for
trafficking in at least i kilogram of heroin or 5 kilograms of cocaine, five years for at least oo
grams of heroin or 500 grams of cocaine, and no mandatory minimum for lesser quantities);
21 U.S.C. S 851 (giving prosecutors discretion to double applicable mandatory minimum
terms for defendants previously convicted of a felony drug-trafficking crime).
42. The federal "three strikes" statute, 18 U.S.C. S 3559(c), imposes a mandatory sentence of life
imprisonment upon conviction for a "serious violent felony" (defined as any offense
punishable by at least ten years which requires the use, or involves significant risk, of force)
if the defendant has been convicted on separate prior occasions of either two "serious violent
felonies" or one "serious violent felony" and one "serious drug offense" (defined as conduct
punishable under 21 U.S.C. S 84 1(b)(i)(A)). A provision of the Armed Career Criminal Act
(ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), mandates a minimum of fifteen years' imprisonment for
defendants convicted of illegal gun possession who have three prior convictions for certain
drug-trafficking or violent crimes.
43. See CAL. PENAL CODE 5§ 667(e)(2)(A)(ii), 1170.12(c)(2)(A)(ii) (West 1994), amended by
Proposition 36, CAL. SECRETARY ST. (2012), http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2012/general/pdf/text
-proposed-laws-v2.pdf#nameddest=prop36. California's statute required a minimum of at
least 25 years' imprisonment prior to parole-eligibility. California amended its three strikes
statute in 2012 by making it applicable only if (i) the "third strike" conviction is for a
"serious" or "violent" felony or for certain sex, drug, and firearm offenses, or (ii) the
defendant has a prior conviction for rape, murder, or child molestation. See CAL. PENAL
CODE §§ 667(e)(2)(A)(ii), 1170.12(c)(2)(A)(ii) (West 2012).
44. ILA. REV. STAT. ANN. S 15 :5 29.1(A)(3)(b) (West 2013). The "three strikes" provision renders
convicted offenders ineligible for parole or any other form of early release. Louisiana also
has a "four strikes" provision that mandates twenty years' imprisonment upon a fourth
felony conviction for any crime. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 15:S29.1(A)(4).
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was so harsh it was challenged as "cruel and unusual" before the U.S. Supreme
Court, a distinction thus far not accorded to any federal sentencing law with
the exception of the death penalty. 45 And while many states' penalties for gun
crimes are less severe than federal penalties, not all are. Florida, Maryland,
Virginia, and New York are all examples of states whose mandatory minimum
penalties for illegal firearms use or possession exceed those under applicable
federal law.46
The last two decades have also seen a movement in many states away from
indeterminate sentencing schemes, under which offenders could secure a
significantly earlier release date from a parole board. Beginning in the 198os,
and hastened in the mid-199os in significant part by the federal "truth-in-
sentencing" grant program, many states began adopting some form of
determinate sentencing; requirements that prisoners (particularly those
convicted of violent crimes) serve at least 85% of their imposed sentence, a ratio
that substantially mirrors federal sentencing rules;47 or some combination of
both.48
45. The law ultimately withstood the challenge, see Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003), as
did a substantially similar three-strikes statute in Texas that was also challenged on Eighth
Amendment grounds, see Rummell v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980). Federal defendants
routinely (and almost always unsuccessfully) challenge non-death penalty sentences as
"cruel and unusual" in violation of the Eighth Amendment, see, e.g., United States v.
Vaughn, 527 F. App'x 826 (lith Cir. 2013) (upholding mandatory life sentence in federal
drug case as non-violative of Eighth Amendment and noting that "outside the context of
capital punishment, there have been few successful challenges to the proportionality of
sentences" (internal citations omitted)). The Supreme Court has yet to hear such a
challenge.
46. In Florida, since 1999, the possession or discharge of a firearm in connection with a drug-
trafficking offense or certain violent felony offenses results in a consecutive mandatory
minimum sentence of ten or twenty years, respectively- twice the terms applicable for
single violations under the comparable federal law. Compare FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.o87(2) (a)
(West 2012), with 8 U.S.C. 5 924(c). Maryland, New York, and Virginia have all enacted
mandatory minimum terms for possession of a firearm, whereas there is no mandatory
minimum under federal law for the equivalent crime. See MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY, 5-
133(c)(1)-(2) (West 2012) (five-year minimum for defendants with drug-trafficking felony
and/or violent felony convictions); N.Y. PENAL LAw §5 70.02(1)(b), 70.02( 3)(d), 265.03(3)
(2013) (3'2-year mandatory minimum penalty); VA. CODE ANN. §5 18.2-308.2, 18.2-308.4(C)
(2010) (five-year or two-year mandatory minimum penalty for violent and non-violent
felons, respectively).
47. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624 (b) (enabling federal prisoners to receive up to fifty-four days credit per
year of imprisonment for "good time," defined as exemplary compliance with prison
disciplinary rules).
48. By 1999, fourteen states (including Florida, Illinois, Ohio, Arizona, and North Carolina)
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If more favorable federal prosecutorial outcomes were dictated by
prescribed penalties, one would expect to see little federal enforcement of street
crimes in states whose own drug, gun, or violent crime statutes were as least as
harsh as federal statutes.49 But that is not what has happened; federal
prosecutors have prosecuted thousands of cases that would be subject to an
equally or more severe penalty under applicable state law. An examination of
federal prosecutions of crimes covered under each of the above-discussed state
laws50 reveals that federal enforcement efforts are not necessarily the product of
relatively higher prescribed penalties under federal law.5
had abolished any early-release by a parole board, and thirty-four states (including New
York, Pennsylvania, California, Michigan, Missouri, Louisiana, Virginia, and the District of
Columbia) had required some or all prisoners to serve at least eighty-five percent of their
imposed sentence notwithstanding any parole release or other earned adjustments. BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 170032, TRUTH IN SENTENCING IN STATE PRISONS 2-3 (1999).
49. Indeed, that is what some scholars presume. See, e.g., Clymer, supra note i.
50. I use these laws as illustrations. An exhaustive state-by-state comparison of violent crime,
firearms, and narcotics laws, and their penalties relative to comparable federal laws, is well
beyond the scope of this Article, and, as noted, I do not quarrel with the basic premise that
most federal penalties are more severe than their state counterparts. My point, rather, is that
federal cases are brought even in instances where applicable state penalties are equally or
more severe.
s1. According to data from the Federal Judicial Center:
* Between 2001 and 2011, federal prosecutors in Florida charged at least 1,043 defendants
(an average of 95 per year) with a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)-even though Florida
law mandates double the imprisonment time for the same effective conduct. See supra
note 46.
* Between 2ool and 2011, federal prosecutors in Virginia have prosecuted at least 1,572
defendants (an average of 143 per year) with a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), and 1,550
defendants (an average of 141 per year) with a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)-even
though Virginia's penalties for the same conduct are at least as, and in many instances
more, severe. See supra note 46.
* In the five years preceding New York's 2006 gun law amendment, which mandates a
term of three and a half years for illegal firearm possession, there were at least 1,o24
federal cases prosecuted in New York State for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), while in
the five years following the amendment, there were 846 defendants prosecuted for that
crime-a decrease of only 17%, notwithstanding the absence of any mandatory penalty
for the equivalent federal crime. See supra note 46.
According to data from the United States Sentencing Commission:
* Between 1991 and 2008 (the latest year for which offense-specific data is available),
federal prosecutors have charged at least twenty-one California defendants and at least
386 Louisiana defendants under the ACCA (which mandates fifteen years'
imprisonment) even though these defendants would be eligible for mandatory life
imprisonment under their respective states' "three-strikes" statutes.
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* Federal prosecutors have prosecuted at least 2,359 Florida defendants for cocaine offenses
and 2,397 for heroin offenses that would have carried a mandatory minimum sentence of
life imprisonment if prosecuted under state law.
* In 1997 (the earliest year for which drug weight data is available, and the year before
Michigan amended its mandatory life term for offenses involving at least 65o grams of
cocaine), federal prosecutors charged at least 126 defendants with cocaine offenses that
would have carried a minimum sentence of life imprisonment if prosecuted under state
law. Moreover, the changes in Michigan's penalty scheme for cocaine offenses involving
at least 650 grams, see supra note 41, appear to have had little effect on federal
prosecutions of cocaine offenses: in the five years preceding Michigan's 2002 repeal of a
mandatory minimum for cocaine offenses involving at least 65o grams, federal
prosecutors charged 373 defendants with such offenses, while in the five years following
the repeal, they charged 322 defendants with such offenses - a decrease ofjust 14%.
(Datasets for FJC and USSC data are available at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb
/ICPSR/series/oo072, and http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/series/83, subject
to restricted use agreement; data analysis is on file with author.)
A few notes on context and methodology are in order. First, context. Charging patterns
vary widely across districts. The ACCA is a good example of such variation. Some districts
in states less populous than California and Louisiana charge more ACCA cases, while others
in states nearly as populous, or more populous (in the case of Louisiana), charge fewer. For
instance, New York, nearly four times the population of Louisiana and more than half the
population of California, charged just 1o9 ACCA cases between 1991 and 2008. See FJC and
USSC data and analysis on file with author. For state population data, see
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/o6ooo.htnml (California); http://quickfacts.census
.gov/qfd/states/36000.html (New York); and http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states
/22ooo.html (Louisiana). (It should be noted that the Sentencing Commission data files
indicate that there are thousands of federal defendants in California whose status under the
ACCA went unreported, which may result in an understatement of the total number subject
to the ACCA.)
Second, methodology. There are two variables that can change applicable mandatory
minimums for federal gun and drug charges: (i) multiple counts of conviction; and (ii), for
drug offenses, prior felony convictions for certain drug-trafficking offenses can, in some
instances, double the applicable mandatory minimum sentence or even raise it to a
mandatory life sentence. See supra note 41. To mitigate these confounding variables, I did
several things. With respect to the offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (which criminalizes
firearm possession by prohibited persons such as convicted felons), I analyzed only
defendants for whom this was the sole count of conviction. With respect to the offenses
under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (which criminalizes the possession or use of a firearm in
furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime or crime of violence, and so is typically charged with
one or more of those other crimes), I analyzed only defendants for whom 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)
was the count carrying the most severe penalty as calculated by the Federal Judicial Center,
and for whom it was the sole count of conviction for that crime (because multiple
convictions under § 924(c) significantly increase the applicable mandatory minimum under
federal law). With respect to drug offenses, the sentencing commission's data files do not
provide specifics on defendants' prior convictions, making it difficult to ascertain the
mandatory minimum sentence the defendant faced prior to conviction. I therefore rely only
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Are all these cases inadvertent misallocations of federal resources? To the
contrary, they are intentioned and deliberate. Most federal street crime
prosecutions are initiated at the request of local police and district attorney's
offices intimately familiar with applicable state penalties and the sentences
typically imposed in actual cases.52 These cases are part of a sustained
collaboration between federal and local law enforcement to reduce drug-
trafficking and violent crime.s3 And they are predicated on federal and local
prosecutors' belief that the defendant is more likely to be convicted and
sentenced to a substantial incarceration term if prosecuted in federal court-
notwithstanding a higher applicable penalty on the state's codebooks.54
upon charges that would have carried at least as severe a penalty under state law
notwithstanding a defendant's prior drug-trafficking convictions -that is, life
imprisonment. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 84 1(b)(1)(A), 851 (providing a mandatory minimum
sentence of life for a defendant with two prior qualifying drug-trafficking convictions,
subject to prosecutorial discretion). This methodology also avoids the issue of multiple
counts impacting applicable penalties, since the minimum penalty faced under state law in
any event is life. My drug offense methodology led me to focus on these specific Michigan
and Florida statutes, even though there are other state penalty schemes that carry (or
carried) higher penalties for first-time and even some second-time drug-trafficking
offenders. New York's Rockefeller laws, which like the federal narcotics laws contain
recidivist enhancements, are, of course, a notorious example. See supra note 40.
In short, the limitations of these datasets make it impossible to ascertain fully and
accurately the number of federal criminal defendants who would have faced the same or
harsher penalties under state law. And the methodology I employ with respect to the drug
offenses carries its own pitfalls. Namely, it focuses on large-quantity drug offenses that may
constitute interstate or even international drug-trafficking in addition to (or in lieu of)
street-level offenses. Notwithstanding these limitations, though, this data at least
illuminates an under-noticed feature of federal charging decisions in gun and drug offenses:
they are not necessarily motivated by applicable state penalties.
52. See generally ScoTT H. DECKER & JACK McDEvITT, NAT'L INST. JUST., PROJECT SAFE
NEIGHBORHOODS: STRATEGIC INTERVENTIONS, GUN PROSECUTION CASE SCREENING 5-6
(2006) (discussing local prosecutors' role in federal case screening); Lisa L. Miller & James
Eisenstein, The Federal/State Criminal Prosecution Nexus: A Case Study in Cooperation and
Discretion, 30 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 239, 244-47, 253-54 (2005) (discussing local law
enforcement collaboration in federal charging decisions).
s3. See generally SCOTT H. DECKER ET AL., U.S. DEP'T JUST., PROJECT SAFE NEIGHBORHOODS:
STRATEGIC INTERVENTIONS: GUN PROSECUTION CASE SCREENING: CASE STUDY 1 (2oo6)
(discussing intentional efforts to increase federal prosecution of gun crimes across all federal
districts through partnerships with federal and local prosecutors and local and state law
enforcement agencies).
54. Miller & Eisenstein, supra note 52, at 257-58 ("When asked why [the local ADAs] bother
taking those cases [in which applicable state and federal penalties are similar] to federal
court if the defendants are not likely to receive a longer sentence anyway, the ADA replied,
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The second and more fundamental limit to federal/state penalty differences
as a source of outcome disparity is that these differences do not account for the
depth of the disparities that exist. The case synopses offered in the
Introduction illustrate the point. For Shateek Andrews, the Bronx robber, local
grand juries did not even return indictments on the armed robberies of which
he was ultimately convicted in federal court - and for which he would have
faced a penalty of ten to twenty-five years under state law.55 Had John Gassew,
the Philadelphian arrested forty-four times for various gun and violent crimes,
been convicted in local court on even one of those occasions, he would have
faced a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years upon his second conviction;
had he been convicted on just two occasions, he would have faced a mandatory
minimum sentence of twenty-five years upon his third conviction.56 A large
portion of the disparity in applicable penalties is very often a function of
antecedent disparities in the ability to convict.
Penalties, of course, affect the ability to convict: the higher the penalty, the
greater the inducement to reduce it through a negotiated plea bargain.Y But in
'Because they are much more likely to get convicted in the federal system."'). A prime
example of this dynamic occurs in Baltimore, Maryland, where state law mandates a five-
year penalty for gun possession by defendants previously convicted of certain crimes. See
MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY, § 5-133(c) (LexisNexis 2011). Notwithstanding the absence of
any mandatory minimum term for the equivalent federal crime, federal prosecutors
routinely threaten to prosecute defendants who do not plead guilty in state court to the
mandatory five-year penalty-a tactic that has proven quite successful at garnering the
desired state court outcomes. See Press Release, Baltimore EXILE Partners Announce 6o%
Increase in Violent Defendants Charged Federally Since 2005, Feb. 20, 2008, http://www
.justice.gov/usao/md/news/archive/BaltimoreEXILEPartnersAnnounce6olncreaseinViolent
DefendantsChargedFederallySince2005.html.
s. Had Andrews been prosecuted in state court for first degree armed robbery, he would, as a
prior violent felony offender, have faced a sentence of io to 25 years. N.Y. PENAL LAw
§§ 70.04, 70.02 (McKinney 2004 & Supp. 2007).
56. See 42 PA. CONs. STAT. ANN. § 9714(a) (West 2007).
s. "Charge bargaining" is the practice in which prosecutors offer a defendant the chance to
plead guilty to a charge with a lower penalty than might apply under initially filed or as-yet
unfiled charges. Because charge bargaining goes unreported, its frequency is difficult to
ascertain; one qualitative study of federal sentencing guidelines circumvention practices in
ten districts found that circumvention occurred in approximately 20% to 35% of cases
resolved by guilty plea, and that of the various methods of circumventing guidelines and
mandatory penalties, charge bargaining was "the most important." See Stephen J.
Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Plea Negotiations Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines:
Guideline Circumvention and Its Dynamics in the Post-Mistretta Period, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 1284,
1293-94 (1997). Attempts to quantify charge-bargaining from available data kept by the
Sentencing Commission can be misleading because those datasets do not contain
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this dynamic, too, case disposition data reveals a more nuanced story. For one
thing, guilty plea rates do not increase (or decrease) in tandem with applicable
penalties. Homicide offenses have one of the lower guilty plea rates in the
federal system, but carry the highest statutory and Guidelines penalties. 5
Immigration offenses have one of the highest guilty plea rates, yet most do not
carry mandatory minimums or particularly high Guidelines ranges.59 And
information on counts initially filed and dismissed, or on counts promised to be filed absent
a plea. The recent report by Human Rights Watch attempting to quantify a "trial penalty"
for federal defendants charged with narcotics-related offenses suffers from this limitation.
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, AN OFFER YOU CAN'T REFUSE: How US FEDERAL
PROSECUTORS FORCE DRUG DEFENDANTS TO PLEAD GUILTY 102 n.326 (Dec. 2013).
Defendants who go to trial receive on average higher sentences than those who plead guilty,
id. at 102-04, but it is impossible to tell, based on sentencing data alone, whether this is the
result of plea bargaining, reductions for cooperation, the effects of trials on judges'
sentencing decisions, or the fact that defendants facing higher penalties at the outset may
more often chose to take their chances at trial -or a mix of some or all of these causes, and
others. Research on these questions is sorely needed.
58. From 2002 tO 2012, the guilty plea rate for homicide offenses has ranged from a low of
67.0% (in 2004) to a high of 79.0% (in 2012), with a mean of 73.8%. The overall guilty plea
rate in the federal system has ranged from a low of 85.8% (in 2003) to a high of 89.0% (in
2012), with a mean of 87.3%. See Judicial Business Archive, U.S. CTs., http://www.uscourts
.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/archive.aspx (click on each of the desired years (2002-2012),
then click on "Table D-4 Defendants Disposed of, by Type of Disposition and Major
Offense") (last visited Dec. 11, 2013) (providing copies of the annually published report
Judicial Business of the U.S. Courts). "Homicide offenses" cover a number of different federal
statutes, most of which carry mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment, and all of which
carry the highest possible Guidelines ranges and maximum terms of life (or death-
although prosecutors are not permitted to enter into a binding plea agreement with a death-
eligible defendant before the Attorney General has decided whether to seek the death
penalty, see UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL (USAM) S 9-10.110, http://www.justice
.gov/usao/eousa/foia-readingroom/usam/index.html (last updated 2011)). See, e.g., 18
U.S.C. § 924(c), (j) (2012) (mandatory minimum of ten years for discharge of firearm, and
additional punishment if the discharge results in death); id. § 1in (mandatory life
imprisonment for murder in the first degree); 21 U.S.C. 5 848(a)-(b) (mandatory minimum
of twenty years' imprisonment).
59. Over the last eight years, the guilty plea rate for immigration offenses excluding illegal re-
entry has ranged from a low of 92.8% (in 20o8) to a high of 95.4% (in 2010), with a mean of
94.0%. Judicial Business Archive, supra note 58 (click on each of the desired years (2005-
2012), then click on "Table D-4 Defendants Disposed of, by Type of Disposition and Major
Offense"). I exclude illegal reentry because the Sentencing Commission allows a four-level
Guidelines reduction for a speedy guilty plea by those defendants, a unique penalty-based
inducement. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K3.1 (2013); Memorandum from
James M. Cole, Dep. Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Department Policy on Early
Disposition or "Fast-Track" Programs 3 (Jan. 31, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/dag/fast
-track-program.pdf.
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narcotics offenses, which tend to have high mandatory minimums and
Guidelines ranges (and, for defendants with previous felony drug convictions,
a plea-inducing penalty enhancement), have a guilty plea rate that hovers close
to the mean for all offenses so It is difficult to ascribe this distribution to
specific causal factors. 61 But there are correlations, and one that stands out is
ease of proof. Of federal crimes, murder is among the hardest to prove. Federal
murder cases almost invariably require eyewitness testimony, usually depend
upon accomplice testimony (which always carries great risk for the
government), and typically involve witnesses fearful of retaliation.
Immigration offenses, on the other hand, are among the easiest to prove. They
are generally established with evidence of the defendant's presence, identity,
and unlawful immigration status (proven by unassailable records). Federal
narcotics offenses are also relatively easy to prove. They typically involve
wiretaps, undercover drug purchases, or sale-quantity amounts of drugs seized
from the defendant or his residence.' Penalties certainly incentivize plea-
bargaining, but as this breakdown of guilty plea rates suggests, the outcome of
that process is heavily guided by the likelihood of conviction on each potential
count. 1
There is more. The acquittal rate for tried cases, the overall acquittal rate,
and the guilty plea rate have not changed significantly since the Supreme Court
decided United States v. Booker,64 which rendered advisory the previously
mandatory Sentencing Guidelines. To the extent the Sentencing Guidelines'
stiff mandatory sentences, coupled with an essentially assured reduction in
6o. Over the last decade, the guilty plea rate for narcotics offenses has ranged from a low of
86.5% (in 2005) to a high of 89.5% (in 2010), with a mean of 88.3%. Judicial Business
Archive, supra note S8 (click on each of the desired years (2002-2012), then click on "Table
D-4 Defendants Disposed of, by Type of Disposition and Major Offense"). For overall
federal guilty plea rate data, see supra note 58.
61. The data show only terminated charges and do not indicate whether or how those differ
from the charges initially filed. In the event of multiple counts, the data reflect the outcome
of the most severe count upon termination. Non-guilty plea resolutions reflect defendants
who did not enter a guilty plea to any count. See E-mail from Kristin Garry, Admin. Office
of the U.S. Courts, to author (July 24, 2013) (on file with author).
62. See Stuntz, supra note 3, at 2021-25 (arguing that the relative ease of proving narcotics
offenses as compared to violent crime has escalated the "war on drugs").
63. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARv. L. REV. 2463,
2470 (2004) (arguing that of the variety of factors influencing plea-bargaining, "[t]he
strength of the prosecution's case is the most important factor").
64. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
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return for a guilty plea,6 s accounted for the high rate of guilty pleas and low
rate of acquittals in the federal system, one might expect to see the guilty plea
rate drop and the acquittal rate rise following Booker. Yet eight years after
Booker, the federal guilty plea rate has only increased while the acquittal rate
has further decreased. At the same time, non-government sponsored
downward departures and variances from the Guidelines have been granted
ever more frequently, and government-sponsored downward departures and
variances have only slightly increased.66 This inverse trend is even more
pronounced with respect to street crimes.6 7
6s. The Sentencing Guidelines permit up to a three-level reduction in offense level in cases
resolved by guilty plea. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (2013).
66. In 2003, before either Booker or its predecessor, Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004),
which invalidated a mandatory state guidelines regime, had been decided, the guilty plea
rate in the federal system was 85.8% and the acquittal rate was o.87%. LEONIDAS RALPH
MECHAM, 2003 JUDICIAL BUSINESS tbl.D-4 (2003), in Judicial Business Archive, supra note
58, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2003/appendices/d4.pdf
Between 2004 and 2012, the federal guilty plea rate has climbed, from approximately 86% in
2004 to 89% in 2012, and the acquittal rate has steadily deceased, from 0.78% in 2004 to
0.40% in 2012. Judicial Business Archive, supra note 58 (click on each of the desired years
(2004-2012), then click on "Table D-4 Defendants Disposed of, by Type of Disposition and
Major Offense"). Meanwhile, the frequency of below-Guideline variances (i.e., Booker-based
departures and/or below-Guidelines sentences) has steadily increased. In 2006, the year
after Booker, sentencing courts granted non-government sponsored below-Guideline
variances in 8% of cases; by 2012, the rate had jumped to 14.9%. Compare U.S. SENT'G
COMM'N, ANNUAL SOURCEBOOK OF SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.27 (11th ed. 20o6)
[hereinafter 20o6 SOURCEBOOK], http://www.ussc.gov/Research_andStatistics/Annual
-Reports-and Sourcebooks/2006/sbtoco6.htm (tabulating both Booker-based departures
and Booker based variances and reporting government-sponsored downward departures and
variances in 27.6% of cases), with U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, ANNUAL SOURCEBOOK OF
SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.2 7 (17th ed. 2012) [hereinafter 2012 SOURCEBOOK], http://www
.ussc.gov/Research-andStatistics/AnnualReportsandSourcebooks/2012/sbtocl2.htm
(demonstrating that the frequency of government-sponsored downward departures and
variances had increased by just three percentage points from FY 2oo6 to FY 2012).
67. In 2003, the guilty plea and acquittal rates, respectively, for violent offenses were 82.3% and
1.5%; for drug offenses, 87.9% and 0.5%; for firearms offenses, 83.3% and 1.6%. MECHAM,
supra note 66, at app. 214 tbl.D-4. In 2012, the respective guilty plea and acquittal rates for
violent offenses were 84.1% and 0.9%; for drug offenses, 89.5% and 0.3%; and for firearms
offenses, 88.3% and o.8%. THOMAS F. HOGAN, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR:
JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS tbl.D- 4 (2012), in Judicial Business
Archive, supra note 58, http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2ol2/statistical
-tables-us-district-courts-criminal.aspx. Meanwhile, between 2006 and 2012, the percentage
of cases in which courts granted Booker-based below-Guidelines variances or departures
jumped markedly across the board in violent crimes and narcotics cases: in murder cases,
from 2.6% to 14.3%; in robbery cases, from 11.1% to 20%; in narcotics trafficking cases, from
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There is, as well, another story that should give us pause when considering
the relationship between prescribed penalties and outcomes. In 1997, the
Clinton Administration piloted a firearm enforcement program in the Eastern
District of Virginia, "Project Exile," under which the U.S. Attorney adopted
and prosecuted every local firearm case from the city of Richmond. 6 8 While a
debate continues as to that program's effect on homicide and violent crime
rates,6 9 there is no debate as to its efficacy at convicting and punishing those it
prosecuted: in its inaugural year it boasted an 86% conviction rate and an
average sentence of more than four-and-a-half years. 70 Less attention has been
paid to the relative failure of the State of Virginia's version of Project Exile. 7'
On the heels of federal Exile's touted successes, Virginia's legislature passed a
series of firearm statutes that were nearly exact replicas of their federal
statutory counterparts, with the added hammer of mandatory minimum
sentences that closely approximated (and in some respects exceeded) the
federal sentencing guidelines.72 What's more, the Virginia legislature also
reformed its bail statute to create a presumption of pre-trial detention in
firearms cases, a provision absent from the federal bail statute.73 State and
federal grants were awarded to the Virginia localities selected to implement
Exile, each of which assigned a full-time prosecutor dedicated to prosecuting
Exile cases from arrest to sentencing, and each of which developed training
8.1% to 16.8%; and in firearms cases, from 8.9% to 17.2%. Compare 20o6 SOURCEBOOK,
supra note 66, at tbl.27 (tabulating both Booker-based departures and Booker-based
variances), with 2012 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 66, at tbl.27 (same).
68. See Richman, supra note 3, at 370.
6g. Compare Michael Janofsky, Fighting Crime by Making Federal Case About Guns, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. io, 1999, http://www.nytimes.com/1999/o2/1o/us/fighting-crime-by-making-federal
-case-about-guns.html (citing those who credited Project Exile for the 36% decline in
Richmond's homicide rate between 1997 and 1998), with Steven Raphael & Jens Ludwig,
Prison Sentence Enhancements: The Case ofProject Exile, in EVALUATING GUN POLICY: EFFECTS
ON CRIME AND VIOLENCE 251 (Jens Ludwig & Philip J. Cook eds., 2003) (arguing that the
evidence is inadequate to show that Project Exile caused the decline).
70. Janofsky, supra note 69.
71. An exception is Richman, supra note 3, at 407-o8 (noting that this failure tended to diminish
prospects of a politically acceptable exit strategy for the federal program).
72. Sherri Johnson et al., Evaluation of the Virginia Exile Program: Final Report, VA. DEP'T CRIM.
JUST. SERVICES 6 (July 2003), http://www.dcjs.virginia.gov/research/documents/exileFinal
.pdf [hereinafter VIRGINIA ExILE REPORT]; see U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
S 2K2.1 & Sentencing Table (2003).
73. VIRGINIA EXIL REPORT, supra note 72.
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teams and working partnerships with local law enforcement.74 So what
happened when Virginia effectively adopted federal firearms law and dedicated
intense efforts and resources to enforcing it? Virginia state prosecutors could
not replicate the federal conviction or average sentence rates. Indeed, they did
not even come close: of the 404 defendants prosecuted under Virginia Exile
laws in the year after enactment, only 155-just 38%-were convicted of an
Exile offense and received the full mandatory minimum sentence.7 1
If Project Exile amounts to a natural experiment, it is an imperfect one. In
the first year of Federal Exile, federal prosecutors prosecuted all firearms cases
in Richmond susceptible of federal jurisdiction,76 but, in the first year of
Virginia Exile, local prosecutors prosecuted only firearms cases declined by the
U.S. Attorney.77 For this reason, one might counter that Virginia Exile simply
demonstrates another frequently advanced explanation for federal/state
outcome disparities: federal prosecutors' ability to selectively prosecute only
the strongest cases, while leaving local prosecutors with cases more challenging
to prove7' But this doesn't explain the depth of the disparity; even if every
federally adopted case had been prosecuted locally and resulted in a conviction,
the local conviction rate would rise to just 53%.79 Something additional is at
74. None of the six localities selected to implement Virginia Exile expended the full grant award
amounts, indicating resources were not lacking. Id. at 16.
75. Id. at 57.
76. Charles D. Bonner, The Federalization of Crime: Too Much of a Good Thing?, 32 U. RICH. L.
REV. 905, 928-29 (1998); Richman, supra note 3, at 379. The federal jurisdictional bar is
quite low, requiring, under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), proof that the gun was used either in
connection with a federal violent or drug trafficking crime, or, under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g),
proof that the seized gun was manufactured outside the state where the defendant possessed
it. Federal jurisdiction for illegal gun possession is readily had in Virginia, a state without a
major firearms manufacturer. See Annual Firearms Manufacturing and Export Report, BuREAu
OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO & FIREARMS (2011), http://www.atf.gov/files/statistics/download
/afmer/2o11-final-firearms-manufacturing-export-report.pdf (providing state-by-state
listing of firearms manufacturers and firearms produced and showing that, of the over 6.3
million firearms manufactured in the United States in 2011, only 3,770- approximately
o.o6% -were made in Virginia).
77. Of the 527 Exile defendants prosecuted in the program's first year, 123 (23%) were
prosecuted federally. VIRGINIA EXILE REPORT, supra note 72, at 57.
78. Indeed, this was one explanation given by local Virginia prosecutors. See id. at 2. I address
this general theory in Section I.C.
79. See id. at 57. My calculation assumes 123 defendants would be added to the 404 locally
prosecuted, and that each of these 123 would be convicted. The same 53% rate results if the
analysis is performed on cases rather than defendants. See id.
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play in the Exile story-something beyond penalties, resources, and case
selection.
All this is not to say that prescribed penalties do not impact outcomes: of
course they do. In many states and for many crimes, more stringent federal
penalties indeed give federal prosecutors extraordinary leverage, particularly
when accounting for guilty pleas induced via charge bargaining.So But even
when federal penalties do operate in this manner, they do not act in isolation.
Other, less overt forces are at play.
B. The Procedural Rules Explanation
Another frequent explanation for better federal prosecutorial outcomes is
federal procedural rules that tend to advantage prosecutors. Commentators
have pointed out that in recent years many state courts (and, in some instances,
legislatures) have increased defendants' procedural protections above the floor
set by federal constitutional law." Some states, for instance, do not recognize
the "good faith" exception to the warrant requirement.2 Others rely on less
flexible standards in evaluating the reliability of an informant's tip in assessing
probable cause." Still others prohibit convictions based only on certain types of
evidence, most notably uncorroborated accomplice testimony.1 And other
states have stricter requirements for grand juries to indict-for instance,
requiring that grand jury evidence comport with the rules of trial
8o. See Wright, supra note 12, at 153 n.225, 154; supra note 57. This is certainly true in the context
of narcotics defendants with prior felony drug-trafficking convictions, where federal law
permits prosecutors to double applicable penalties at their discretion, offering an enormous
plea-bargaining "chip." See 21 U.S.C. §§ 84 1(b)(1), 851 (2012). Charge bargaining, though,
raises more questions about forum disparities than it answers. What distinguishes federal
prosecutors' charge-bargaining leverage from that of local prosecutors when state law
supplies similar penalties for a given crime? Resources play a role, to be sure, but do not
quite account for the depth of the disparities we see. See supra note 74 and accompanying
text; infra notes 106-113 and accompanying text.
81. E.g., Clymer, supra note 1, at 671-73.
82. See Michael J. Gorman, Survey: State Search and Seizure Analogs, 77 MIss. L.J. 417, 424, 427,
444, 446, 448, 453 (2007) (identifying in this category Connecticut, Georgia, New Jersey,
New Mexico, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania).
83. See id. at 420, 435, 446-47, 457 (identifying Alaska, Massachusetts, New Mexico, New York,
and Tennessee).
84. See Charles Steigler, Offering Monetary Rewards to Public Whistleblowers: A Proposal for
Attacking Corruption at its Source, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 815, 821 n.21 (2012) (identifying
seventeen states with such a ban).
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admissibility." Procedural rules such as these undoubtedly give federal
prosecutors a leg up on their state and local counterparts in certain states. But
in prosecutions of street crime, how much does that leg up really matter?
In practice, probably not a great deal. As an initial matter, the distinctions
between federal and state constitutional criminal procedure are not so stark. In
a number of states, state constitutional search and seizure doctrine has not
diverged at all from federal search and seizure doctrine as set forth by the
federal courts." And even in states where it has, those differences operate
largely at the margins; most of the time, constitutional infirmities in street
crime cases, if present, will exist under both state and federal law.7
More to the point, though, federal prosecution of street crime is rarely a
stand-alone enterprise. Rather, it operates as a complement to what is almost
entirely a state and local law enforcement effort." This has two ramifications
for constitutional criminal procedure. First, because many federal narcotics and
violent crime cases begin in state court, those cases have already arguably
satisfied state procedural law: local prosecutions would not have been initiated
absent a likelihood of prevailing on a suppression motion. Second, even cases
filed in federal court at the outset will have generally relied at least to some
extent on assistance from local law enforcement officers, who must operate
within state constitutional constraints."
8. Jeffries & Gleeson, supra note i, at 111i & n.63 (noting that the use of hearsay testimony
before the grand jury is prohibited in New York, California, Alaska, Nevada, and South
Dakota).
86. This has been the case in California (where, pursuant to a 1982 voter referendum, claims
relating to the exclusion of evidence on grounds of unreasonable search and seizure arising
under state law are measured by the same standard governing such claims under federal
law), Florida, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, Texas,
and West Virginia. See Gorman, supra note 82, at 422 & n.19, 425-26, 431-36, 439, 441, 457-
58, 462.
87. See generally Gorman, supra note 82 (providing an overview of the key differences between
federal and state constitutional criminal procedure across all fifty states). Suppression
motions in criminal cases invariably rest on the credibility of the law enforcement officers
whose actions are the subject of constitutional challenge. In this respect, there may be
differences in how such credibility questions are resolved between state and federal forums
(and as between federal and local law enforcement agents, see infra Section III.A). But that is
to be distinguished from forum-based differences in procedural rules and doctrine.
88. See Daniel C. Richman, Judging Untried Cases, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 219, 222 (2007).
8g. This is not to say that local law enforcement always abides by state and federal
constitutional requirements, but rather that, among those cases in which prosecutors have
elected to file charges, the vast majority are not saddled with constitutional infirmities under
either state or federal law. See infra Section I.C.
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It is difficult to overstate this second point. Enforcement of street crime,
even at the federal level, requires local policing knowledge and expertise. 90
Even the DEA and ATF, which investigate almost exclusively narcotics and gun
cases, have relatively little pre-investigation knowledge of neighborhood
intricacies and interpersonal relationships among an investigation's subjects. A
DEA agent might identify a particular target as a member of a violent drug
gang, but the officers in the local precinct already know that target, potentially
very well. They may have arrested the target or his accomplices on prior
occasions; they probably know what bars or clubs the target and his gang
frequent; or they might already have an informant who can "make buys"
(purchase narcotics in an undercover capacity) from the target or his gang.
Such intimate knowledge is critical in federal street crime prosecutions.
The practical upshot of this dynamic is that narcotics and violent crime
investigations do not happen without local law enforcement involvement. 9'
And, because local law enforcement can never be sure in the end whether the
case will "go federal," they must operate under state procedural requirements.
That means that if, for instance, state law requires a warrant when federal law
does not, the local police will often err on the side of getting a warrant. This is
not always the case; sometimes, it is clear from the outset that the federal
government intends to devote its resources to the case and will prosecute no
matter what. But given the absence of advance knowledge as to what an
investigation will ultimately uncover, it is generally difficult to make that
prediction.9 2 More often than one might think, federal investigations do not
go. See Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and Enforcement
Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REv. 757, 786 (1999) ("As federal interest moves down to more
episodic criminal activity, like street crimes, agencies become more dependent on local police
departments, the only entities whose tentacles reach every street corner.").
g9. For this reason, many such cases are investigated by task forces composed of federal, local,
and sometimes state officials. Examples include the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement
Task Forces; the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas Program; and REDRUM (murder
spelled backwards). See Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces, U.S. DEP'T JUST.,
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/taskforces/ocdetf.html (last visited Dec. 11, 2013); High
Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) Program, WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse
.gov/ondcp/high-intensity-drug-trafficking-areas-program (last visited Dec. 11, 2013);
Report of the Drug Enforcement Administration: 199o-1994, U.S. DEP'T JUST. 82, http://www
.justice.gov/dea/about/history/1990-1994.pdf (last visited Dec. Ii, 2013).
92. Although the expansion of federal criminal law has effectively made federal prosecution of
most any narcotics or violent crime possible, in practice there is a divide between "federal"
and "local" matters. See Richman, supra note i, at 82-83; see also Principles of Federal
Prosecution, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-27.240 (Aug. 2002), http://www
.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foiareading_room/usam/title9/27mcrm.htm (describing, in broad
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ultimately result in federal prosecutions.93 And even when a federal
investigation does result in federal prosecution, it is not always the case that
every subject ensnared will be prosecuted federally; some will be prosecuted in
state court, where state rules of procedure will govern.
And what of the evidentiary limitations imposed by some states, such as
prohibitions on the use of uncorroborated accomplice testimony94 or stricter
evidentiary requirements in the grand jury? These rules may go a good deal of
the way toward explaining why federal prosecutors are able to bring cases that
state and local prosecutors cannot, but they don't fully explain why federal
prosecutors win those cases. More liberal evidentiary licenses are a double-
edged sword when it comes to proving a case before a trial jury. Such rules may
permit indictments or convictions based on less evidence, but the prosecutor's
burden of proof to the jury remains. Federal prosecutors, of course, know this;
it is why they do not hew to the bare minimum of evidentiary requirements. In
terms, those factors federal prosecutors should consider in deciding whether to charge a case
or decline in favor of another prosecuting authority). Absent extenuating circumstances,
federal prosecutors tend to decline drug-trafficking cases that involve lower quantities of
drugs. See Klein & Grobey, supra note 13, at 49; Michael Edmund O'Neill, Understanding
Federal Prosecutorial Declinations: An Empirical Analysis of Predictive Factors, 41 AM. CRIM. L.
REv. 1439, 1456 (2004). As a result, a fair number of cases begun as federal investigations
end up in state court.
g3. See EXEC. OFFICE FOR U.S. ATT'YS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEYS' ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 2012, at 36-37 tbl.3, 85 tbl.i4 (2012),
http://www.justice.gov/usao/reading_room/reports/asr20l2/12statrpt.pdf (reporting that,
in FY 2012, 715 narcotics cases and 1,641 violent crime cases were declined by federal
authorities in favor of prosecution by another authority or on another charge or for lack of
federal interest, and 13,942 narcotics cases and 1,890 violent crime cases were filed in
federal court that year). While some of these declined cases may have been investigated by
state or local rather than federal authorities, the increasing prevalence of joint task forces in
violent crimes and narcotics-trafficking cases has made jurisdictional boundaries in street
crime investigations more fluid. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
94. To say that a state bars conviction based solely on accomplice testimony is, in any event, not
as stringent an evidentiary limitation as it might seem. In New York, for instance, the courts
have expressly rejected the notion that the accomplice testimony rule requires independent
evidence of guilt. People v. Reome, 933 N.E.2d 186, 188 (N.Y. 2010) ("The corroborative
evidence need not show the commission of the crime; it need not show that defendant was
connected with the commission of the crime. It is enough if it tends to connect the
defendant with the commission of the crime in such a way as may reasonably satisfy the jury
that the accomplice is telling the truth." (quoting People v. Dixon, 131 N.E. 752, 754 (N.Y.
1921))). In the Reome case, the court upheld a defendant's rape conviction based on a single
accomplice identification corroborated by the victim's description of the events,
notwithstanding the fact that the victim did not identify the defendant and DNA evidence
matched the three accomplices but not the defendant. Id.
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the vast majority of street-crime prosecutions, federal prosecutors, like their
state counterparts, will hesitate to proceed absent corroboration (and, ideally,
substantial corroboration) of accomplice witnesses through other evidence. 95
And when they cannot do so, the question remains: what explains federal
prosecutorial successes even in the face of relatively flimsy proof?
Professor John Jeffries and Judge John Gleeson touched on this issue when,
in explaining how federal prosecutors obtain convictions in organized crime
cases based on accomplice testimony, they observed that "one of the most
dramatic advantages of the federal system" is that, by insulating accomplice
witnesses from the other evidence in the case, "an accomplice-based case can be
made to hinge not on the credibility of the inherently unreliable accomplices,
but on the jury's assessment of the integrity of the prosecutors. Federal
prosecutors usually win such cases."96 The question that has yet to be
answered is: why?
C. The Selectivity and Resources Explanations
Two other leading explanations for the disparities between federal and
local street crime prosecution outcomes are interrelated. The first is that, unlike
state and local prosecutors who bear ultimate accountability for criminal
prosecutions, federal prosecutors have the luxury of choosing which cases they
bring. 97 The second, a corollary of the first, is that federal prosecutors have a
lower caseload and therefore substantially greater time and resources to devote
to their cases than local prosecutors.98 In short, a great deal of federal
prosecutorial success can be attributed to the political economy of prosecution
in our federalist system.
95. See U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN
THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 117 (2011); Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating
Defendants: The Costs and Benefits of Purchasing Information from Scoundrels, 8 FED. SENT'G
REP. 292, 293 (1996).
96. Jeffries & Gleeson, supra note ii, at io5-o6 ("No matter how well accomplices have been
quarantined [from the other witnesses and evidence], there is always a link among them-
the prosecution team. Defense attorneys frequently are forced to argue, explicitly or
implicitly, that the accomplice witnesses have told a conveniently consistent story because
the government put them up to it."). And on the battleground of integrity, the authors
argue, federal prosecutors have the upper hand. Id.
97. See sources cited supra note 13.
g8. See sources cited supra note 12.
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These points have strong intuitive appeal. Being able to cherry-pick one's
cases, and having fewer cases and more resources to spend on them, seems a
recipe for prosecutorial success 99 -and, to a large degree, it is. However, in
assessing these federal advantages, we must also consider to what extent state
and local prosecutors lack them.
Start with case selection. It is true that state attorneys general and county
district attorneys are directly accountable to their electorate in a way that
appointed U.S. Attorneys are not. It is also true that state and local prosecutors
(particularly local prosecutors) are responsible for prosecuting all readily
provable crimes committed within their jurisdiction. Yet notwithstanding these
pressures, local prosecutors frequently decline cases. 00 Political accountability
imposes pressure to bring cases,' but it also imposes pressure to win them."0 2
How these competing forces impact local district attorneys' dismissal patterns,
and how those patterns compare to evidentiary-based federal declinations,10 3
gg. For a detailed examination of how and why inadequate resources in many urban district
attorneys' offices severely damage prosecutorial effectiveness, see Adam M. Gershowitz &
Laura R. Killinger, The State (Never) Rests: How Excessive Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm
Criminal Defendants, 1o5 Nw. U. L. REv. 261, 279-97 (2011).
io0. See BARBARA BOLAND & ELIZABETH BRADY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, THE PROSECUTION OF FELONY ARRESTS, 1980, at 1 (1985), https://www.ncjrs.gov
/pdffilesl/bjs/ 9 7684.pdf (finding in a study of28 urban county courts that "[a]pproximately
50% of all felony arrests the police make do not lead to a conviction but are rejected by the
prosecutor before court charges are filed or are later dismissed in court"); KATHLEEN B.
BRosI, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMIN., A CROSS-CITY
COMPARISON OF FELONY CASE PROCESSING 7 fig.2 (1979) (finding pre-filing declination rates
in five major urban jurisdictions ranging between 18% and 48%); MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE
PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 127-29
(1979); MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS, JUDGES,
AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 100 (1978), The sources cited here are all regrettably dated,
highlighting the need for renewed attention to local police-prosecutor relations.
101. See Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone's Revenge: An Essay on the Political
Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 1o5 COLUM. L. REv. 583, 6oo (2oo5) (noting the political
pressures on local prosecutors to prosecute the crimes most visible to voters: violent
felonies, major thefts, and hard drugs).
102. See, e.g., Gordon Van Kessel, Adversary Excesses in the American Criminal Trial, 67 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 403, 442 n.164 (1992) ("Elected state prosecutors often face bitter contests in
which their win-loss record becomes a campaign issue.").
103. Federal prosecutors decline cases for a variety of reasons, which frequently include lack of
evidence, absence of criminal intent, request by the investigating agency, prosecution by
another authority or for another crime, insufficient federal interest, and lack of federal
jurisdiction. See EXEC. OFFICE FOR U.S. ATT'YS, supra note 93, at 85 tbl.14. Notably,
2265
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
are complex questions worthy of further study. But we should not presume
federal prosecutors are always more willing and able than their local
counterparts to decline weak cases.
Moreover, given the nature of gang and drug-related street crime, in which
victims of one crime are often also perpetrators of another, it is not necessarily
the case that political accountability breeds aggressive enforcement. Indeed, the
contrary may be true. It is no accident that much of the federal street-crimes
docket consists of crimes against other criminals -robberies of drug dealers,
murders of rival gang members, and the like. It is not merely the jurisdictional
hook that lures the feds, who could easily fill their Hobbs Act docket with far
more sympathetic victims of, for instance, convenience store robberies.o 4 It is
the absence of political pressure on local district attorneys to bring cases
involving unsympathetic (and usually disenfranchised) victims. These cases are
often the most challenging to bring, and to win.
This raises another point. We should not presume that in selecting cases,
federal prosecutors' interest in winning convictions outweighs other interests.
To the contrary, the history of federal criminal enforcement is peppered with
hard-fought, high-profile cases that have generated both wins and losses.
Federal prosecutors certainly "cherry pick" their cases -but often, the cherries
are not the quick or easy cases.105
prosecution by another authority is a distinct reason given for declination; weak cases are
declined because they are weak, not because they will be prosecuted by local authorities.
104. Most federal robberies (apart from bank robberies) are prosecuted under the Hobbs Act, 18
U.S.C. § 1951 (2012), enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause, which prohibits
obstruction of interstate commerce by robbery. As a practical matter, this limits federal
robbery prosecutions to those involving commercial establishments and illegal narcotics or
narcotics proceeds.
is. Others have commented upon the variety of incentives influencing federal prosecutorial case
selection, and the tendency of federal prosecutors to choose more challenging cases. See, e.g.,
Edward L. Glaeser et al., What Do Prosecutors Maximize? An Analysis of the Federalization of
Drug Crimes, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 259, 273 (2000) (noting that, compared to drug
defendants in state courts, federal drug defendants tend to be a "wealthier, more prestigious
set of criminals, who are more likely to have private lawyers"); Daniel C. Richman, Old
Chief v. United States: Stipulating Away Prosecutorial Accountability?, 83 VA. L. REV. 939,
966-67 (1997) ("The motivations of those attracted to a job for which the remuneration can
be comparatively low, in a legal market where the opportunities to shirk abound, will be far
more complex (than just conviction-maximization]. Much work remains to be done in
exploring the personal ideologies of prosecutors, the influence of long-term economic self-
interest, and the psychological aspects of prosecutors' self-selection."); William J. Stuntz,
Self-Defeating Crimes, 86 VA. L. REv. 1871, 1884-85 (2000) (arguing that federal prosecutors
tend to seek out marginal cases because a prosecutor's value in the private market is
enhanced by trial experience).
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Whatever can be said of federal prosecutors' selection criteria, though, the
fact remains that federal prosecutors have substantially fewer cases to prosecute
than their local counterparts.,o6 This translates into more per-case resources in
the form of time, manpower, and money. The claim that federal prosecutors'
resources contribute to their success is unassailable. But how far can it take us?
Resources are critical; prosecutors cannot bring cases without them.
Moreover, in a system that depends almost entirely on pretrial resolutions for
its effective functioning, resources help define the "going rate" for the
punishment of offenses. The greater the pressure prosecutors face to dispose of
cases without the expense and time of a trial, the weaker their leverage in plea
negotiations. Because much of a federal prosecutor's docket is discretionary,1o7
particularly in the street crime context, she can afford to take to trial those
defendants who will not agree to an appropriate (in the prosecutor's view) plea
bargain. This willingness and ability in turn reduces the discount rate offered
for a guilty plea, at least relative to offers that might be extended by her local,
overburdened counterparts.
Yet this is only part of the story. Willingness to proceed to trial means very
little without the proven ability to secure a guilty verdict. Resources
undoubtedly help in that regard, but it is worth asking how and why this is so.
Federal prosecutors do not have unlimited time and money (particularly in
low-profile street crime cases) to pursue every evidentiary lead and every
possible target, to make unlimited undercover drug buys, or to wiretap every
phone for which they could seek court approval. They, too, must make choices.
And, almost uniformly, federal prosecutors choose to devote their resources to
preparing cases for trial. Federal prosecutors and agents scrupulously track
down and prepare witnesses (including law enforcement witnesses, who
sometimes require substantial preparation), and devote time and funds to
securing witnesses' safety. These choices matter not merely because they
improve trial outcomes in individual cases, but also because they leave a lasting
impact on participants' (and ultimately the community's) perceptions of
federal law enforcement-perceptions that reap benefits in future cases.os
It is worth thinking, as well, about those high-profile cases in which the
federal government has expended seemingly limitless resources, and lost. John
1o6. See Klein & Grobey, supra note 13, at 7; Richman, supra note 3, at 397.
107. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
108. I explore these dynamics further infra Part III.
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Edwards,o 9 Roger Clemens,o and the "African sting" prosecution under the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act"' are all recent examples of cases in which
resources could not overcome the challenge of prosecuting conduct on the
margins of what the public deems imprisonment-worthy.1 1 2 These sorts of
cases present evidentiary burdens quite different from street crimes, but the
lesson translates: even abundant resources cannot cure a deficit of trust in the
government's case." 3
The foregoing discussion is not meant to discredit conventional
explanations for forum disparities but, rather, to expose the complexities
within them. Each explanation, and all of them together, takes us quite far in
understanding criminal forum disparities. But there are other factors we must
explore too. The balance of this Article starts that project.
II. LEGITIMACY AND CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT
The concept of "legitimacy" in governance, and in criminal enforcement in
particular, has received sustained and deep engagement over the last several
decades by social psychologists, criminologists, and legal theorists. As a result,
there is now a rich body of theoretical and empirical literature that helps us to
understand what factors influence perceptions of legitimacy in law
enforcement.
The work of Tom Tyler and others demonstrates that people comply with
the law in large part out of a sense of obligation to the authorities enforcing the
iog. Charlie Savage, Another High-Profile Failure for a Justice Dept. Watchdog, N.Y. TIMES,
May 31, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2o12/o6/ol/us/edwards-case-a-blow-to-justice-dept
-corruption-unit.html.
11o. Juliet Macur, Clemens Found Not Guilty of Lying About Drug Use, N.Y. TiMEs, June
18, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2oi2/o6/19/sports/baseball/roger-clemens-is-found-not
-guilty-in-perjury-trial.htmnl.
iii. Leslie Wayne, Bribery Case Falls Apart, and Tactics Are Doubted, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 23,
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2o2/o2/24/business/fbi-bribery-case-falls-apart-and-raises
-questions.html.
112. For an expanded discussion of this dynamic, see Stuntz, supra note io.
113. Commentators have attributed the African Sting fiasco in particular to an erosion of juror
trust, compounded by embarrassing text messages sent by FBI agents to the government's
informant, which "savage[d] the credibility and professionalism of [the] agents." Del
Quentin Wilber, Racy, Vulgar Texts Hurt Justice Department's Largest Sting Operation
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law ("legitimacy"), as well as because the law comports with their own
personal conceptions of right and wrong ("personal morality")*114 In studies
that have compared the influence on compliance of various attitudinal and
background factors, legitimacy and personal morality proved to be among the
most significant.n5 By contrast, the threat of sanction was among the least
influential factors."' The relative unimportance of instrumental motivations
might explain why people continue to commit crimes despite the threat of
harsh punitive sanctions.'17
These two aspects of compliance -"legitimacy" and "personal morality" -
have spawned two largely separate bodies of literature."' The former asks what
factors influence people's support for and obligation to the governing
authorities, while the latter asks which crimes, theories of liability, theories of
defense, and penalties most comport with public conceptions of right and
wrong. Research has shown that people's perceptions of an authority's
legitimacy are influenced most by their perceptions of the fairness of the
114. See TYLER, supra note 4; TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. Huo, TRUST IN THE LAw: ENCOURAGING
PUBuc COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS (2002); Tom R. Tyler, Procedural
Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule ofLaw, 30 CRIME & JUST. 283 (2003). The perceived
obligation to obey the law reflects a belief that the authority is entitled to regulate behavior,
and it is therefore a component of an authority's legitimacy. TYLER & HUo, supra, at 101-03.
11s. In his seminal study of 1,575 adults in Chicago, Tyler assessed the independent impact on
compliance of people's perceptions of eleven different factors: obligation to obey the law
and allegiance to or support for the relevant authority (legitimacy); likelihood of getting
caught (deterrence); judgments of their peer group (peer disapproval); personal belief in
the morality of the law in question (personal morality); evaluation of the quality of
performance by the authority (evaluation); and background factors: gender, race, age,
income, education, and political leanings. The results revealed that personal morality had
the strongest impact on compliance, followed by gender, age, income, and then legitimacy.
Peer disapproval had a moderately significant influence, and least influential were political
leanings, deterrence, race, and evaluation. TYLER, supra note 4, at 59.
116. Comparing legitimacy to deterrence, Tyler found legitimacy five times more likely than
deterrence to influence compliance. Id.
117. I say "might" because the efficacy of deterrence depends in large part on the likelihood
people ascribe to getting caught. If punishment is harsh but highly uncertain, it is unlikely
to deter. Certain punishment, regardless of its severity, will probably have a much greater
impact on behavior-albeit substantially less of an impact than non-instrumental factors
such as legitimacy. See TYLER, supra note 4, at 59-60; Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley,
The Utility ofDesert, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 453, 458-64 (1997).
11s. For discussions of the two theories in tandem, see Bowers & Robinson, supra note 18; and
Tom R. Tyler & John M. Darley, Building a Law-Abiding Society: Taking Public Views About
Morality and the Legitimacy of Legal Authorities into Account When Formulating Substantive
Law, 28 HOFSTRA L. REv. 707 (2000).
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process and procedures by which it enforces the law."9 This theory of
compliance has thus come to be known as "procedural legitimacy." The extent
to which substantive law aligns with personal morality has been described
alternatively as "moral credibility," "moral alignment," or "empirical desert."120
Both theories concern the ability of governing authorities to harness voluntary
compliance, cooperation, and deference, as opposed to coercing it through
threat of sanction.
A. Procedural Legitimacy
What factors influence perceptions that an authority is legitimate?
Substantial qualitative research suggests that, in interactions with the courts
and police, people place greater value on the process of their interaction with
criminal justice authorities and the motives of those authorities than on
whether the outcome of the interaction is ultimately fair or favorable to
them."' These two factors-termed "procedural justice" and "motive-based
trust"-have been shown to significantly shape citizens' perceptions of the
119. See Tyler, supra note 114, at 292-97 (collecting studies).
120. See Bowers & Robinson, supra note 18; Tom R. Tyler & Jonathan Jackson, Popular
Legitimacy and the Exercise of Legal Authority: Motivating Compliance, Cooperation and
Engagement (Yale Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 477, 2013), http://ssm.com/abstract
=2292517.
121. JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 67-
96, 102-16 (1975) (finding that in laboratory studies of simulated trials, litigants were more
accepting of verdicts from adversary trials than inquisitorial trials, the former of which they
viewed as a fairer procedure, independent of the favorableness of the verdict); TYLER, supra
note 4, at 104-08 (finding, in a study of 1,575 diverse adults in Chicago, that respondents
assessed the legitimacy of police and courts primarily on the basis of the fairness of the
procedures used, rather than the outcome obtained); TYLER & Huo, supra note 114, at 30, 53-
90 (finding, in a study of 1,656 diverse adults in Oakland and Los Angeles who had had
recent personal experiences with the police and/or local courts, that respondents were more
willing to defer to authorities they believed had treated them fairly and whom they trusted
as having fair motives).
Social psychologists call the former a "relational" view ofjustice, because it concerns the
relationship between the individual and the authority, and the latter an "instrumental" view
ofjustice. TYLER, supra note 4, at 276. The substantial research in this area does not discount
entirely instrumental influences; it comes as no surprise that people are more accepting of
favorable decisions, and are more inclined to believe favorable decisions to be a result of fair
process. TYLER & HuO, supra note 114, at 55-56, 84. Rather, the research demonstrates that
when assessed independently, process is the dominant factor shaping people's attitudes and
behavior toward authorities. Id. at 53-56, 84.
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legitimacy of legal authorities.'m Procedural justice and motive-based trust
influence people's overall views of the legitimacy of criminal justice authorities
(courts and police), as well as their willingness to defer to and cooperate with
those authorities in a particular case.12 3
What personal traits influence perceptions of legitimacy? Age, race or
ethnicity, gender, education, income, and political affiliation, among other
things, each have an impact; yet when isolated, the influence of each of these
background characteristics is relatively minor.1" Research further suggests that
across racial and ethnic groups, procedural justice, rather than outcomes, is the
key predictor of perceived legitimacy;'2 s lower perceptions of legitimacy among
minorities can be traced to feelings of unfair treatment rather than outcomes.22
In addition, personal identification with the group or entity through which
authority is exercised ("superordinate identification") has been shown to have
significant impact on evaluations of authority and perceptions of legitimacy.'2
Procedural legitimacy has tremendous promise for governance in general
and criminal justice in particular because it enables governance based on the
public's trust. A legitimate authority has the diffuse support of those whose
behavior it regulates, a construct often described as a "reservoir" of trust or
goodwill.128 Such diffuse support, in turn, allows the authority to impose and
effectuate unfavorable outcomes on those adjudged guilty of wrongdoing.
Diffuse support also gives the authority discretionary latitude to regulate
within a range of behavior, even when the regulation is at odds with the moral
beliefs of some (or even many) members of the community.2 9 Procedural
i2z. TYLER& HUO, supra note 114, at 54-96.
123. Id. at 177-97 (finding, based on four separate studies, that people's evaluations of the quality
of local police and courts were influenced most by perceptions of whether those authorities
treated community residents fairly and with dignity, and cared about residents' concerns).
124. Jason Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Shaping
Public Support for Policing, 37 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 513, 532-34 (2003); Tyler & Jackson, supra
note 120.
u5. Sunshine & Tyler, supra note 124, at 532.
126. TYLER & Huo, supra note 114, at 162; Sunshine & Tyler, supra note 124, at 522-23.
127. See TYLER & Huo, supra note 114, at 115-22; Yuen J. Huo et al., Superordinate Identification,
Subgroup Identification, and Justice Concerns: Is Separatism the Problem; Is Assimilation the
Answer?, 7 PSYCH. SCL 40 (1996). Thus, for instance, identification with one's city or
country has been shown to influence perceptions of legitimacy.
128. TYLER, supra note 4, at 26, 29.
129. Id. at 25-26, 279-80.
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legitimacy is thus particularly important in a pluralistic society with diverse
moral beliefs.
Legitimacy is self-reinforcing, as is its absence. Research has shown that
preexisting conceptions of an authority's legitimacy influence compliance,
deference, and cooperation, which in turn enhance the authority's ability to
govern fairly, further reinforcing its legitimacy.'3o By contrast, preexisting
perceptions of illegitimacy result in noncompliance and refusal to cooperate
and defer, breeding more crime and hindering the criminal justice system's
ability to enforce the law -often resulting in resort to force or other methods
that further erode legitimacy.*' Legitimacy is self-reinforcing in another sense
too: people who perceive the criminal justice system as legitimate are more
likely to be influenced by process concerns than instrumental concerns in their
interactions with the justice system.' Put differently, legitimacy moves people
to value process over outcome, while illegitimacy moves people to value
outcome over process. In a system in which unfavorable outcomes are
inevitable, illegitimacy thus creates "a spiral of increasing conflict and
decreasing legitimacy."
B. Moral Credibility
Empirical research indicates that people are more likely to comply with
laws with which they agree'34 and more willing to defer to and assist
authorities they view as enforcing just laws.'35 Substantive law that does not
13o. TYLER & Huo, supra note 114, at 126; Tyler, supra note 114, at 287.
131. TYLER& HUo, supra note 114, at 131.
132. Id. at 126-28.
133. Id. at 131.
134. TYLER, supra note 4, at 37 (citing five separate studies); Bowers & Robinson, supra note 18,
at 258-63. But see Christopher Slobogin & Laura Brinkley-Rubinstein, Putting Desert in Its
Place, 65 STAN. L. REV. 77, 101-03 (2013) (presenting empirical data indicating that personal
agreement with criminal laws does not substantially influence compliance).
135. See Bowers & Robinson, supra note 18, at 256-63 (collecting studies). Tyler's work, however,
indicates that while people's individual compliance with the law is highly influenced by the
extent to which they agree with the law on a moral level (sometimes referred to as "personal
morality"), people's perceptions of legitimacy-i.e., their support for authorities and sense
of obligation to obey them -and their willingness to defer to authority are not significantly
influenced by distributive fairness. See TYLER, supra note 4, at 97, 103; TYLER & Huo, supra
note 114, at 54-56; see also Tyler, supra note 114, at 292 (noting that although "distributive
justice judgments have a role in shaping people's reactions to their encounters with legal
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reflect the community's norms is ultimately unsustainable because effective law
enforcement depends on the cooperation and respect of those within its ambit
(witnesses, victims, jurors, judges, prosecutors, and defendants).*
Moral credibility's limitations are obvious. What if the moral convictions of
a society's members are dissonant? 37 What if social norms depart from
philosophical and ethical conceptions of justice?'>" For moral legitimists, these
limitations arise from the law's own inability to shift community norms. While
the criminal law "sometimes nurtures the norm[s]" through prosecution and
enforcement, " [t] he criminal law is not an independent player in that process,"
but merely "a contributing mechanism." 3 9 Accordingly, for a society to
function effectively, it must derive both moral and procedural legitimacy. That
is, it must strive to enact laws with which the public largely agrees and, in the
absence of societal agreement, it must be able to draw on the public's support
for its institutions as the final arbiters of what the law should be. 40
authorities . . . procedural justice judgments consistently are found to have the major
influence").
136. See Bowers & Robinson, supra note 18, at 217 ("To the extent that people see the system as in
conflict with their judgments of justice, that acquiescence and cooperation is likely to fade
and be replaced with resistance and subversion.... Witnesses may lose an incentive to offer
their information or testimony. Citizens may fail to report crimes in the first instance. Jurors
may disregard their jury instructions. Police officers, prosecutors, and judges may make up
their own rules. And offenders may resist adjudication processes and punishments rather
than participate in them.").
137. Paul Robinson and John Darley give as an example the breakdown wrought by dissonant
moral beliefs on abortion. See Robinson & Darley, supra note 117, at 482-83 (describing a
trajectory from peaceful protest to unlawful killing of doctors providing abortion services);
see also Tracey L. Meares, Norms, Legitimacy and Law Enforcement, 79 OR. L. REv. 391, 399-
400 (2000) ("[L]egitimacy is a more stable basis for voluntary compliance than is personal
morality," because "[w]hile greater legitimacy translates into more compliance whether or
not compliance is in the personal interest of an individual, one's personal moral schedule
may or may not be in line with authoritative dictates.").
138. See Bowers & Robinson, supra note 18, at 216 ("[P]eople's shared intuitions of justice are not
justice, in a transcendent sense. People's shared intuitions can be wrong.").
139. Robinson & Darley, supra note 117, at 473.
140. See Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the Empowerment ofDiscretionary Legal
Authority: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 43 DuKE L.J. 703, 712 (1994)
(discussing how, because of its legitimacy as an institutional authority, the Supreme Court
has been able to legitimate abortion policies that lack moral support from a large portion of
the American public).
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C. Legitimacy and Criminal Adjudication
In the context of criminal investigation and adjudication, work on
procedural legitimacy has primarily focused on how the criminal process affects
perceptions of legitimacy.14' In fact, though, criminal adjudication has a dual
function: it both affects and reflects legitimacy.
Begin with the criminal jury. Empirically assessing the factors motivating
jurors' decisionmaking is exceedingly difficult; defendants' due process rights
limit the means and methods by which researchers can investigate jurors' pre-
trial attitudes and predilections, 42 jurors themselves may be unaware of the
factors influencing their reasoning, 4 and the interaction of both known and
unknown variables obscures attempts to isolate and control for them.'"4
Nevertheless, the empirical work on juries, for all its limitations, tends to
support what criminal practitioners intuit: jurors' assessment of the evidence,
and predisposition to the prosecution, is guided in part by their perceptions of
the legitimacy of the pertinent laws and legal authorities. On the whole, jurors
who report trust and confidence in the police are more likely to be predisposed
to the prosecution in a local criminal case. 45 So, too, are jurors who believe the
applicable laws, and the consequences of conviction, to be fair.46
141. See generally Bowers & Robinson, supra note 18, at 237-40 & an.113-27 (summarizing studies
of the public's and defendants' views of various adjudicatory procedures, including plea
bargaining, as well as views on courts more generally).
142. See Amy Farrell, Liana Pennington & Shea Cronin, Juror Perceptions of the Legitimacy ofLegal
Authorities and Decision Making in Criminal Cases, 38 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 773, 794 (2013)
(noting that in studies of real juries, defendants' rights prevent researchers from posing pre-
trial questions to jurors, thus obscuring the extent to which jurors post-trial responses were
influenced by the trial itself).
143. Paula Hannaford-Agor & Valerie P. Hans, Nullification at Work? A Glimpse from the National
Centerfor States Courts Study offuries, 78 CHI-KENT L. REV. 1249, 1264 (2003) ("Indeed, some
psychologists would argue that it is unlikely that the majority of jurors would be able to say
with any certainty which specific factors led them to their decision." (citing R.E. NISBETT &
L. Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF HUMAN JUDGMENT
(1980))).
144. See, e.g., John R. Hepburn, The Objective Reality ofEvidence and the Utility of Systematic Jury
Selection, 4 LAw & HUMAN BEHAV. 89, 90 (1980) (discussing the difficulties of accounting
for and isolating variables injury research).
145. See Farrell, Pennington & Cronin, supra note 142, at 779, 783 (2013) (analyzing post-trial
questionnaire responses from nearly 2,000 jurors who had collectively served on 210
separate non-capital felony cases in four different urban jurisdictions -Washington, D.C.;
the Bronx, New York; Los Angeles County, California; and Maricopa County, Arizona - and
finding that, holding certain other juror characteristics and case-specific variables constant,
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The criminal jury, though, is only the beginning of legitimacy's measure.
As others have pointed out, the adjudication of criminal cases serves an
expressive function.47 It tells us what conduct is actually prohibited, and what
the probability of a juror favoring the prosecution prior to deliberations is 75% for jurors
reporting high trust and confidence in police, and 47% for jurors reporting no trust and
confidence in the police); Stephen P. Garvey, Paula Hannaford-Agor, Valerie P. Hans,
Nicole L. Mott & G. Thomas Munsterman,juror First Votes in Criminal Trials, 1 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUDIES 371, 396-97 (2004) (analyzing the same dataset used by Farrell, Pennington,
and Cronin and finding that in addition to evidentiary strength, the credibility of police
testimony and juror beliefs about fairness of applicable laws and penalties all significantly
affected jurors' pre-disposition to the prosecution, as measured by jurors' first pre-
deliberation votes); Hepburn, supra note 144, at 97, 98 (analyzing the effect of juror
attitudes and demographics on verdicts in simulated trials and concluding that "the strength
of the evidence is relative, influenced by case-relevant juror attitudes" towards police and
punishment).
Parenthetical summaries of jury studies necessarily gloss over complexities of the
findings, which, as noted, must be approached with caution. The Farrell, Pennington &
Cronin study in particular presented mixed findings: it measured the effects of juror trust
and confidence in police on jurors' predisposition to the prosecution prior to deliberations
and on jurors' first, pre-deliberation votes, and found a stronger correlation with respect to
the former than the latter. Farrell, Pennington & Cronin, supra note 142, at 784, 787. The
study further found a stronger correlation between trust in police and predisposition to the
prosecution for black jurors than for white jurors, with the racial gap narrowing as black
juror trust and confidence in the police increased. Id. at 788-90. But see Garvey et. al, supra,
at 397-98 (finding, in a study of the same dataset, that race had a limited influence on juror
decision-making except with respect to drug offenses tried in the District of Columbia). The
Farrell, Pennington & Cronin study also measured the effect on juror predisposition and
first juror votes of juror trust and confidence in the courts and found a reverse correlation:
jurors reporting high trust in the courts were less predisposed to the prosecution than jurors
reporting low trust in the courts. Id. at 784. (Trust in courts had no effect on juror first
votes. Id. at 787.) The authors postulate that the inverse correlation between trust in courts
and predisposition to the prosecution could reflect the former as evincing a strong belief in
defendants' due process rights, which might translate into a more robust application of
reasonable doubt. Id. at 793-94. Likewise, jurors with low trust in courts may perceive
courts as too lenient towards criminal defendants. Id. My focus in this Article is perceptions
of the legitimacy of law enforcement (police, federal agents, and federal and local
prosecutors) as opposed to courts.
146. Farrell, Pennington & Cronin, supra note 142, at 785; Garvey et al., supra note 145, at 396-97;
Hannaford-Agor & Hans, supra note 143, at 1266-68 (analyzing the same dataset as Garvey
et al. and finding that jurors' attitudes about the fairness of applicable laws influenced juror
decision-making).
147. See Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REv. 349 (1997)
(discussing the expressive function of criminal prosecution); Richman & Stuntz, supra note
101, at 586 ("[C]riminal litigation is not just a means of rationing criminal punishment. It is
also a source of productive signals and valuable information."); Robinson & Darley, supra
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level of opprobrium we accord that conduct. The legislature defines crimes, but
prosecutors decide whether to charge those crimes. Likewise, the legislature
ascribes penalties for crimes; but prosecutors decide, by virtue of the charges
they bring, which penalties will apply, and judges decide what specific sentence
will be imposed in a given case. And in a system that functions almost entirely
through plea-bargaining, prosecutors' decisions -which cases to charge, what
charges to bring, and what charges to dismiss - reflect the realities of how
juries or judges decide tried cases, and what sentences judges will impose. In
short, the criminal law in the statute books can be quite different from the
criminal law in practice. The adjudication of cases, through trials, guilty pleas,
and sentencings, tells us what "the law" in each jurisdiction really is.
Prosecutors dismissing cases or charges because witnesses refuse to
cooperate or because juries will not credit the testimony of those who do; juries
acquitting defendants, or grand juries refusing to charge them, because of a
lack of trust in the prosecution's evidence; judges sentencing far below
mandated or advisory terms because of a fundamental disagreement with those
penalties; and plea bargaining practices that reflect these realities -all of these
phenomena are expressive. And what they express, at least in part, is a
disagreement between the community and the criminal justice authority over
how the criminal law should be written, how it should be enforced, or both.
They are symptoms of the criminal justice system's illegitimacy. And the
symptoms feed the disease. When the public sees that certain conduct is rarely
policed or penalized, it internalizes those norms. The newly internalized norms
result in the perception by some in the community that the law is under-
enforced and by others that the law "as written" is over-punitive relative to
community norms. These perceptions further erode legitimacy.48
In contrast, when we see a criminal justice system characterized by
relatively high rates of convictions, adherence to mandated or advisory
penalties, and pre-trial resolutions that reflect these realities, we must ask
note 117, at 472 ("[C]riminal law enforcement and adjudication activities send daily
messages to all who read or hear about them. Every time criminal liability is imposed, it
reminds us of the norm prohibiting the offender's conduct and confirms its condemnable
nature.... Further, every adjudication offers an opportunity to confirm the exact nature of
the norm or to signal a shift or refinement of it.").
148. See Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Criminal Justice: Introduction, 6 OHIO ST. J. CpIM. L. 123,
130 (2008) ("[S]trong enforcement of laws that the community greets with ambivalence can
erode legitimacy. Under-enforcement for acts that are widely viewed as deserving
punishment damages legitimacy, as well. Distributive justice concerns also damage
legitimacy when there is (perceived) asymmetry between the harm of the act and the
severity of the punishment.").
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whether legitimacy might have something to do with that. As I have
acknowledged, these aspects of the federal criminal justice system' 49 can all be
explained by other factors, up to a point. Let us consider whether legitimacy
might, at least in part, fill the explanatory gap.'
149. These characterizations of the federal criminal justice system are, of course, broad
generalizations. The ninety-four federal judicial districts are notoriously impervious to
collective description, as are the hundreds of local urban county districts throughout the
United States. Although an exacting empirical comparison (were it even possible) is beyond
the scope of this Article, examples of these forum disparities appear throughout. See supra
notes 5-7, 54, 68-79 and accompanying text; infra notes 211-220, 240 and accompanying text.
In addition, the existing national data paint, in broad strokes, an overall picture worth
noting.
In 2006, the most recent year for which data is available on felony case outcomes in the
nation's 75 largest counties, only 50% of defendants charged with a violent felony offense
were convicted of a violent felony offense (an additional 2i% were convicted of a
misdemeanor offense) and only 59% of defendants charged with a felony drug offense were
convicted of a felony drug offense (an additional io% were convicted of a misdemeanor
offense). The guilty plea rate was 45% for violent felony offenses (an additional lo% of
felony defendants pled guilty to a misdemeanor offense), and 56% for felony drug offenses
(an additional 9% pled guilty to a misdemeanor drug offense). Thomas H. Cohen & Tracey
Kyckelhahn, Felony Defendants in Large Urban Counties, 2oo6, BUREAU JUST. STAT. 11 tbl.ii
(2010), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fdluco6.pdf. Now consider federal case
disposition data for the same year: an 88.9% conviction rate (and an 81% plea rate) for
violent felony offenses, and a 91.7% conviction rate (and 87.8% plea rate) for felony drug
offenses. JAMES C. DUFF, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 20o6
JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 249-50 tbl.D-4 (2007), in Judicial Business
Archive, supra note 58, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2oo6
/appendices/d4.pdf.
The above comparison should be taken as a rough indication, not a measure. The urban
county dataset measures both initial charges and outcomes in a statistical sample of felony
cases filed in 2006 and resolved within one year, while the federal dataset measures
outcomes of all federal cases terminated in 2006, regardless of when charged and without
regard to the initial charge. (The county data thus does not account for ni% of cases within
the statistical sample that were not resolved within one year-a factor that likely
substantially under-represents trial outcomes, and thus likely over-represents conviction
rates, because tried cases generally take longer to resolve than untried cases, and some tried
cases end in acquittals whereas all pled cases end in convictions.) In addition, it bears noting
that some of the disparity reflected in this comparison likely comes from differences in case
processing: federal prosecutors are able to screen and decline cases almost entirely before
initiating legal process, while in some counties, local prosecutors do not assess cases until
after charging. In such counties, post-charging screening will invariably result in a higher
number of dismissals.
1so. Most of the empirical work on procedural legitimacy has focused on local criminal justice
systems. There are inherent limitations of using studies of legitimacy in one context (local
policing and local criminal cases) to advance theories in another (the federal criminal justice
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III. LEGITIMACY, STREET CRIME, AND THE FEDERAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM
A legitimacy inquiry focuses on the public's belief that the laws and
criminal justice authorities are entitled to deference. Accordingly, to assess a
justice system's legitimacy, we must examine the relevant authority, the
relevant public, and the laws. This Part addresses each of these three elements
and their interactions with one another.
A. Authority
In every prosecution there are two relevant authorities: the authority that
investigates and the authority that prosecutes. In state and local prosecutions,
both authorities are typically arms of the locality: the police and the district
attorney's office.s'5 In federal prosecutions of violent crimes and narcotics, the
prosecuting authority is the United States, specifically the United States
Department of Justice (typically operating though the United States Attorney's
Office for the district in which the crime is being prosecuted). The
investigating authority may be federal (for instance, the FBI, DEA, or ATF),
may consist of only the local police, or might include (as is usually the case in
violent crimes or narcotics cases) a combination of the two. But even when
only the local police were involved up to the point of arrest -as is often the case
when the federal government "adopts" a local case already underway in state
court -there will almost always be a federal agent assigned to shepherd the
case through the federal system or, at the very least, to offer assistance with
evidence evaluation or collection. 52 The federal agent assigned to the case sits
system). Cf Tyler & Mitchell, supra note 140, at 747 (cautioning that empirical studies of
local justice systems might not apply in the context of national-level legal authorities such as
the Supreme Court). In the particular context of street crime, though, empirical research
within local justice systems can inform our understanding of the federal criminal justice
system. Because federal street crime prosecutions supplant local cases, they are a parallel
alternative that can be contrasted with local prosecution at every stage. I do not apply
research on local criminal justice systems to national-level political institutions that perform
entirely different roles. Rather, I undertake a comparison of local and federal prosecution of
substantially similar cases.
151. In some instances the state attorney general might investigate and/or prosecute, but rarely
for episodic street crime.
152. For instance, federal prosecutions of felon-in-possession cases -the street crime cases most
often adopted from state courts -will usually involve an ATF agent who acts as the "case
agent." Even though the ATF agent will not have had any involvement in the apprehension
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with the prosecutor at counsel table and is often introduced to the jury either
during voir dire or in the government's opening statement as one of the
representatives of the United States responsible for bringing the case on behalf
of the federal government. From the standpoint of public perception, the "face"
of any federal prosecution will always be the federal government.
The significance of federal authority is not lost on federal prosecutors.
Often, they can be heard in courtrooms telling the jury in opening statements
that it is their privilege to "represent the United States." In cases with little
federal investigatory involvement, prosecutors may make strategic choices
specifically to ensure that a federal law enforcement agent appears before a
jury. For instance, in felon-in-possession cases in which local police
apprehended the defendant and seized the firearm, federal prosecutors
sometimes decline to stipulate to the fact that the gun was manufactured in
another state (the requisite interstate element of the crime) in order to call an
ATF agent as an expert witness on the firearm's site of manufacture. In a drug
case investigated by local police, federal prosecutors might call a DEA agent as
an expert witness to testify that the type of packaging and amount of drugs
seized is consistent with distribution rather than personal use.
Federal prosecutors do these things because they intuitively understand the
power of the federal authority. But what accounts for that power? It is not
enough to say that the federal authority garners legitimacy simply because it is
"federal." History gives us examples of how quickly that construct can break
down.15 Nor can one generalize about "federal" authority, a concept that can
have very different meanings depending on the context.'5 We must instead
of the defendant, the agent will usually either testify himself or arrange for testimony by
another ATF agent as to the interstate nexus element of the firearm.
153. Tom Tyler cites the Vietnam War as an example of a crisis that taxed citizens' willingness to
defer to institutions of government authority. See TYLER, supra note 4, at 271; see also
MARGARET LEvi, CONSENT, DISSENT, AND PATRIOTISM 177 (1997) (discussing how public
"dissatisfaction with federal government policy increased markedly during the Vietnam
era"). Other examples include Watergate; the FBI abuses uncovered by the Church
Committee hearings; and, more recently, the atrocities committed by U.S. armed forces in
the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, the federal government's inadequate and ineffectual response
to the Hurricane Katrina disaster, and the perceived abuses of the government's
"warrantless wiretapping" and NSA phone data collection programs.
154. The "federal authority" exercises power through a variety of different institutions, and
public opinion surveys consistently show that Americans accord them very different levels of
trust and respect (for instance, the Supreme Court tends to garner relatively high levels of
respect and trust, whereas Congress does not). See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Jones, Confidence in US.
Public Schools at New Low, GALLUP POL. (June 20, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/1 55258
/Confidence-Public-Schools-New-Low.aspx. And context matters. Citizens' trust in and
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examine what it is about the nature of street crime, and the nature of federal
law enforcement, that might enhance the legitimacy of the federal authority in
street crime prosecutions.
Street crime prosecutions have three salient features. First, they typically
rely on the testimony of local police officers. Second, the credibility of law
enforcement witnesses (whether local police or federal agents) is often critical
to a disputed issue in the case. Third, violence, or the threat of it, lurks within
every case.
Consider the first feature. Street crime is so-called because it takes place, or
at least originates, in the street: the open-air drug market, the corner store
robbery, the drive-by shooting. Local police protect the streets. Even in cases
arising from long-term federal investigations, federal prosecutors will
inevitably draw upon the testimony of local police officers who, over the course
of the investigation or preceding it, responded to reports of episodic crime
related to the government's case. 55
The second feature-the enhanced importance of law enforcement's
credibility -is perhaps the single biggest evidentiary difference between street
crime and white collar prosecutions. In white collar cases, law enforcement
plays a supporting role. Agents might seize evidence or make an arrest, but
respect for federal authorities, and willingness to obey them, will undoubtedly vary
depending on whether the matter concerns social policy, fiscal policy, national security, the
criminal law, or any other of the broad areas subject to federal authority. For instance, in
one study of Supreme Court legitimacy and abortion rulings, respondents indicated a weak
general feeling of obligation to federal authority: 6o% disagreed with the statement, "I feel
that I should accept the decisions made by government leaders in Washington even when I
disagree with them," 48% agreed that "[t]here are times when it is all right for people to
disobey the government," and 66% agreed with the statement, "I can think of situations in
which I would stop supporting the policies of our government." Tyler & Mitchell, supra note
140, at 807. The authors postulated that these weak feelings of an obligation to obey could
be explained by the fact that some federal laws implicate moral or ideological differences
among citizens. Id. at 761-62. This is, of course, the case for abortion, the subject of the
study. It would not be the case for federal laws related to, for instance, robbery or murder -
conduct that is equally prohibited by local, state, and federal law and for which there is no
significant room for moral disagreement. For this reason, any consideration of the "federal
authority" must be narrowly tailored to the precise federal entity and federal laws at issue.
155. There are a number of ways this happens. The government might introduce evidence of a
defendant's prior bad acts under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). In a conspiracy case, the
government might introduce prior arrests of the co-conspirators to demonstrate the
background of the conspiracy and the relationship of the co-conspirators. In a RICO
prosecution, the government must introduce evidence of a "pattern of racketeering activity"
(so-called "predicate acts"), which, in a violent crime or drug case, will almost always
involve prior local arrests and/or convictions. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(a), 1961(1)(A) (2012).
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very little depends on their word. It is difficult for a defendant to argue that a
law enforcement agent planted evidence when the evidence consists of reams of
detailed financial statements or emails on the defendant's own computer. And
because a defendant will often have retained counsel prior to having been
arrested or even approached by law enforcement, he ordinarily will not make
any statements to the agents. In violent crime and narcotics cases, in contrast,
law enforcement officers in many ways are the evidence - or, at least, a
substantial part of it. It is they who respond to the scene, where they witness
first-hand either the crime in progress or its immediate aftermath. If the
defendant attempts to flee, they give chase. When they apprehend the
defendant, they search him and question him. If he has contraband, it is they
who seize it; if he speaks, it is they who hear it. The testimony of law
enforcement officers in street-crime cases is critical. Sometimes, it is the only
evidence that bears on guilt."s'
The third feature, violence, is critical because it imposes a uniquely onerous
burden on victims and witnesses (including cooperating defendants). Violence
is ever-present in street-crime cases. Witnesses fear retaliation even if no overt
threat against them is ever made.' 'Even in cases in which no violent act is
charged, such as drug cases or gun possession cases, the threat of violence
against witnesses remains.sS The near inseparability of drugs and violence in
156. For instance, felon-in-possession cases typically establish the element of possession solely
based on the testimony of the police who caught the defendant carrying a gun. The
remaining elements -possession "in interstate commerce," satisfied by proof that the gun
was manufactured in another state, and the defendant's prior conviction -are almost never
in dispute.
157. In a study of 260 victims with cases pending in Criminal Court in Bronx County, New York,
57% of victims who had not been threatened feared reprisals, and 71% of all respondents said
that they would feel threatened if the defendant were released on bail. Robert C. Davis,
Barbara E. Smith & Madeline Henley, Victim/Witness Intimidation in the Bronx Courts: How
Common Is It, and What Are Its Consequences?, VICTIM SERVICES AGENCY 13 (1990),
http://www.popcenter.org/problems/witness intimidation/PDFs/Davis-etal_199o.pdf
158. See Gary Gately, Baltimore Struggles to Battle Witness Intimidation: Prosecutors Say Violence,
Threats Hinder Testimony, Bos. GLOBE, Feb. 12, 2005, http://boston.con/news/nation
/articles/2005/o2/12/baltimore struggles-tobattlewitnessintimidation (reporting one
drug gang's murder of a woman and her family after she confronted gang members about
selling drugs on her street and another gang's hurling Molotov cocktails at the house of a
woman who had called police to report drug dealing); Nancy Phillips, Craig R. McCoy &
Dylan Purcell, Witnesses Fear Reprisals, and Cases Crumble, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 14, 2009,
http://articles.philly.conV2oo9-12-14/news/24988519 _witnesses-murder-case-police-and
-prosecutors (reporting that an alleged Philadelphia drug kingpin was accused of ordering
at least seven witness-related murders in order to protect his drug business).
2281
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
the inner city is so well-recognized that it has spawned permitted evidentiary
inferences in gun and drug cases. 1S9 And in actual violent crime cases (murders,
shootings, robberies), the threat of witness retaliation is palpably real. In some
cities, witness intimidation in violent crime cases has become so prevalent that
it has crippled local prosecutors' ability to bring successful cases. 6 o
If local policing, law enforcement credibility, and violence lie at the heart of
street crime cases, we must ask which aspects of the federal authority bear on
these issues. Three critical features stand out. First, federal law enforcement
does not police citizens. Second, federal prosecutors have demonstrated a
robust commitment to policing local police departments' interactions with
citizens. Third, federal law enforcement has cultivated a sterling reputation for
witness protection. Each of these three aspects of federal law enforcement
authority implicates procedural legitimacy's key components: procedural
justice and motive-based trust.161
Begin with the absence of policing. This matters to public perception
because, from the standpoint of perceptions, policing in the inner city is an
enterprise with great downside and little upside. Urban police forces suffer
from high levels of community dissatisfaction." Victims of crime perceive the
isg. E.g., United States v. Wallace, 532 F.3d 126, 131 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that a jury could
properly infer intent to distribute narcotics from, among other things, defendant's
possession of a firearm); United States v. White, 969 F.2d 681, 684 (8th Cir. 1992)
("Because a gun is 'generally considered a tool of the trade for drug dealers, [it] is also
evidence of intent to distribute."' (quoting United States v. Schubel, 912 F.2d 952, 956 (8th
Cir. 1990))); United States v. Garrett, 903 F.2d 1105, 1113 (7 th Cir. 1990) ("Intent to
distribute has been inferred in cases where small amounts of drugs . .. have been possessed
in conjunction with other indicia of drug distribution, such as a weapon." (footnote
omitted)).
160. See Gately, supra note 158 (describing Baltimore prosecutors' estimate that witness
intimidation occurs in 95% of all homicide cases in Baltimore, with the result that cases are
dropped or defendants are acquitted, and Boston police's estimate that two-thirds of
Boston's 64 murders in 2004 remained unsolved due to witness intimidation); David
Kocieniewski, With Witnesses at Risk, Murder Suspects Go Free, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2oo7/o3/o1/nyregion/olwitness.html (describing how rampant
witness intimidation in New Jersey and elsewhere has led to prosecutors' refusals to even
bring charges in violent crime cases that depend on a single witness's testimony); Phillips,
McCoy & Purcell, supra note i8 (describing a continuing epidemic of witness intimidation
in Philadelphia, in which 13 witnesses were killed over 10 years, countless others are
threatened into silence, and case after case collapses as a result).
16. See supra notes 121-123 and accompanying text.
162. See Fagan, supra note 148, at 127-28.
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police as unresponsive; i63 suspects and defendants perceive the police as
overbearing and abusive.164 Because both street crime and policing tend to be
more concentrated in poor, minority communities, minorities, and African-
Americans in particular, perceive these failures as by-products of pervasive
racial discrimination by local police forces. 6 s High crime levels and
underfunding exacerbate the police practices that fuel these perceptions.
Overburdened police forces have little time to investigate episodic street crime
beyond the immediate aftermath and even less time to follow up with victims
and apprise them of the status of their case. In a number of cities, political
pressure to clamp down on violent crime has resulted in police departments
adopting order maintenance policing, a technique that has come to be equated
with aggressive enforcement of minor misdemeanor laws and pervasive use of
stop-and-frisk.'6 6
Federal law enforcement agents, in contrast, have all of the benefits of
being law enforcers without the attendant burdens of policing. The feds do not
walk a beat, which means that they do not have occasion to stop and frisk
people. They are not the ones who show up in response to a 911 call. They do
not interact with the community at all, in fact, save for the relatively rare
situations in which they are called in to investigate a crime after it has already
been reported. The lack of community interaction with federal law
enforcement matters a great deal, because research has shown that people's
163. See Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1725-27 (20o6).
164. Fagan, supra note 148, at 127-28.
i6. See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 71 (1997) ("Large numbers of blacks are
convinced that, in general, law enforcement authorities value the safety and well-being of
whites more than that of blacks."); Fagan, supra note 148, at 127-28; Jeffrey Fagan & Garth
Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race, and Disorder in New York City, 28
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457, 458-63, 482, 499 (2000); Ronald Weitzer, Racialized Policing:
Residents' Perceptions in Three Neighborhoods, 34 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 129, 151-152 (2000)
(demonstrating that blacks in low-income, high-crime neighborhoods perceived themselves
as receiving inferior treatment by police as compared to both blacks and whites in higher-
income, lower-crime neighborhoods).
166. See Fagan & Davies, supra note 165, at 462, 470-71 (describing collateral effects of New
York's order-maintenance policing on minorities' trust in police); Bernard E. Harcourt &
Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: New Evidence from New York City and a Five-City Social
Experiment, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 271, 272 (2006) (noting that New York, Chicago, and Los
Angeles have all adopted policing strategies predicated on "more aggressive enforcement of
minor misdemeanor laws, also known as 'order maintenance' policing"); Philip B.
Heymann, The New Policing, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 407, 422-40 (2000) (discussing order
maintenance policing efforts in New York, Boston, and Chicago); Weitzer, supra note 165,
at 151 (describing similar dynamic in Washington, D.C.).
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perceptions of and satisfaction with police is grounded heavily in their personal
experience.'6 7 That personal experience, in turn, significantly influences
perceptions of the justice system's legitimacy. 68
Now consider the federal authority's sustained and visible role in enforcing
the rights of individuals against local police misconduct. Rodney King,169
Abner Louima'70 -the federal criminal prosecutions of local police officers in
cases such as these evoke positive images of the federal government as much as
they evoke negative images of the local police forces involved. 7' And the federal
167. See JULIAN V. ROBERTS & LORETrA J. STALANS, PUBLIC OPINION, CRIME, AND CRIMNAL
JUSTICE 144-45 (1997) (collecting studies showing that "how police handle investigatory
stops and requests for assistance from citizens shapes evaluations of police performance and
perceptions of the fairness of police in general").
168. TYLER & Huo, supra note 114, at 28-30, 132-33, 178 (finding, in a study of 1,656 adults in
Oakland and Los Angeles, that 30% of the variance in people's overall assessment of
legitimacy was linked to their judgments about their own recent interactions with the police,
and, applying same method to Tyler's 1990 study of 1,575 adults in Chicago, finding that
24% of the variance in people's overall assessment of legitimacy in that study was linked to
their judgments about their own recent interactions with the police).
169. Three months after a local jury in Simi County, California acquitted four police officers
charged in a videotaped beating of King, sparking days of rioting and nationwide protests,
the U.S. Attorney for the Central District of California filed federal criminal civil rights
charges against those officers. See Robert Reinhold, U.S. Jury Indicts 4 Police Officers in King
Beating, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 6, 1992, http://www.nytimes.com/books/98/o2/o8/home/rodney
-indict.html. The federal trial resulted in the convictions of two officers and the acquittal of
two officers. Seth Mydans, Verdict in Los Angeles; 2 of 4 Officers Found Guilty in Los Angeles
Beating, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 18, 1993, http://www.nytimes.com/books/98/o2/o8/home/rodney
-guilty.html.
170. The U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of New York prosecuted the police officers
involved in a brutal beating and sexual assault of Louima, a Haitian immigrant, as well as
those involved in a subsequent cover-up attempt. Of seven officers tried, six officers were
convicted-the ringleader of the attack was convicted of assault and sentenced to 30 years'
imprisonment, while three others were convicted of conspiracy to obstruct justice (one of
whom was also convicted of joining in the attack), and two others for lying to investigators.
The conspiracy convictions and the conviction of the officer who joined in the attack were
reversed on appeal. The Louima Ruling; Chronology of the Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1,
2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2oo2/o3/ol/nyregion/the-louima-ruling-chronology-of-the
-case.html.
171. This is why the upended federal convictions in United States v. Bowen, the highly-publicized
"Danziger Bridge" case (the federal prosecution of five New Orleans police officers for the
September 4, 2005, shooting of six unarmed civilians, causing the death of two), has
ramifications for federal authority that extend well beyond that case. See Order and Reasons
at 124, United States v. Bowen, No. 10-204, (E.D. La. Sept. 17, 2013), 2013 WL 5233325, at
*63 (ordering a retrial based on prosecutors' online postings regarding the defendants,
described as misconduct "committed by those with significant authority who act in the
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government has prosecuted less notorious cases of police misconduct, securing
convictions that might lack national notoriety but nevertheless matter greatly
to local communities.172 The federal government's use of civil injunctions to
remedy pervasive and systemic civil rights violations has also burnished its
reputational capital when it comes to policing. 73
In short, the federal government doesn't police the community, and it does
police the police. In cases that depend both on the local police and law
enforcement credibility generally, then, the federal authority has a uniquely
powerful voice. When a federal agent takes the witness stand, he is, in a very
real sense, a physical embodiment of the federal authority. And when a federal
prosecutor calls a local police officer to the stand, that officer, too, becomes
name of the 'United States of America' when they enter court and at all other times, and
who have now left a fractured public trust"). The incident is all the more disheartening to
New Orleans residents because the federal prosecution, like some other federal civil rights
prosecutions, arose following a failed prosecution in state court. See Juliet Linderman,
Reversal of Danziger Bridge Convictions a "Bitter Pill" for Hurricane Katrina Survivors, NEW
OiuEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Sept. 17, 2013, http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2oi3/o9
/reversal ofdanziger bridgeco.html.
172. See, e.g., John Marzulli, Guilty Brooklyn Cop: "I Don't Know Why I Didn't Commit Suicide
Yet," N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 15, 2012, http://www.nydailynews.con/new-york/brooklyn
/guilty-brooklyn-don-didn-commit-suicide-article-i.i184296 (describing a guilty plea by
police officer charged with federal civil rights violations for unlawfully handcuffing and
pepper-spraying a man at a bar without justification); Don Terry, Philadelphia Shaken by
Criminal Police Officers, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 28, 1995, http://www.nytimes.com/1995/o8/28/us
/philadelphia-shaken-by-criminal-police-officers.html (detailing the federal prosecutions
and resulting convictions of a string of Philadelphia police officers who unlawfully framed
innocent citizens for drug crimes, a scandal that substantially undermined the community's
trust in the police); Mark Fazlollah & Aubrey Whelan, Grand Jury Probing Corruption in
Phila. Police Narcotics Unit, PHILA. INQUIRER, Jan. 19, 2004, http://www.philly.com/philly
/news/20140118_Federal-grand-jury-probing-corruption inPhilapolice-narcotics unit
.html (describing federal grand jury investigation and prosecution into corruption offenses
among certain officers in the Philadelphia Police Department's narcotics unit).
173. See 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (20o6) (authorizing the Department of Justice to investigate law
enforcement agencies for engaging in a "pattern or practice" of civil rights violations and to
impose systemic reforms upon those agencies, by court order if necessary). Since the law's
passage in 1994, the U.S. Department of Justice has exercised its oversight authority
aggressively in actions against dozens of state and municipal police departments, including
those in New Orleans, Los Angeles, Detroit, Pittsburgh, and the District of Columbia. See
Civil Rights Div., Special Litigation Section Cases and Matters: Law Enforcement Agencies, U.S.
DEP'T JUST., http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spVfindsettle.php#police (last visited Dec.
20, 2013); POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, CIVIL RIGHTS INVESTIGATIONS OF LOCAL POLICE:
LESSONS LEARNED 1 (2013) (noting that "more than 25 police departments have experienced
some form of DOJ involvement in the last two decades," which has primarily involved the
investigation of improper use of force, unlawful stops and searches, and biased policing).
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imbued with federal authority. Implicit in the act of calling the officer to testify
is the judgment-by the federal entity with the proven ability to prosecute
him- that the officer has acted appropriately in the discharge of his duties and
that he is telling the truth.
Finally, the federal government's reputation for witness protection further
enhances its power in street crime prosecutions by signaling a protected space
to otherwise reticent witnesses. It is not that the feds can guarantee witness
safety-they can't, as any federal agent will attest. It is that witnesses perceive
safety in the hands of a federal agent. Resources certainly play a role in this, but
not the only one. Indeed, for witnesses in public housing (as many are),
relocation is less a question of money than bureaucratic hassle. It is also about
image. The federal witness protection program is the stuff of lore in popular
culture.' 74 And although few witnesses in street crime cases need avail
themselves of such stringent protection measures, their mere existence graces
federal agents with credibility. Indeed, in joint federal-local investigations, it is
no accident that witness security tends to be the primary responsibility of
federal agencies, regardless of the extent to which local law enforcement
agencies share in the expenses. When it comes to witness security, federal
agents inspire trust in a way local law enforcement simply doesn't. In urban
criminal justice systems "gridlocked with fear,"'17 this trust can pave the path
to the witness stand.
B. The Public: Authority and Community Interaction
Legitimacy focuses on public perceptions of authority. Who, then, is "the
public?" In a criminal justice system, the public is the community subject to the
justice system-those who serve on its juries, elect its district attorneys (and, in
many states, its judges), and are policed by its police department. In state and
local justice systems, the community is the local county. In large cities, the local
county is typically confined to an urban area, which may or may not include
surrounding suburbs.1'7
174. The federal "Witsec" program has generated television shows, e.g., In Plain Sight (USA
Network); books, e.g., PETE EARLEY & GERALD SHUR, WITSEC: INSIDE THE FEDERAL
WITNESS PROTECTION PROGRAM (2002); and movies, e.g., FEDERAL PROTECTION (Chariot
Communications 2002); ERASER (Warner Bros. 1996); BIRD ON A WIRE (Universal Pictures
1990).
175. Gately, supra note 158 (quoting Nicole Krivda, a Baltimore prosecutor).
176. The late William Stuntz postulated that, because "metropolitan counties typically include
both cities and close-in suburbs," the rise in the white suburban population in the latter half
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In federal prosecutions, the community is the federal district, and it has
two distinguishing features. First, a federal district's community does not elect
its prosecutor or its judges.'" Second, the federal district always comprises a
larger geographic area than the local county.17 Depending on the district, it can
comprise anything from one city and its surrounding counties to an entire
state. 179 Federal juries are therefore less representative of the local community
in which the crime occurred. And the lack of direct political accountability by
federal criminal justice authorities (both judges and prosecutors) means that
these authorities will be less beholden to local constituents. In short, in the
federal justice system, "the public" is both geographically broad and politically
diffuse.
Scholarly attention on the jury's role in the federal criminal justice system
has focused principally on these two features and their impact on racial
of the twentieth century resulted in a political power-shift that has led to negative
consequences for local urban justice systems. See Stuntz, supra note 3, at 2002. While
Stuntz's description of county scope is accurate with respect to certain counties (for
instance, his examples of Chicago, Atlanta, Cleveland, and Detroit), it is not for a number of
the nation's most notoriously crime-ridden inner cities. Bronx County, in New York, is
comprised entirely of the borough of the Bronx and includes no surrounding suburbs. The
same is true for Philadelphia, Baltimore (which operates as an independent city with no
county control), New Orleans, and Washington, D.C., as well as some smaller urban areas
(Richmond, Virginia, the site of Project Exile, see supra notes 68-79 and accompanying text,
among them). These so-called "consolidated city-counties" thus present real-world
applications of some of the reform theories that Stuntz and other scholars have advanced, a
point I take up in further detail in Section IV.A.
17. The United States Attorney and judges for the district are appointed by the President of the
United States (usually selected for the President by the senators of the district's state).
Federal judges serve lifetime appointments, while U.S. Attorneys typically serve until the
conclusion of the appointing President's time in office.
178. The sole exception is the District of Columbia, in which the local and federal court districts
are geographically coterminous.
179. Particularly populous districts, or those spanning large geographic areas, may have more
than one courthouse location in the district, in which case each courthouse location may
draw jurors from a narrower pool. For instance, the Southern District of New York is
comprised of eight counties: two counties in New York City (New York County and Bronx
County), and six in the suburbs. The two courthouses in Manhattan draw jurors from these
two New York City counties and three surrounding counties (Westchester, Rockland, and
Putnam counties), while the courthouse in White Plains draws jurors from six suburban
counties (Westchester, Rockland, Putnam, Orange, Dutchess, and Sullivan). See Amended
Plan for the Random Selection of Grand and Petit Jurors in the United States District Court for the
Southern District Of New York, U.S. DIsT. CT., S. DIST. N.Y. (Feb. 2009), http://www.nysd
.uscourts.gov/jury-handbool'juryplan feb_2009.pdf
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composition" and prosecutorial discretion."' Here, I focus on three additional
effects of geographic breadth and political diffuseness and how those effects
might bear on legitimacy. I first consider the impact on jurors' self-
identification. Next, I examine the demographic alignment between the jury
pool and the larger electorate. Finally, I consider the empowerment of law over
norms.
1. Juror Identification
Research has demonstrated that one's identity with the group through
which authority is exercised-that is, the "superordinate" group -significantly
impacts perceptions of legitimacy." This phenomenon operates on two levels.
First, the more one self-identifies with the superordinate group, the more likely
one is to value the relational (i.e., process) rather than the instrumental (i.e.,
outcomes) in assessing legitimacy.8 3 Second, high levels of identification with
a superordinate group are correlated with increased perceptions of
legitimacy.'S' Studies have shown, moreover, that these correlations remain
regardless of the strength of an individual's identification with his or her own
subgroup - indicating that, even in societies divided into subgroups along
racial, ethnic, socioeconomic, or other lines, shared identification with the
superordinate group enhances perceptions of the legitimacy of authorities.8 s
iso. The geographic breadth of federal districts results in less minority representation in federal
jury venires as compared to local venires within the same district. See, e.g., Laura G. Dooley,
The Dilution Effect: Federalization, Fair Cross-Sections, and the Concept of Community, 54
DEPAUL L. REV. 79 (2004); Nancy Gertner, 12 Angry Men (and Women) in Federal Court, 82
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 613 (2007).
181. Richman & Stuntz, supra note 101; Stuntz, supra note 3.
182. See Huo et al., supra note 127.
183. See id. at 42-43 (finding that persons proud to be part of their employer's organization were
more likely to value relational concerns in their interactions with supervisors than those less
proud of the organization); see also Heather J. Smith & Tom R. Tyler, Justice and Power:
When Will Justice Concerns Encourage the Advantaged to Support Policies Which Redistribute
Economic Resources and the Disadvantaged to Willingly Obey the Law?, 26 EUR. J. Soc.
PSYCHOL. 17], 183, 191-92 (1996) (finding, in two studies, one of 352 white adults and one of
150 African-American adults, a significant correlation between strong self-identification as
"American" and relational views of justice, as well as a significant correlation between weak
self-identification as "American" and instrumental views ofjustice).
184. TYLER& HUO, supra note 114, at 116-22.
185. Yuen J. Huo, Procedural Justice and Social Regulation Across Group Boundaries: Does Subgroup
Identity Undermine Relationship-Based Governance?, 29 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BuLL.
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And a number of studies have shown that strong self-identification with
America in particular enhances both valuation of relational concerns and
perceptions of legitimacy.'8 6
The research on superordinate identification can enrich our thinking about
the jury. A jury is tasked with overcoming differences in order to reach
agreement. It must speak as a single body rather than as the collection of
individuals who comprise it. And through the deliberative process, jurors'
perceptions are further refined. Uniform perceptions among jurors may be self-
reinforcing; asymmetry may breed greater movement in juror views.
In federal court, the superordinate authority is the United States, and the
superordinate group, Americans. In a local county court, on the other hand, the
authority's identity is less pronounced. The prosecutor is an agent of the
locality, but she enforces state law. She might describe herself, variously, as
representing the state or the "people" of an unarticulated community. The
superordinate group, then, is also undefined. In a Bronx County court, for
instance, is the superordinate group those residing in the county (the Bronx),
the locality (New York City), or the state whose laws the prosecutor seeks to
enforce (New York State)?
One study in particular supports the distinction between national and local
identification. In that study, which polled 1,656 adults in Oakland and Los
Angeles, eighty-nine percent of respondents said that being an American was
important to their identity, while only sixty-two percent of respondents said
that being a resident of their city was important to their identity.'1 More
significantly, the study tested the extent to which self-identification at the
national versus local level influenced perceptions of legitimacy. The correlation
between national identity and legitimacy was nearly three times greater than
the correlation between local identity and legitimacy.' In other words, people
self-identifying more strongly as Americans were more likely to perceive
authorities as legitimate.1 9
336, 346 (2003) ("[E]ven in a highly volatile context fraught with ethnic tension-
minorities' encounters with the police and courts -identification with a diffuse social
category such as the nation can facilitate cooperation with the directives of authorities whose
responsibility it is to maintain social cohesion."); Huo et al., supra note 127, at 45.
186. See Huo, supra note 185, at 336; Smith & Tyler, supra note 183, at 182-83.
187. See TYLER & Huo, supra note 114, at 30, 120 tbl.7.4.
iss. See id. at 122 tbl.7.6 (identifying a beta weight of 0.31 in a regression of legitimacy against
pride in the United States and identifying a beta weight of only 0.12 in a regression of
legitimacy against pride in city).
189. The study tested perceptions of legitimacy of the police and courts. See id. at 28, 32-33.
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One cannot ascribe too much importance to a single study, particularly
when confined to one state. Additional studies in different states and localities
are needed, along with studies that assess self-identification with one's state
and the impact of blended authority on superordinate identification. But this
study, and superordinate identification research more generally, has intriguing
and potentially significant implications. Strong juror identification with the
prosecuting authority in federal cases might, in small part, explain why, for
instance, in the District of Columbia the conviction rate is substantially higher
in federal court than Superior Court, even while the two forums share the same
jury pool.190 It might also in part explain why the federal District of the Virgin
Although the study did not specifically limit itself to local police and courts, it appears to
have been so limited in practice, simply as a result of the nature of most citizen encounters
with law enforcement and the judicial system. See id. at 32-33; see also supra notes 167-168
and accompanying text (describing the importance of recent interactions in driving
perceptions). The study thus indicates, interestingly, that self-identification on a national
level translates into perceptions of legitimacy of local institutions.
190. In 2007-2013, the most recent years for which conviction rate data is available from the D.C.
Superior Courts, the overall felony conviction rate has averaged 67% (and the conviction
rate in jury trials, 62.2%) while the overall conviction rate average from 2007-2012 (2013 is
not yet available) in federal court in the District of Columbia was 84.4% (and the conviction
rate in jury trials was 92.8%). Compare Annual Reports and Documents, D.C. CTS.,
http://www.dccourts.gov/internet/about/orgperf/annualreports.jsf (click on the "Annual
Report - Statistical Summary" for each of years 2007-2013 and scroll down to the "Criminal
Division Case Activity" table) (last visited Feb. 18, 2014), with Judicial Business Archive, supra
note 58 (click on each of the desired years (2007-2012), then click on "Table D- 7 Defendants
Disposed of, by Type of Disposition and District"). (For the D.C. Superior Court conviction
rate, I calculated the total number of felony guilty pleas and jury and bench trial guilty
verdicts as a percentage of total disposed felony cases; for the jury trial conviction rate, I
calculated guilty verdicts as a percentage of total jury trials.) It should be noted that the
federal court dataset tracks outcomes by individual defendants, while the D.C. Superior
Court dataset tracks outcomes by cases (which may or may not include multiple
defendants). Because of the potential for mixed verdicts or judgments in multi-defendant
cases, disposition data tends to reflect a higher conviction rate if calculated by case outcome
as opposed to defendant outcome. In other words, were these two court systems to use the
same methodology, the disparity might be even more pronounced.
To be clear, there are a number of causes contributing to the conviction rate differential
in the District of Columbia, including, most significantly, differences in the size and nature
of the docket in each forum; in the total mix of factors, superordinate identity surely plays a
relatively minor role. Nevertheless, the comparison is worth noting in light of other
constants (or "controls") unique to that district, namely, the jury pool and the prosecuting
office are the same in federal and local court. This also complicates the influence of
superordinate identity in D.C. Superior Court prosecutions, because federal and local
authority are blended: federal prosecutors charge violations of the local city code that arise
almost entirely from local arrests. See ExEC. OFFICE FOR U.S. Arr'ys, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
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Islands, where U.S. citizen residents cannot vote in national elections and
many are apparently apathetic as to their political status,'91 has the lowest
conviction rate of any federal district.'9 It may also in part explain why all-
white federal juries in the Jim Crow south convicted white defendants accused
of crimes against African-American victims far more frequently than did all-
white juries in state courts at that time.'93
UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 14 (2011),
http://www.justice.gov/usao/readingroom/reports/asr2ol/listatrpt.pdf.
191. See Sam Dimeo, Political Status Referendum Falls Short in U.S. Virgin Islands, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Oct. 11, 1993, http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1993/Political-Status-Referendum
-Falls-Short-In-U-S-Virgin-Islands/id-a35f49515fbo8b46bcd53142ad7fbfoa (observing that
"[a]pathy appeared to be the strongest sentiment" in a 1993 political status referendum,
where voter turnout was so low that the referendum was deemed invalid).
192. Judicial Business Archive, supra note 58, (click on each of the desired years (2008-2012), then
click on "Table D-7 Defendants Disposed of, by Type of Disposition and District")
(showing that over the last five years, the conviction rate in the District of the Virgin Islands
averaged 44.9%, as compared to an average conviction rate of 90.9% for the federal judicial
system as a whole). While the District of the Virgin Islands has a much higher jury
conviction rate, see id. (jury conviction rate of 69.8%), the total conviction rate reflects not
just outcomes in tried cases, but importantly, prosecutors' assessments of how cases will fare
at trial. Generally speaking, a dismissal reflects the prosecutor's belief that she will not
secure a conviction at trial.
It is interesting to compare the Virgin Islands with Puerto Rico (86% conviction rate
and 90.3% jury conviction rate over the last five years, id.), where in a 2012 political status
plebiscite, sixty-one percent of voters who indicated a preference for one of three non-
territory political status options wanted Puerto Rico to become a U.S. state. See Associated
Press, Puerto Ricans Opt for Statehood in Referendum, USA TODAY, Nov. 7, 2012,
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2012/11/07/puerto-rico-referendum/1689097.
(Other unincorporated territories are Guam and the Northern Marianas Islands, which also
have federal conviction rates well below average, but which have significantly smaller
caseloads.) Again, conviction rate differences are the product of multiple contributing
factors. The District of Puerto Rico has a high volume of cases, most of which involve
narcotics charges, whereas the District of the Virgin Islands has a lower volume of cases,
many of which involve violent crimes including firearm offenses. Judicial Business Archive,
supra note 58 (click on each of the desired years (20o8-2012), then click on "Table D-7
Defendants Terminated, by Major Offense and District"). As noted, the former are relatively
easier to prove than the latter. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. For a discussion of
the tangled and complex influences on Puerto Ricans' and U.S. Virgin Islanders'
identification as Americans, including in particular issues of race and ethnicity, see ROBERT
E. STATHAM, JR., COLONIAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE TYRANNY OF UNITED STATES'
OFFSHORE TERRITORIAL POLICY AND RELATIONS 25-64 (2002).
193. See Campbell Robertson, Last Chapter for a Court with a Place in History, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
17, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2o02/o9/18/us/mississippi-courthouse-with-rich-civil
-rights-past-set-to-close.html (recounting the 1967 federal conviction, by an all-white
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Note the qualifier: in part. There are numerous complex factors that impact
a jury's decision in a given case or that contribute to patterns of jury decisions
over time. Many of them, such as evidentiary strength or case type, surely have
a greater impact than superordinate identification. And subgroup identification
is also important; clearly, in criminal law and in street crime in particular, race
matters. 194 But to this complex mix of influences, we should add superordinate
identification, and we should undertake to better understand its potential
impact on juries across forums.
2. Adjudicative-Legislative Alignment
The distinguishing feature of "street crime," as its name implies, is its
locus. Unlike many other types of crime, street crimes harm not just their
immediate victims, but the public life of the local community.' 95 Streets, parks,
schoolyards, the entryways and stairwells of apartment buildings, the corner
store - these are the "scene of the crime." For residents in communities ravaged
by street crime, the places of daily life become zones of fear. They also become
the focus of police attention. For street crimes, more than any other, it is the
local community that principally bears the burdens of the law's violations and
its enforcement.
federal jury in Mississippi, of seven defendants for the brutal murders of three civil rights
activists-the first of subsequent civil rights convictions against white defendants by all-
white federal juries in the South).
194. The complexities of race, crime and the jury have generated a deep and thoughtful body of
literature. See KENNEDY, supra note 165, at 242-44; Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury
Nullification: Black Power in The Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677 (1995); William T.
Pizzi, Batson v. Kentucky: Curing the Disease but Killing the Patient, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 97,
129-30 (1987) (explaining social psychological phenomenon of "ingroup-outgroup bias,"
and its application to race-based peremptory challenges); Samuel R. Sommers and Phoebe
C. Ellsworth, How Much Do We Really Know About Race and juries? A Review ofSocial Science
Theory and Research, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 997 (2003) (surveying the empirical literature);
see also Fagan, supra note 148 (discussing tensions within minority communities regarding
crime, law enforcement and imprisonment); Jeffrey Fagan & Tracey L. Meares, Punishment,
Deterrence and Social Control: The Paradox ofPunishment in Minority Communities, 6 OHIO ST.
J. CluM. L. 173 (2008) (same); Tracey L. Meares, Charting Race and Class Differences in
Attitudes Toward Drug Legalization and Law Enforcement: Lessons for Federal Criminal Law, 1
BUFF. ClM. L. REV. 137 (1997) (providing empirical data suggesting African-American
views on drug law enforcement are complex and sometimes in tension).
195. See Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts,
Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 551, 553, 558-59 (1997).
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The law-making that defines and punishes street crimes, though, occurs at
the state rather than local level. Because states comprise all demographics while
street crime affects primarily urban areas, laws governing street crime are made
at a level of government not directly answerable to the communities the laws
most affect. Adjudication, on the other hand, occurs at the local county level.
To the extent, then, that local county norms of conduct or ideologies about
punishment differ from state norms, those differences manifest in case
adjudication. Juries might acquit more often for certain crimes. Judges might
seek ways to circumvent sentences mandated by the state legislature.
This is precisely what happened in California during the time of its original
"three strikes" law, a statute that was enacted pursuant to a state-wide
referendum ballot.' 96 Juries and local judges in San Francisco - a consolidated
city-county' 97 and the only county in the state in which a majority of voters
voted against the law-frequently nullified the law; as a result, the San
Francisco District Attorney declined to enforce it.'98 Juries in San Diego
County, on the other hand -a county comprised of both urban and suburban
areas, in which approximately 76% of voters had voted in favor of the three
strikes law-regularly returned convictions in three strikes cases, resulting in
robust enforcement of the law in San Diego County.' 99 A similar dynamic
occurred in Virginia when the state legislature enacted firearms laws that
mirrored federal law. In Richmond County, also a consolidated city-county,
and the site of the tremendously successful federal "Project Exile,"2oo local
prosecutors ran into roadblocks when they sought to replicate federal results in
local court. Many local judges balked when told that the new laws mandated a
presumption of detention in all firearms cases, and simply granted bail as if the
i6. The statute, enacted in 1994, mandated a sentence of at least 25 years to life imprisonment
for any defendant convicted of a third felony offense, regardless of severity. See CAL. PENAL
CODE §§ 667, 1170 (West 1995). A 2012 referendum modified the law to permit this
enhanced sentence only for certain enumerated felonies. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667, 1170
(West 2012); Statement of Vote November 6, 2012, General Election, CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE DEBRA
BOWEN 13 (2012), http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2o12-general/sov-complete.pdf.
197. See supra note 176.
198. See Tony Perry & Maura Dolan, Two Counties at Opposite Poles of "Three Strikes" Crime
Debate: San Francisco Is Restrictive in Applying Law, San Diego Takes Hard Line, L.A.
TIMEs, June 24, 1996, http://articles.latimes.conV1996-o6-24/news/mn-18004-1_san-diego
-county. People v. Superior Court, 917 P.2d 628 (Cal. 1996) found that judges had authority
to dismiss the allegation that a defendant had an otherwise qualifying prior felony
conviction "in furtherance of justice." Id. at 630.
19. Perry & Dolan, supra note 198.
200. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
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heightened evidentiary standard did not exist.2o0 Some judges were reported to
engage in nullification, acquitting defendants despite strong evidence of guilt
simply to avoid imposing what they viewed to be an excessive punishment.20 2
And in New York, the 2006 law mandating a three-and-a-half-year term for
illegal possession of a gun has been applied inconsistently. Defendants in the
Bronx often avoid any state prison sentence, while the mandatory minimum
sentence is vigorously enforced against defendants in Queens County. 2o3
On the surface, the federal criminal justice system would seem to operate in
a similar fashion: laws are made at the national level (by the U.S. Congress)
and adjudicated at the local level (by juries and judges in the ninety-four
federal districts). In reality, it is not at all similar. An overlooked feature of the
federal criminal justice system is its alignment, at least in terms of
demographics, between the legislative and adjudicative levels. Almost every
federal district contains urban centers, suburbs, and rural areas.20 4 In some
201. See VIRGINIA EXiLE REPORT, supra note 72, at 73.
202. Id. at 30-31. Almost all defendants charged with gun crimes in Richmond County elected to
proceed before a judge rather than a jury. Id. at 30. Virginia is one of the few states in the
nation to permit jury sentencing.
203. See Sam Roberts, Prison Isn't as Mandatory as State's Gun Laws Say, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20,
2013, http://www.nytimes.comV2ol3/ol/2/nyregion/prison-not-as-mandatory-as-ny-state
-gun-laws-say.html. Like California's three strikes statute, see supra note 198, the New York
gun statute permits judges to sentence a defendant to less than three-and-a-half years if the
interests of justice so require. And as in California, that provision has been interpreted
unevenly across different localities. See Roberts, supra; supra note 198.
204. Compare Urbanized Areas and Urban Clusters: 2oo, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www
.census.gov/geo/maps-data/maps/pdfs/thematic/2oloua/UA2oloUAs andUCsMap.pdf
(last visited Feb. 1, 2012), with Geographic Boundaries of the United States Courts ofAppeals and
the United States District Courts, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/images
/CircuitMap.pdf (last visited Dec. 11, 2013). Note that the U.S. Census Bureau defines an
"urbanized area" as one containing more than so,ooo inhabitants and an "urbanized cluster"
as one containing between 2,500 and 50,000 inhabitants. See Urban and Rural Classification,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/geo/reference/urban-rural.html (last visited
Dec. 11, 2013). For a breakdown of the percentage of urban and rural areas in each county of
the United States, both by population and land area, see Percent Urban and Rural in 201o by
State and County, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www2.census.gov/geo/ua/PctUrbanRural
County.xls (last visited Feb. 10, 2014). For a state-by-state breakdown of the specific
counties within each federal judicial district, see Federal Judicial Districts, FEDSTATS
http://www.fedstats.gov/mapstats/fjd (last updated Apr. 20, 2007).
These maps and datasets illustrate the tremendous range of population densities within
federal judicial districts. But even these fail to fully capture the reality of lived experience.
Densely-populated suburban areas, such as Nassau County in New York State, can be
classified by the U.S. Census as "urbanized areas." See Urbanized Areas and Urban Clusters:
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districts urban areas might be more represented, while in others suburban or
rural areas might make up more of the mix. But there is not a single federal
district (with the exception of the District of Columbia) that does not at least
contain some portion of all three types of neighborhoods. 0 In this sense,
federal districts reflect the mix of communities that occurs on a national level.
This means that within the federal system there is less demographic
disconnect between the constituencies that elect the lawmakers (i.e., the
national electorate) and serve as jurors (i.e., the district-wide jury pool). For
street crime, which primarily affects one demographic (urban dwellers), the
demographic alignment between the legislative and adjudicative communities
is significant. If criminal adjudication at least partly serves to give voice to
"community" norms, it is unsurprising that in the federal system we see less
discord between the norms of the community that makes the laws and the
norms of the community that adjudicates violations of them, particularly when
it comes to cases of street crime.
This is not to say this aspect of the federal system is preferable; those who
think of the jury as a "check" on legislators and prosecutors might argue it is
not (an argument I engage in Part IV). But before we talk about the jury's role
in constraining the criminal law, we must appreciate the jury's relationship to
the polity-not just the polity that elects district attorneys and judges, but the
polity that elects lawmakers.26
2010, supra; Percent Urban and Rural in 201o by State and County, supra. Accordingly, it is
worth noting the U.S. Attorneys' Offices' own descriptions of their districts. For example,
the Eastern District of New York's website describes Nassau and Suffolk counties as
"suburban." See U.S. ATT'Y's OFF. FOR E. DIsTRIcT N.Y., http://www.justice.gov/usao/nye
(last visited Dec. 11, 2013).
20s. Compare Urbanized Areas and Urban Clusters, supra note 204, with Geographic Boundaries of
the United States Courts ofAppeals and the United States District Courts, supra note 204.
206. In this vein, it is also worth noting that where they exist, differences in jury selection
procedures between federal and local districts may exacerbate this distinction in legislative-
adjudicative alignment. All but seventeen federal districts compile juror venires from lists of
registered voters. See JODY GEORGE, DEIRDRE GOLASH & RUSSELL WHEELER, FED. JUD. CTR.,
HANDBOOK ON JURY USE IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 11-12 (1989) (noting that a small
number of districts with large minority populations have supplemented voter registration
lists with other sources, including driver's license records and state jury selection lists); John
P. Bueker, Note, Jury Source Lists: Does Supplementation Really Work?, 82 CORNELL L. REv.
390, 391 (1997). While some states similarly select jurors solely from voter registration lists,
many supplement from additional sources such as driver's license records or income or
property tax records. See Gregory E. Mize, Paula Hannaford-Agor & Nicole L. Waters, The
State-of-the-States Survey of Jury Improvement Efforts: A Compendium Report, NAT'L CENTER
FOR ST. CTs. 13-14 (Apr. 2007). One effect of these selection differences may be minority
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3. The Empowerment ofLaw over Norms
If the arguments of moral legitimists are correct, criminal law can do little
to move a community's social norms when those norms are well established
and widely adopted.207 But theories of moral legitimacy also recognize that,
when norms within a community differ, criminal law has the power to dictate
which norm will prevail -a power strengthened by the authority's reservoir of
public support.20s If the authority dictating the law is perceived as legitimate,
the community will defer to the law's enforcement. Over time, continued
enforcement might even serve to shift social norms to align more closely with
the law's dictates. Even if the law fails to shift norms, enforcement will
continue-people will be arrested, prosecuted, convicted, and sentenced in
accordance with prescribed penalties-as a result of the larger community's
deference to the authority as the legitimate arbiter of conflicting norms.
A larger and more geographically diverse community contains a larger and
more diverse set of norms. It follows, then, that the larger and more diverse the
community, the greater the criminal law's power to dictate norms. This is what
we see in the federal criminal justice system: a large "community"
encompassing broad swaths of a state's population, communities, and
attendant norms. Such norm diversity, in turn, empowers federal criminal law.
The empowerment is most visible in the prosecution of street crimes,
where the relevant norm-setting community is uniquely delineated along
geographic lines. A defendant accused of insider trading would almost certainly
never face twelve jurors all within the community of Wall Street investors and
traders, regardless of whether he were tried in federal or state court. But a
defendant accused of selling heroin on the corner could, conceivably, face quite
different communities, from the perspective of norms, in a federal versus local
forum. The local forum would almost certainly include jurors who were
personally affected by drugs or neighborhood drug dealing and its attendant
violence; who knew someone so affected, a drug dealer, or the family members
representation on juries. But see Bucker, supra, at 392 (arguing that source supplementation
has been shown not to enhance minority representation on juries). But another important
effect is perceptions of legitimacy: to the extent that federal districts cull only from the ranks
of registered voters, they are selecting from among those citizens who participate in the
larger political process, and who therefore may be more predisposed to believing in the
system's legitimacy. (I am grateful to Hosea Harvey for pointing me to the issue of jury
selection procedures.)
207. See supra notes 134-140 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 128-129 and accompanying text.
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of an imprisoned drug dealer; or who were, or knew others who were, subjects
of police stops. The federal forum might result in a jury bereft of any personal
experience with street-level drug dealing and enforcement of the drug laws.
The jury, though, is only the start of the law-over-norm dynamic in federal
court; it is at sentencing that the real work gets done. Consider one salient
example. In inner-city communities, illegal gun possession, particularly by
those already involved in the criminal justice system, is a norm of street life
that conflicts with, and effectively lays siege to, the norms of the large majority
of community residents (who are law-abiding). 20 9 The criminal law in nearly
every state aligns with the norms of the law-abiding residents and prohibits
convicted felons from carrying a firearm.21 o Yet in some local urban courts, the
street norm overshadows the criminal law. In these courts, non-custodial
sentences are not infrequent, notwithstanding the law's applicable penalties.
For instance, in New York prior to 20o6 (when the legislature decreed a
three-and-a-half-year mandatory-minimum penalty for illegal gun
possession), non-custodial sentences for illegal gun possession were
common-even though then-existing statutes mandated a sentence of two to
eight years, subject only to departures for mitigating circumstances."' And in
209. Research indicates that anywhere from forty to ninety percent of youths involved in the
criminal justice system carry firearms. See DEANNA WILKINSON & JEFFREY FAGAN,
SITUATIONAL CONTEXTS OF GUN USE BY YOUNG MALES IN INNER CITIES 6 (2000),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/nij/grants/194120.pdf; see also id. at 1-2 ("[G]uns have
become an important part of the discourse of social interactions in modem urban life, with
both symbolic meaning (power and control), social meaning (status and identity), and
strategic importance. Getting and using a gun against another person has become a rite of
passage into manhood, or at least into a respectable social identity within this context.").
210. See generally BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS & EXPLOSIVES, STATE LAWS
AND PUBLISHED ORDINANCES - FIREARMS (31st ed. 2010-2011), https://www.atf
.gov/files/publications/download/p/atf-p-5300-s-31st-editiion/20o10-201i-atf-book-final.pdf
(collecting firearms laws and ordinances of all fifty states, effective through January 2011).
In a number of states convicted felons may have their firearms rights restored under certain
circumstances; such state reinstatements are recognized and permitted under federal law.
See Michael Luo, Felons Finding it Easy to Regain Gun Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13,
2011, http://www.nytimes.coM/201/11/14/us/felons-finding-it-easy-to-regain-gun-rights
.html (reporting on reinstatement rules in ni states). But see Jay Buckey, Firearms for Felons?
A Proposal to Prohibit Felons from Possessing Firearms in Vermont, 35 VT. L. REv. 957, 957 (2011)
(noting that "Vermont has no state law that bans firearms for felons").
211. See New York State Violent Felony Offense Processing 2oo6-2010, REP. N.Y. ST. Div. CRIM. JUST.
SERVICES 6, 13 (2012), http://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/crimnet/ojsa/nys-violent-felony
-offense-processing-2006-zoo.pdf (noting that as a result of the law, which went into effect
in November 2oo6, prison sentences for gun possession crimes in New York City increased
by 126.8% between 2006 and 2010, even as the total number of weapons possession cases in
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the Bronx, custodial sentences in gun cases remain rare, despite the new law.212
In Virginia in 2000, following the passage of mandatory sentences for certain
gun crimes, some judges evaded the new sentencing laws through the use of
charge reductions, bench trial acquittals, and suspension of sentences. 13
Probationary sentences for gun possession are not uncommon in Philadelphia,
where, in 2010, fifteen percent of defendants convicted under Pennsylvania's
felon-in-possession statute received sentences of probation and an additional
twelve percent received sentences of imprisonment in county jail, for which the
average minimum hovered around one year- notwithstanding sentencing
guidelines ranging from eighteen months to ten years depending on the
defendant's criminal history (guidelines that are, incidentally, substantially
similar to federal sentencing guidelines for the equivalent crime).2 14
In federal courts, in contrast, most judges tend to have little tolerance for
illegal gun possession. In 2012, the median sentence for federal defendants
convicted of illegal possession of a firearm was nearly four years,
notwithstanding the absence of any legislatively-mandated penalty.2 5 Federal
judges could choose, if they wished, to sentence felons-in-possession of
firearms to non-custodial sentences or even sentences far below the advisory
guidelines range, yet they almost never do.21' A sentence of probation for illegal
firearm possession is practically unheard of in federal court. 17
the city declined by 18%); N.Y. PENAL LAW §5 70.02.3(C), 7 0.02.4 (b) (McKinney 2013).
212. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
213. See VIRGINIA EXILE REPORT, supra note 72, at 37-38, 53, 58-59.
214. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 61o5(a.1)(i), 1103(2) (West 2000 & Supp. 2013) (providing
statutory penalties for the offense); Summary of Sentences by Offense Category and County, PA.
SENT'G COMM'N 2010 (on file with author and available from Pennsylvania Commission on
Sentencing) (for 18 P.S.A. § 6105); PENNSYLVANIA SENTENCING GUIDELINES
IMPLEMENTATION MANUAL 36, 53 (6th ed. 2008); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §
2K2.1(a)(6) & Sentencing Table (2010) (guidelines range from i months to ten years
depending on the circumstances of the offense and the defendant's criminal history). I cite
to the manuals in effect as of 2010, the latest year for which sentencing data is available from
the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing. With respect to the felon-in-possession
offenses, there have been no subsequent amendments to the sentencing guidelines in either
Pennsylvania or the federal system. See PENNSYLVANIA SENTENCING GUIDELINES
IMPLEMENTATION MANUAL 47, 71 (7 th ed. 2012); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §
2K2.1(a) (6) & Sentencing Table (2013).
215. HOGAN, supra note 67, at tbl.D-5, (showing a median sentence of 46 months).
216. See id.
217. See 2012 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 66, at tbl.12 (reporting that just 2.9% of defendants
charged with firearms-related crimes received only probation). This statistic, moreover,
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I use the felon-in-possession statutes in these three states" as an
illustration of a more widespread phenomenon of disparate sentencing patterns
in street crime cases between the federal and local forums. In 2004, for instance
(the most recent year for which data are available), twenty-two percent of all
defendants convicted of violent felony offenses in state courts received a non-
custodial sentence. 9 In federal court, violent felony offenses almost never
result in non-custodial sentences. 22 0 These sorts of disparities are, of course,
the product of many forces, including case and defendant selection and, in
some jurisdictions, differing applicable penalties (whether mandated or
advisory)." In this respect, though, the felon-in-possession example offered
here is particularly useful: these crimes are, by and large, the same across
forums - both with respect to the nature of the crime and the applicable
penalties - and yet forum-based disparities persist.
This is norm diversity in action. Federal judges preside over a diverse class
of criminal cases arising from a diverse community of litigants. In addition to
street crimes, federal judges also see a fair share of white-collar crimes,
immigration offenses, and interstate narcotics trafficking. They also see many
more civil cases compared to their local urban counterparts (who, in many
includes those defendants who received a sentence reduction for cooperation with the
government.
218. I chose these states because (i) they have publicly-available, offense-specific sentencing data
for felon-in-possession cases in a mode that is readily comparable to the equivalent federal
crime (on the dearth of offense-specific state sentencing data, see Marc L. Miller, A Map of
Sentencing and a Compass for Judges: Sentencing Information Systems, Transparency, and the
Next Generation ofReform, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 1351, 1354-55 (2005)); and (ii) these states, or
cities within the states, have made visible efforts to combat gun crime through the use of
these statutes. The dynamic in illegal gun possession cases in these states, though, has been
observed by researchers more broadly. See EDMUND F. MCGARRELL ET AL., NAT'L INSTS.
JUSTICE, PROJECT SAFE NEIGHBORHOODS - A NATIONAL PROGRAM TO REDUCE GUN CRIME:
FINAL PROJECT REPORT 16-17 & n.15 (2009) ("PSN officials in many jurisdictions report that
for years illegal possession of a firearm by a felon or concealed carrying offenses, and even
crimes committed with a firearm present but no shooting, were routinely treated as non-
violent offenses with high rates of dropped charges, dismissed cases, and suspended
sentences.").
219. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Felony Sentences in State Courts, 2004, U.S. DEP'T JUST. 3 (2007),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssco 4 .pdf.
220. 2012 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 66, at tbl.12 (showing that for most violent crimes no
defendants received probation, for robbery 1.9% of defendants received probation, and for
assault io.6% of defendants received probation; the table does not indicate whether these
defendants were cooperators).
221. See sources cited supra notes io, 13.
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jurisdictions, preside over only criminal cases).m And they see litigants from
urban, suburban, and rural areas. This means that, when a defendant charged
with possessing a gun appears before a federal judge for sentencing, he does
not come on the heels of ten others like him. In all likelihood, he also does not
come on the heels of ten others who have committed more serious violent
crimes, such as murder, armed robbery, or rape. To the federal judge, the
defendant's gun possession appears very much aberrant, outside the norms of
the large community over which the judge exercises her authority.2 3
In local courthouses, street norms often translate into courthouse norms:
when certain criminal conduct is endemic, prosecutions of those crimes become
routine. Routine cases tend to garner less outrage; the result is a courtroom
culture of acceptance, in which street norms tend to dictate the "going rate" of
punishment for a crime. 24 Federal prosecution of street crime is largely an
effort to shift that culture by leveraging the federal law's power over
entrenched local courthouse norms and the street norms that generate them.s2 1
The norm-shifting effort is indeed a key component in many federal gun
prosecution campaigns. Posters are displayed in local communities advertising
the sentences given in federal gun cases, and defendants in local gun cases may
be threatened with federal prosecution if they do not agree to a sentence closely
approximating what they would likely receive in federal court."2
222. It is a common feature of many urban justice systems to assign judges to either a criminal or
civil docket. This is the practice, for instance, in New York, Chicago, Philadelphia,
Baltimore, Washington, D.C., and San Francisco.
223. There are certainly other factors at work, too. Federal prosecutors tend to prosecute
defendants with more egregious criminal records, which naturally garner more severe
sanction. But to some degree this explanation is circular: federal prosecutors choose such
defendants precisely because they have not, despite their records, received sufficient (in the
prosecutor's view) sentences in local court. The examples offered in the Introduction
illustrate this dynamic.
224. See MCGARRELL ET AL., supra note 218, at 16-17 & n.15 (discussing the dynamic in some
jurisdictions when gun cases become routine). For studies of how courtroom norms
develop, particularly with respect to the disposition of frequently-prosecuted crimes, see
Roy B. FLEMMING, PETER F. NARDULLI & JAMES EISENSTEIN, THE CRAFT OF JUSTICE:
POLITICS AND WORK IN CRIMINAL COURT COMMUNITIES (1992); and PETER F. NARDULLI,
JAMES EISENSTEIN & ROY B. FLEMMING, THE TENOR OF JUSTICE: CRIMINAL COURTS AND THE
GUILTY PLEA PROCESS (1988).
225. For a theoretical account of punishment's expressive power to influence social norms, see
Kahan, supra note 147.
226. See DECKER & MCDEVITT, supra note 52, at iii, 8; Press Release, supra note 54 (discussing the
Maryland U.S. Attorney's Office's use of "Federal Letters of Intent to Prosecute").
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The success of the federal norm-shifting endeavor is certainly debatable.
Even assuming punishment's ability to alter norms of conduct-a highly
disputed contention 2 2 7 -the vastly fewer numbers of federal compared to state
cases present a practical challenge, to say the least, to any real norm-shifting
exercise. But at least in the federal courthouse, for those few cases prosecuted,
and perhaps in local forums where federal prosecution is threatened, the
criminal law acquires more power than it otherwise might.
C. Moral Credibility: Penalties, Perceptions, and Communities
When it comes to street crime, moral credibility primarily revolves around
penalties. There is no disagreement as to whether armed robbery should be
criminalized; the debate is simply over what the penalty for such conduct
should be.. While some might posit that the same cannot be said for drug
crimes, in fact the public overwhelmingly supports criminalization of "hard"
drugs such as powder cocaine, crack, and heroin.22' The severity of the
penalties associated with drug crimes and the concern that many drug
offenders should receive treatment rather than imprisonment animate much of
the debate over the "war on drugs."
Moral credibility in street crime, then, turns principally on punishment,
and the issue of punishment is morally fraught-all the more so for street
crime because it primarily impacts the poor and minorities. What is the "right"
sentence for a particular crime or a particular defendant? Is this question even
answerable? And if it isn't, then what empowers a legislature or a sentencing
commission to decree punishment? In particular, what inspires fidelity to the
penalty-drafters' wishes? These questions underlie the remainder of this Part,
which considers the extent to which federal penalties pertaining to street crime
align with public and judicial views, the ramifications of moral credibility gaps
227. See Meares, supra note 137; Robinson & Darley, supra note 117. But see Kahan, supra note 147.
228. See, e.g., Americans Decry War on Drugs, Support Legalizing Marijuana, ANGUS REID PUB.
OPINION 1-2 (June 6, 2012), http://www.angus-reid.con/wp-content/uploads/2o12/o6/2012
.o6.06_DrugsUSA.pdf (finding, in a nationwide survey of 1,017 adults, that less than lo%
of respondents favored legalizing powder cocaine, crack, heroin, or methamphetamine,
while over 5o% favored legalizing marijuana); ii% Favor Legalizing, Regulating Cocaine,
RASMUSSEN REP. (May 21, 2012), http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public-content
Aifestyle/general_1ifestyle/may_2012/11 favor legalizing-regulating-cocaine (finding, in a
survey of i,ooo likely voters, that only ni% of respondents favored legalizing cocaine). I
discuss the federal response to marijuana-legalization trends infra notes 265-266 and
accompanying text.
2301
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
within the federal system, and why moral credibility with respect to street
crime might differ across federal and local forums.
1. Moral Credibility in the Federal System
Empirical data on public and judicial views of federal penalties reveal three
salient facts. First, there is no "uniform" view as to the appropriate sentence for
a crime; individual views differ, sometimes markedly. Second, despite the
absence of uniformity on an individual level, with few exceptions federal
penalties accord with median public (and judicial) views. And third, in the few
instances where there is a significant gap between federal penalties and public
and judicial views-what I refer to as a "moral credibility gap"-there are
ramifications for federal enforcement power, albeit not at the extremes we see
in some local county courts. This Subsection sets out data supporting the
above points, and the next Subsection considers moral credibility's potential
role in forum-based outcome disparities in prosecutions of street crime.
Two important studies reveal an absence of uniform public opinion as to
the appropriate sentences for federal crimes. In 1994, Peter Rossi and Richard
Berk were tasked by the U.S. Sentencing Commission with undertaking the
first (and, as yet, only) systematic study of public opinions of federal sentences
under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines." 9 The Rossi and Berk study
compared the Guidelines rules for determining sentences, and the resulting
sentences, with the rules and sentences preferred by a representative sample of
the American public.2 3o It drew two principal conclusions. First, there was
substantial variation among respondents with respect to appropriate
penalties.2 3' As the authors succinctly put it: "One person's two-year sentence
229. PETER H. Rossi & RICHARD A. BERK, JUST PUNISHMENTS: FEDERAL GUIDELINES AND PUBLIC
VIEWS COMPARED 4-6, 13-15 (1997).
230. Id. at 4, 33. Respondents were given vignettes on a series of crimes, each setting forth
specific details about the nature of the crime and its impact, as well as background
information about the offender. Id. at 34-50, 55. For each vignette, respondents were asked
to specify the type and amount of punishment they would impose. Id. at 40. By varying
specific features in each vignette (for example, the use of a gun in a robbery, or whether the
defendant had children), the researchers ascertained the weight respondents accorded to
particular features, thus providing an account of what factors the public considers important
in apportioning punishment. Id. at 36-37. The researchers then assessed the extent to which
the Guidelines reflected public views of sentences and sentencing rationales. Id. at 75-79.
231. Id. at 79-82.
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may be the equivalent of another's four-year sentence." 32 Second, despite the
lack of uniformity among respondents, the Guidelines penalties tended, in
most cases, to approximate the respondent median or mean. 33 There was one
glaring exception to this general trend: crack cocaine penalties. Median
respondent views as to the appropriate penalties for crack offenses were
approximately twelve years lower than existing federal penalties under statutes
and the sentencing guidelines. 34
In 2010, the U.S. Sentencing Commission amassed federal judges' opinions
of the Guidelines, along with statutorily-mandated penalties, through a
detailed survey.235 The Sentencing Commission's survey, while using a
different methodology than the Rossi and Berk study,236 likewise revealed a
wide range of opinions on the appropriate sentences for given crime categories.
232. Id. at 98. An example from the study illustrates the point. In a vignette in which the
defendant is convicted of robbing a convenience store, the median sentence of respondents
was 5 years; the mean was 8.5 years. Id. at 64 tbl.4.5. These appear to approximate the
Guidelines median and mean, which are 6.5 years and 7.6 years, respectively. Id. at 92
tbl. 5.5. Yet individual responses varied considerably. Of the 596 respondents to this vignette,
1.6% chose probation, 0.3%, chose death, 4% chose life imprisonment, and the remainder
varied within those extremes. Id. at 64 tbl-4.5.
233. Id. at 149 (finding "remarkable agreement between average respondent sentences and
guidelines sentences, not just overall but in sentencing determinants. Time and again, the
patterns [of guidelines and respondent sentences for given crimes] were nearly identical").
Conformity between respondents' views and the Guidelines' penalties, though, varied for
each vignette and across different crimes. With respect to a street robbery, for instance, the
respondent median was 4.1 years lower than the Guidelines median, but there was almost no
mean difference. Id. at 88 tbl.5.4 . For firearms offenses, the respondent median was 0.5 years
lower than the Guidelines median, but the respondent mean was 2.5 years higher than the
Guidelines mean. Id.
234. Crack penalties "represent[ed] the greatest disparity between the guidelines and
respondents" in the Rossi and Berk study. Id. at 95. The median respondent sentence for a
crack cocaine offense vignette was io years, while the median Guidelines sentence for the
same vignette was 22 years. Id. at 92 tbl-5-5.
235. Results of Survey of United States District Judges: January 201o Through March 2010, U.S.
SENT'G COMM'N (June 2010) [hereinafter U.S.S.C. Survey], http://www.ussc.gov/Research
_andStatistics/ResearchProjects/Surveys/2oioo6o8judgeSurvey.pdf.
236. Whereas the Rossi and Berk study used a factorial survey to gather data on what penalties
respondents believed were appropriate for a given set of facts and then compared the results
to the sentence that would be calculated under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines on those
facts, see Rossi & BERK, supra note 229, the Sentencing Commission's survey instead asked
judges whether, as a general matter, they believed the Guidelines and certain statutorily
mandated penalties were "appropriate," "too high," or "too low," U.S.S.C. Survey, supra
note 235, at tbls.1, 8.
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For any given crime category, judges expressed differing views on the
appropriateness of applicable penalties. But on the whole, a slight but
consistent majority of judges believed both the Guidelines and statutorily-
mandated penalties were appropriate -with the exception of crack cocaine and
certain child pornography penalties. 37 Nearly three-quarters of surveyed
judges believed that both Guidelines and mandatory minimum penalties for
crack cocaine possession were too high.3' The only other crime category for
which judges expressed a similar view was possession and receipt of child
pornography (an offense category on which Rossi and Berk did not canvass
public views and for which, in any event, Guidelines penalties were then far
lower).239
What are we to draw from this data? On one level, it empirically confirms
what criminal practitioners know to be true: when it comes to sentencing,
moral beliefs can be wildly divergent. Indeed, the Guidelines were borne of the
desire to mitigate this inescapable reality. On another level, though, the data
reveals a less obvious trend: there is, to a large degree, moral alignment
between federal penalties and average public and judicial views. How much
might this alignment explain the relatively high degree of adherence to
prescribed penalties within the federal system, at least with respect to street
crimes?24o Let us consider the two documented instances of moral credibility
237. U.S.S.C. Survey, supra note 235, at tbls.1, 8.
238. Seventy-six percent thought the mandatory minimum penalties for crack cocaine were too
high, and 70% thought the Guidelines penalties were too high. Id. at tbls.i, 8. The survey
was conducted from January through March 2010, while the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010,
which greatly reduced the mandatory minimum penalties for crack offenses, was pending in
Congress but had not yet been passed. See Bill Summary and Status, In1th Congress, S.
1789, LIBR. or CONGRESS: THOMAs, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?diu:SNo1789
:@@@D&summl& (last visited Mar. n1, 2014).
239. 71% of judges believed the mandatory minimum penalty for receipt of child pornography
was too high, and 69% and 70% of judges believed the Guidelines penalties were too high
for the offenses of, respectively, receipt and possession of child pornography. U.S.S.C.
Survey, supra note 235, at tbls.i, 8.
240. See 2012 Annual Report, U.S. SENT'G COMM'N 44 (2012), http://www.ussc.gov/Research
andStatistics/Annual-Reports-andSourcebooks/2012/arl2toc.htm. In only 13.9% of
cases did judges sentence defendants to a term below the applicable Guidelines range, where
the below-range sentence was pursuant to Booker rather than a guidelines' departure
provision and not at the prosecution's request; of those cases, the median decrease from the
minimum guidelines term was 14 months, a median decrease of 35.1%. Id. For street crimes
(comprising the offense categories of murder, manslaughter, robbery, burglary, drugs and
firearms), the average rate of Booker-based below guidelines sentences was 13.5%, and the
median percent decrease from the Guidelines minimum ranged between 28% (for firearms)
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gaps in federal penalties and their ramifications for enforcement, sentencing,
and penalty reform.
Start with crack, a story that is, by now, well known. Congress' decision to
impose significantly enhanced penalties for trafficking in the base form of
cocaine (crack) as opposed to the powder form (cocaine) began, after a number
of years, to meet with a rising tide of disapproval from nearly all sides. Legal
scholars, federal judges, the Sentencing Commission, and even law
enforcement - including then-Attorney General Janet Reno - publicly criticized
the crack/powder penalty disparity, both for its lack of grounding in scientific
and criminological data and for the racially disparate sentences it generated.24 '
Anecdotal reports surfaced of jury nullification and judicial resignations.2 4 2
Though it took decades, Congress ultimately heeded the calls and amended the
laws in 2010 to substantially lessen, but not eliminate, the crack-powder
disparity.243
Inside the courtroom, however, the crack story weaves a considerably more
complicated narrative. In some respects, the disaffection did not generate
palpable results. Defendants in crack cases cooperated at least as often as
defendants in other narcotics cases.4 4 Pre-Blakely/Booker, judges sentenced
and ioo% (for simple drug possession). See 2012 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 66, at tbls.27,
31C. Local prosecutors and judges do not necessarily accord state penalty-drafters the same
level of deference. See supra notes 196-203 and accompanying text.
241. Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321, 2328-29 (2012) (reciting the history of crack laws,
subsequent public opposition, and the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010); William Spade, Jr.,
Beyond the 1oo:1 Ratio: Towards a Rational Cocaine Sentencing Policy, 38 ARiz. L. REV. 1233,
1282 (1996) (describing the critical response to the disparity among African-American
commentators and academics, as well as federal judges, prosecutors, and juries). Despite
Reno's criticism, her Justice Department did not ultimately support proposed amendments
to the laws. It is worth noting as well that criticism, though widespread, was not uniform.
See Randall Kennedy, The State, Criminal Law, and Racial Discrimination: A Comment, 107
HARv. L. REv. 1255, 1256 (1994) (arguing that "the state was justified in penalizing
possession of crack cocaine more harshly than possession of powdered cocaine"); Meares,
supra note 194, at 138 n.2 (citing sources supporting the federal crack penalty scheme).
242. Spade, supra note 241, at 1281-82; William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L.
REV. 1795, 1827 (1998) (reporting anecdotal evidence ofjury nullification).
243. See Fair Sentencing Act of 2olo, Pub. L. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (codified as amended at 21
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) (2012)) (reducing the powder/crack ratio of the weight required to
generate certain mandatory sentences from loo:1 to 18:1).
244. In the year preceding Booker, 29.5% of defendants convicted of crack cocaine offenses earned
a government-sponsored downward departure based on substantial assistance to the
government, compared to 26.9% of powder cocaine defendants, 21.5% of heroin
defendants, 31% of methamphetamine defendants, and 17% of marijuana defendants. See
U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, ANNUAL SOURCEBOOK OF SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl. 45 (9 th ed.
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crack defendants to within-Guidelines sentences nearly as often as they did
powder cocaine offenders. 45 And prosecutors continued to bring large
numbers of crack cases, disposing of them without significant discounts.46
The disaffection did manifest in sentencing post-Booker, when non-
government-sponsored, below-Guidelines sentences for crack offenses began
to increase steadily, at a rate and to a degree higher than for powder offenses." 7
Moreover, this trend immediately reversed following the enactment of the
FSA: in just the quarter following its enactment, the amount of non-
2004), http://www.ussc.gov/Research and Statistics/AnnualReports-andSourcebooks
/2oo4/sbtoco4.htm. That distribution of cooperation rates among drug offenders has not
substantially changed following either Booker or the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA),
which reduced the crack/powder penalty disparity. See 2012 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 66, at
tbl. 45 (reporting substantial assistance rates of 27.1% for crack defendants, 28.2% for powder
cocaine defendants, 31.5% for methamphetamine defendants, 24.3% for heroin defendants,
and 16.3% for marijuana defendants).
245. See U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING
POLICY 51 (2007).
246. In the ten years preceding the FSA, crack cocaine cases as a percentage of all narcotics cases
remained consistently above 20%, with a low of 20.2% in 2002, and a high of 24.3% in 2008.
See Annual Reports and Sourcebook Archives, U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, http://www.ussc.gov
/Research_andStatistics/AnnualReports-andSourcebooks/Archives.cfm (click on the
link in the "Sourcebook" column for each of the desired years (2000-2010), then click the
link for "Primary Drug Type of Offenders Sentenced Under Each Drug Guideline," which
corresponds to Table 33) (last visited Dec. 11, 2013). It is only since the passage of the FSA
that federal crack prosecutions have declined. See id. at year 2011 (17.3%) and 2012
(13.8%) (2012 link is at http://www.ussc.gov/Research andStatistics/AnnuaLReports-and
Sourcebooks/2o12/Table33.pdf). During the pre-FSA years, moreover, the government
agreed to very few below-guidelines sentences for non-cooperating defendants prosecuted
for crack offenses: between 2oo6, when the Sentencing Commission began reporting
government-sponsored below-range sentences for non-cooperating defendants, and 2010,
the year the FSA was enacted, the government only agreed to below-guidelines sentences in,
on average, 3.2% of crack cases. See Sourcebook Archives, supra, (click on the link in the
"Sourcebook" column for each of the desired years (2006-2010), then click the link for
"Sentences Relative to the Guideline Range for Drug Offenders by Each Drug Type," which
corresponds to Table 45) (last visited Dec. 11, 2013). Unfortunately, there is no data analysis
available on national conviction rates for crack offenses.
247. U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, REPORT ON THE CONTINUING IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V. BOOKER
ON FEDERAL SENTENCING, PART C 6, 7 (2012) [hereinafter BOOKER CRACK COCAINE
REPORT], http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative andPublicAffairs/Congressional-Testimony
andReports/Booker Reports/2ol2_Booker/PartC4 CrackCocaineOffenses.pdf; U.S.
SENT'G COMM'N, REPORT ON THE CONTINUING IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V. BOOKER ON
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government-sponsored, below-Guidelines sentences decreased by about one
third.248
Now consider the story of child pornography penalties.4 9 While the crack
story might be characterized as one of public views diverging from static laws,
the child pornography story is one of laws steadily and quickly moving off-
track from public (or at least, judicial) views.25 For more than three decades,
Congress has steadily increased maximum penalties, added mandatory
minimum penalties, and repeatedly directed the Sentencing Commission to
impose harsher Guidelines penalties for child pornography offenses.2 s' As a
result, penalties for child pornography are now higher than for actual child
abuse, a situation that strikes many judges as unjust.2 2 The political story, too,
is quite different. Apart from the vocal dissent of some federal judges,2 53 there
has been far less public outcry to Congress, at least as compared to what
occurred in the case of crack penalties. 254 This may be in part because the
divergence between penalties and views has become pronounced only fairly
recently, with the enactment of the 2003 PROTECT Act. 2 Or it may be in part
248. See BOOKER CRACK COCAINE REPORT, supra note 247, at 7 (showing a decrease of non-
Government sponsored below-Guidelines cases from approximately 30% to approximately
20%).
249. Although child pornography is not a street crime, and for this reason falls outside this
Article's focus, I consider it here because any consideration of the crack penalties suggests a
comparison to the other documented moral credibility gap in the federal system. As
discussed infra notes 260-262 and accompanying text, a number of differences in the nature
of these crimes makes comparison difficult. Despite these limitations, though, it is
nevertheless worth considering other, non-offense-specific differences that might also
explain the somewhat different paths of these two moral credibility gaps.
250. See Carol S. Steiker, Lessons from Two Failures: Sentencing for Cocaine and Child Pornography
Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in the United States, 76 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 27, 37
(2013). As noted, Rossi and Berk did not canvass public views on pornography penalties,
which were at the time substantially less severe than they were 15 years hence, at the time of
the Sentencing Commission's survey of federal judges. See supra note 239 and accompanying
text.
251. U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: THE HISTORY OF THE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
GUIDELINEs 6-8 (2009), http://www.ussc.gov/Research andStatistics/ResearchProjects
/Sex Offenses/2009103o History-ChildPornography-Guidelines.pdf.
252. Steiker, supra note 250, at 37-44.
253. Id. at 38.
as4. Thus far, there have been no bills proposed in Congress to reduce child pornography
penalties. In comparison, bills to amend the crack/powder disparity were introduced in
Congress almost yearly beginning in 1993. See Steiker, supra note 250, at 30.
255. Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of
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because the disparity between child pornography and child abuse penalties
doesn't raise the disturbing specter of racially disparate outcomes, as did the
crack/powder disparity. Or it may be because those who view and traffic in
child pornography are simply less sympathetic as a political matter. Whatever
the reason, there has been little in the way of genuine movement for penalty
reform inside Congress, at least at present.
Inside the courtroom, though, the divide between applicable penalties and
judicial views has real effects. Non-government-sponsored, below-Guidelines
sentences for possession, receipt, or distribution of child pornography, at
nearly forty percent, far eclipse any other offense category.25' And the degree of
departure is substantial: sentences for such offenses are discounted by thirty-
eight percent, which translates into a median discount of forty months - again,
far above almost any other offense category.'5 Prosecutorial practices have
changed, too: as penalties gradually increased, prosecutors offered more
frequent and more substantial sentencing discounts to defendants.2s And
unlike in crack cases, at least some federal judges in child pornography cases
have been reported to blatantly flout mandatory minimum penalties by
throwing out jury verdicts and ordering retrials or threatening to advise juries
of the mandatory penalties in direct disregard of permissible federal
procedure.5 9
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003) (codified in scattered sections of 18, 28, 42,
and 47 U.S.C.).
256. 2012 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 66, at tbl.27.
257. 2012 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 66, at tbl. 31C.
258. See U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, FEDERAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY OFFENSES 134-35 (2012),
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative andPublicAffairs/CongressionalTestimony-and
Reports/SexOffenseTopics/201212_FederalChildPornographyOffenses/FullReport
toCongress.pdf (observing that government-sponsored below range sentences have
steadily increased from 2.1% in 2005 to 11.2% in 2010).
259. See A.G. Sulzberger, Defiant Judge Takes on Child Pornography Law, N.Y. TIMEs, May
21, 201o, http://www.nytimes.com/2o1o/oS/22/nyregion/22judge.htmI (reporting how,
following a guilty verdict in a federal jury trial for possession and receipt of child
pornography, Judge Jack Weinstein informed the jurors of the penalties that would result;
learned that a number of jurors would have voted to acquit had they been aware of the
penalties; and subsequently dismissed the verdict and ordered a new trial); Benjamin
Weiser, A Judge's Struggle to Avoid Imposing a Penalty He Hated, N.Y. TiMEs, Jan. 13,
2004, http://www.nytimes.cof/2oo4/o/13/nyregiorVa-judge-s-struggle-to-avoid-imposing
-a-penalty-he-hated.html (reporting how, in a federal trial for advertising child
pornography, then-district Judge Gerry Lynch pledged to advise jurors, pre-deliberations, of
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How, then, to explain the different trajectory of these two moral credibility
gaps? There is, of course, no single answer to this question. One reason is the
differences between defendants. Crack defendants generally have substantial
criminal histories, while child pornography defendants typically have no
criminal history, a circumstance that might make within-Guidelines sentences
in many crack cases more palatable for judges.26 o Child pornography
defendants are also overwhelmingly white whereas crack defendants are
overwhelmingly black, a difference that might lead some to conclude that the
contrasts between the two sentencing patterns reflect some level of racism
within the system, however unconscious."' Still another explanation is the
relationship of the Guidelines to mandatory minimum terms. In the case of
crack cocaine, the Sentencing Commission gradually sought to reduce
Guidelines penalties in an effort to bring the Guidelines more in line with
public and judicial views, which in turn led to less distance between mandatory
terms and Guidelines ranges. In the case of child pornography, Congress
usurped the Commission's role, effectively legislating Guidelines ranges that
grew far higher than mandatory minimum terms."'
26o. Compare U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, supra note 258, at 143 (reporting that, in 2010, over 8o% of
child pornography offenders fell within the Guidelines' lowest criminal history category,
Category I), with U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, ANNUAL SOURCEBOOK OF SENTENCING STATISTICS
tbl.37 (15th ed. 2010) [hereinafter 2010 SOURCEBOOK], http://www.ussc.gov
/Research andStatistics/AnnualReports andSourcebooks/2010/sbtocio.htm (reporting
that 28.3% of crack offenders fell within the Guidelines' highest criminal history category,
Category VI, while 22.2% fell within Category I and the rest were distributed fairly evenly
across the remaining categories). The differences in criminal history, though, don't entirely
explain the greater adherence to the Guidelines in crack cases given that the applicable
Guidelines range takes into account an offender's criminal history.
261. Compare U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, supra note 258, at 143 (reporting that, in 201o, approximately
90% of child pornography defendants were white), with 2010 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 260,
at tbl. 34 (reporting that, in 2010, 78.5% of crack defendants were black); see also MICHELLE
ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 102-05 (2010) (describing the rise of racial bias in crack
cocaine prosecutions). The primary reason a large majority of judges objected to federal
crack penalties, though, is because of the penalties' racially disparate impact -a circumstance
that would seem to undercut race-based theories of relatively greater Guidelines-adherence
in crack cases. Moreover, post-Booker sentencing practices in crack cases on the whole
mitigated racial disparities wrought by the federal crack laws. See Amy Baron-Evans & Kate
Stith, Booker Rules, 16o U. PA. L. REv. 1631, 1688 (2012) ("By imposing below-guideline
sentences that they could not have imposed under the mandatory guidelines, in fiscal year
2010 alone, judges spared more than 86o black defendants sentenced under the crack or
career offender guidelines over 3300 years of unnecessary incarceration.").
262. See Steiker, supra note 250, at 28-33, 37-41 (discussing the different trajectories of
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But perhaps the most compelling explanation stems from the dynamic
underlying the Guidelines/mandatory minimum relationship: the trajectory of
the moral credibility gap. In the case of crack, public and judicial views
gradually parted ways from a static law. In the case of child pornography, the
law continues to part ways, quite drastically, from judicial views. And so in the
former scenario, there was hope and promise that the penalty-drafters would
ultimately narrow the credibility gap (which they did).6 3 In the latter, it is
primarily the penalty-drafters who have created and enlarged the credibility
gap. This bodes poorly for legislative reform. Trust in the legislative system is
eroded, and courts feel it incumbent upon themselves to correct the imbalance.
Moral credibility, then, impacts federal criminal enforcement power. Most
federal penalties (and particularly those for street crime) have substantial
public and judicial support. Those that don't have been less consistently
applied. And the extent of the divergence between written and applied law
depends on the trajectory of written law and public views. Where the system is
at least receptive (if not immediately responsive) to public views, actors within
that system are more willing to trust the system to make necessary corrections.
Where the system is perceived as having deliberately run off-track from
community conceptions, actors within the system are more likely to flout it.264
Indeed, the Justice Department's own recognition of this dynamic lies at the
heart of its recent efforts to align its enforcement practices with evolving
community views on penalties - and even, in the case of marijuana, on
decriminalization.26 5 The Department has launched these initiatives not merely
congressional and Commission penalty-drafting with respect to crack and child
pornography).
263. The FSA was indeed an effort to engender greater credibility for federal law and for the law
enforcement agencies (both federal and local) that enforce it. See Restoring Fairness to Federal
Sentencing: Addressing the Crack-Powder Disparity: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime &
Drugs of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 1uth Cong. 26 (2oo9) (statement ofJohn F. Timoney,
Chief of Police, Miami Police Dep't) (advocating for the elimination of the crack/powder
penalty disparity on the ground that "police departments across America face a much more
difficult challenge gaining the trust of their communities if there are glaring inequities in the
justice system that are allowed to persist"); id. at 4-6 (statement of Lanny A. Breuer,
Assistant Att'y Gen., Criminal Div., U.S. Dep't Justice) ("Public trust and confidence are
essential elements of an effective criminal justice system. Our laws and their enforcement
must not only be fair, but they must also be perceived as fair. . . . We also believe that the
[sentencing] structure [for crack offenses] is especially problematic because a growing
number of citizens view it as fundamentally unfair.").
264. I explore the significance of this observation to local justice systems infra Subsection IV.A.2.
265. The Justice Department's "Smart on Crime" initiative directs federal prosecutors to consider
alternatives to incarceration for low-level, non-violent offenders. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
2310
123:2236 2014
LEGITIMACY AND FEDERAL CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT POWER
for the criminal defendants who benefit, but primarily for law enforcement
agents and prosecutors, whose efforts to fight crime are significantly
strengthened by the trust and support of the communities they serve.266
2. Moral Credibility and Forum Disparities
The examples of crack cocaine and child pornography teach us that moral
credibility affects federal criminal justice. We might, then, conclude that
federal conviction rates and sentences in street crime cases may owe, at least
partially, to public and judicial agreement (on average) with federal penalties
for such crimes. Yet if so, why might we see such different outcomes in local
urban justice systems? How, in other words, might moral credibility, or its
absence, partially explain forum disparities in street crime cases?
SMART ON CRIME: REFORMING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
(2013), http://www.justice.gov/ag/smart-on-crime.pdf. The Department's new marijuana
policy, implemented in the wake of a series of state ballot referendums that legalized
marijuana possession for medicinal, and then recreational, purposes, advises federal
prosecutors to refrain from enforcing federal marijuana laws that conflict with the laws in
those states, except where federal enforcement is necessary to address certain enumerated
federal interests (such as preventing distribution for the benefit of gangs and cartels,
preventing violence and drugged driving, and preventing distribution to minors or to states
where marijuana remains illegal). See Memorandum on Guidance Regarding Marijuana
Enforcement from Deputy Att'y Gen. James M. Cole to All U.S. Att'ys (Aug. 29, 2033),
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052o13829132756857467,pdf.
266. See Att'y Gen. Eric Holder, Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the American Bar
Association's House of Delegates (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag
/speeches/2013/ag-speech-130812.html ("Because [mandatory minimums] oftentimes
generate unfairly long sentences, they breed disrespect for the system. When applied
indiscriminately, they do not serve public safety. They-and some of the enforcement
priorities we have set-have had a destabilizing effect on particular communities, largely
poor and of color. And, applied inappropriately, they are ultimately counterproductive....
Ultimately, this is about much more than fairness for those who are released from prison.
It's a matter of public safety and public good."); see also Conflicts Between State and Federal
Marijuana Laws: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, ni3th Cong. 3 (2013)(statement of James M. Cole, Deputy Att'y Gen.), http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/9
-10-13ColeTestimony.pdf (describing the new federal marijuana enforcement policy, which
largely defers to state laws and enforcement practices in states that have legalized or partly
legalized marijuana, as "consistent with our efforts to maximize our investigative and
prosecutorial resources during this time of budget challenges, and with the more general
message the Attorney General delivered last month to all federal prosecutors, emphasizing
the importance of quality priorities for all cases we bring, with an eye toward promoting
public safety, deterrence, and fairness").
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To the extent moral credibility bears on forum disparities, surely it is not a
result of differences between applicable federal and state penalties. As noted,
even when penalty differences are miniscule or non-existent, forum-based
outcome disparities persist.26 7 Moreover, as others have observed, applicable
federal penalties are, in most instances, harsher than their state counterparts.268
In such cases, one would hardly expect public or judicial agreement with
federal penalties to result in greater leniency at the state level (whether through
plea-bargaining, jury verdicts, or judicial sentencing discretion).
Greater moral credibility gaps in local forums, then, must derive, if at all,
from differences in public perceptions. What factors influence public
perceptions of punishment, and how might the different "publics" in the two
systems exacerbate (or mitigate) those influences? A careful examination of the
Rossi and Berk study reveals both why a representative sample of the American
public agrees, at the median, with most federal street crime penalties, and why
we might see less robust agreement in local systems.
Rossi and Berk sought to ascertain which demographic, experiential, and
attitudinal factors most closely associated with individuals' views on
sentencing.26 9 Utilizing regression analyses, the researchers found a number of
statistically significant factors that related to views on punishment. 2 70 Specific
to street crimes (what the study authors label as "drug trafficking," "drug
possession," and "street crimes"),"' statistically significant factors2 72 were:
267. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
269. Rossi & BERK, supra note 229, at 167-206. Among demographic factors, they considered age,
race/ethnic group, gender, income, education, and residential locus (both geographic region
and community size). Among experiential factors, they considered the respondent's level of
contacts with the justice system, whether the respondent had ever been a crime victim, and
the respondent's perception of the crime problem in his or her community. Among
attitudinal factors, they considered the respondent's views on the level of rights that should
be accorded an accused, the level of civil rights that should be accorded minorities, the
amount of welfare benefits that should be accorded the poor, the amount of investigative
freedom that should be given to police, the level of attention that should be given to
environmental pollution, and how the respondent self-identified politically. Id.
270. Rossi &BERK, supra note 229, at 200-01 tbl.8.17.
271. Thus, Rossi and Berk break down what I define as street crimes into separate categories of
"drug trafficking," "drug possession," and "street crimes." As a result, some of the "drug
trafficking" crimes they study might fall under the categories of international or interstate
drug trafficking, as opposed to street-level dealing. My use of the term "street crimes" when
referring to the Rossi and Berk data reflects their definition, not mine.
272. That is, the factors with p-values less than 0.05.
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1. Region of residence ;171
2. Age;274
3. Views on the investigative freedom of police;2 75
4. Views on the rights accorded an accused;276
5. Views on civil rights accorded minorities;2f"
6. The frequency of contacts with the justice system;71
7. Social and political views ;279
8. Years of education.o
273. Respondents from New England tended to give the least severe sentences; respondents in
the West South Central (Texas, Oklahoma, Arkansas, Louisiana) and East South Central
(Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi) regions gave the most severe sentences. Id. at
zoo-o tbl.8.17 (respondents in both these regions imposed over 6.5 years more than New
Englanders in drug trafficking cases and over 3 years more than New Englanders in street
crime cases). Other regions ranged between the two extremes. Id. For a description of
geographic regions in table 8.17, see id. at 175 tbl.8.1.
274. Respondents aged 50-64 sentenced on average 2.1 years more for drug trafficking offenses
and 0.6 years more for drug possession offenses than respondents aged less than 35. Id. at
200-01 tbl.8.17. Respondents aged 35-49 on average sentenced 0.91 years more in street
crimes cases than respondents aged less than 35. Id.
275. Those who believed police are given too much investigative freedom sentenced less severely
than those who believed police investigative freedom to be appropriate or insufficient. Id.
(on average 1.67 years less for drug trafficking, 0.31 years less for drug possession, and 0.76
years less for street crimes).
276. Those who believed an accused should have fewer rights sentenced more severely than those
who believed an accused should have more rights. Id. (on average 1.64 years more for drug
trafficking offenses and 1.09 years more for street crimes; views on defendants' rights were
not statistically significant for drug possession sentencing).
277. Those who believed minorities should be accorded fewer civil rights sentenced more
severely in drug trafficking crimes than those who believed minorities should be accorded
more civil rights. Id. (on average 1.15 years more in drug trafficking cases; civil rights views
were not statistically significant for drug possession or street crimes sentencing).
278. Those who had more contacts with the justice system, including the civil justice system, on
average sentenced drug trafficking offenses and street crimes more severely than those who
had fewer justice system contacts. Id. (respectively, 0.98 years and 0.59 years more; justice
system contacts were not a statistically significant factor for drug possession sentencing).
The study counted as "contact" any of the following interactions: jury service, reporting
crimes to the police, being sued in court, testifying in court as a witness, being arrested, or
serving time in jail or prison. Id. at 192 tbl.8.ii. The study did not differentiate among types
of contact (i.e., whether the person had been a defendant, had simply called the police to
report a crime, or had some other type of contact with the justice system). Id. at 192.
279. Those who self-identified as "liberal" in social and political views sentenced less severely for
drug trafficking, drug possession, and street crimes than those who did not so identify. Id.
at 200-01 tbl.8.12 (0.74 years, 0.12 years, and 0.26 years less, respectively).
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Rossi and Berk's study did not test the extent of sentencing variance by
community type (i.e., urban, suburban, or rural). Instead, they measured only
the effects of community size, which, by virtue of the methodology they
employed, lumped these differing residential milieus together.21' Further
research, then, is needed to ascertain empirically the correlation between
community type and sentencing views. But a reasonable hypothesis is that,
with the potential exceptions of region (which will manifest in both the federal
and local forums in a given region of the country)212 and education, the
influence of the remaining factors will tend to be more pronounced in local
urban courts. The young are more concentrated in cities213 as are those who
identify as having "liberal" views.284 And it is city residents - and particularly
residents of the inner-city, where most street crime occurs-who are most
disaffected by local policing and by the treatment accorded suspects,
defendants and minorities in particular.ss
On this last point, Rossi and Berk's findings impart a particularly
important message. Perceptions of procedural justice-that is, perceptions of
the fairness with which law enforcement treats citizens -correlate with
perceptions of the fairness of laws. And procedural justice perceptions are a
particularly significant in the street crime arena, where police-citizen
encounters are endemic.
28o. Those who were more educated sentenced less severely for drug trafficking, drug
possession, and street crimes as compared to those who were less educated. Id. (0.26 years,
o.1o years and 0.20 years less, respectively).
281. As the authors noted, their measure of community size was "not very sensitive to the
considerable differences in the actual living conditions that respondents face within each size
class," an unfortunate limitation of their dataset. Id. at 178.
282. This will be true at the district court level, but it may not be true at the federal appellate
level, at least in circuits that encompass significant areas in more than one geographic
region. These include the Second, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits.
283. See Lindsay M. Howden & Julie A. Meyer, 2010 Census Briefs: Age and Sex Composition: 2010,
U.S. CENSUS BuREAu 11 fig.7 (May 2011), http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2olo/briefs
/c2olobr-03.pdf.
284. Using the results of the latest presidential election as a proxy for political views, with few
exceptions urban counties strongly favored the Democratic candidate (Barack Obama) over
the Republican candidate (Mitt Romney), even in states carried overwhelmingly by
Romney. See Election 2012: President Map, N.Y. TimEs, http://elections.nytimes.conm/2012
/results/president (last updated Nov. 29, 2012).
285. See supra notes 162-166 and accompanying text.
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The effects of such credibility gaps may also be particularly destabilizing in
local courts, which deal with a narrower range of crime categories.286 if a
significant number of street crime penalties and enforcement practices are
perceived as unjust in a system for which such crimes are the mainstay, the
effects can be profound.8 7 Conversely, when credibility gaps are perceived as
isolated and limited, and the enforcing authority is otherwise perceived as
legitimate, the authority maintains legitimacy through its "reservoir" of
support.2' This "reservoir" dynamic partly explains the federal government's
relative success in enforcing even unpopular laws. Indeed, even the crack and
child pornography laws, for all their criticism, have generated a relatively low
level of dissent in the courthouse -at least as compared to what occurs in some
local courts when there is marked disagreement between penalties and public
or judicial views.289
This federal "reservoir" dynamic might also explain, at least in part, why
the nearly three decades-long crack/powder differential, and for that matter the
nearly five decades-long "war on drugs," has well outlasted the federal
government's thirteen-year assault on liquor. The federal government in 1920
held an entirely different place in criminal law enforcement, and American life
for that matter, than it does today. The Volstead Act came at a time when the
federal government enforced very few criminal laws. The feds in the 1920S
were not prosecuting swindlers and fraudsters to any great degree; they were
not policing stock trades; and they were not taking on organized crime or
international terrorists.2 9o They were also not overseeing the distribution of the
286. See supra text accompanying notes 222-223.
287. Paul Robinson and John Darley call this phenomenon the "generalization of disrespect": the
more laws citizens perceive as immoral, the more apt they are to discredit the entire system
as opposed to the select laws with which they disagree. More generalized systemic aversion
is also more likely to occur where unjust results are not readily attributable to a particular
legal rule. Robinson & Darley, supra note 117, at 483-85.
288. See supra notes 128-129 and accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 196-203, 209, and accompanying text. In this sense, it is worth noting that
even with the greater number of below-range sentences in child pornography cases, the
median sentence in those cases has risen along with the Guidelines range, albeit at a lower
rate than the Guidelines' increase. And even post-Booker, the median sentence is still far
above the statutory mandatory minimum. U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, supra note 258, at 135.
290. The Post Office Act of 1872 and, subsequently, the Offenses Against the Postal Service Act of
1909 were the precursors of the modern-day federal mail and wire fraud statutes, 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1341, 1343 (2012), but despite these acts' breadth, it was not until the New Deal era that
federal prosecution of large-scale frauds became widespread. See Richman, supra note 1, at
83-87. The federal securities fraud statutes were first passed in 1933 and 1934. Securities Act
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many benefits and services integral to modern American life, such as Social
Security, food stamps, urban housing, Medicare and Medicaid, which have in
turn given rise to new arenas of federal criminal enforcement. 291 There are
many reasons Prohibition ultimately failed.2 9 2 But probably among them-or
at least, among the reasons it failed so swiftly-is the fact that the federal
government at the time had a far smaller reservoir of support, at least with
respect to criminal enforcement, than it does today. 293
Of course, federal and local enforcement patterns, and the trust reservoirs
those patterns create (or deplete) do not remain static. A second decade of
transformative national security challenges brings with it a new landscape of
both federal and local enforcement,294 and with that, a change in the
relationship between citizens and the institutions of authority. The direction of
that change, its permutations, and its particular impact on street crime
enforcement-and perhaps, forum disparities-remain to be seen.2 95
of 1933, ch. 38, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74, (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §5 77a-77aa
(2012)); Securities Exchange Act of 934, ch. 404, Pub. L. No 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78pp). The federal RICO statute, the primary tool used to
combat organized crime, was first passed in 1970. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 5
901(a), Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968).
291. Congress criminalized fraud upon health care benefits in 1996, Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act § 242(a)(1), Pub. L. No. 104-191, 1o Stat. 2016 (1996) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. S 1347); fraud in connection with food stamps in 1964, The Food
Stamp Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-525, 78 Stat. 708 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2024); and fraud
in connection with an entity receiving federal housing funds in 1948, Crimes and Criminal
Procedure 5 1012, Pub. L. No. 80-772, 62 Stat. 752 (1948) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1012).
292. For a cogent argument as to why class-based enforcement undermined both Prohibition and
the federal crack laws, see Stuntz, supra note 242. See generally DANIEL OKRENT, LAST CALL:
THE RISE AND FALL OF PROHIBITION (2011).
293. This is not to say the federal government would have better luck enforcing the Volstead Act
today. Just as the federal government holds an entirely different place in modern American
life, so too does liquor. For a richly detailed history of alcohol, alcoholism, and public
drunkenness at the dawn of the twentieth century, and its impact on Prohibition's rise, see
OKRENT, supra note 292.
294. See Matthew C. Waxman, National Security Federalism in the Age of Terror, 64 STAN. L. REV.
289 (2012).
295. Anti-terrorism presents a particularly tangled set of reputational consequences for federal
and local law enforcement. Some federal anti-terrorism efforts, most notably the
enforcement of immigration laws among select minority communities, have detracted from
federal law enforcement's standing in those communities. As a result, local police forces,
which depend on the support and cooperation of minority communities to fight street
crime, have in many instances declined to cooperate with federal immigration enforcement
efforts. See Daniel C. Richman, The Right Fight, BoS. REV., Dec. 1, 2004, http://www
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IV. WHY LEGITIMACY MATTERS
A legitimacy-focused exploration of the federal criminal justice system
enhances our understanding of federal criminal power. It also challenges us to
reconsider the significance of forum disparities in criminal cases. These
disparities are not merely the result of different sovereigns' choices of legal
rules, or of resource allocations between sovereigns. They are also the result of
less intentioned forces.
This observation yields a number of insights. First, it explains why states
that have sought to emulate federal prosecutorial outcomes merely by
emulating federal penalties have largely come up short. Virginia Exile is just
one example of a state borrowing from federal penal laws;291 there are
others. 97 Appreciating legitimacy's role in federal criminal justice illuminates
the shortcomings of this approach. If legitimacy at least in part explains federal
prosecutorial success, legislators' attempts at emulation have been
misdirected -or, at least, they have been directed at a piece of federal criminal
enforcement that has questionable value in isolation. Worse, this single-
minded approach can affirmatively undermine successful law enforcement if
the laws lack the support of the communities they most affect.
Second, attention to legitimacy reveals a deeper and more complicated
federalism. While much of the criticism of federal intervention in street crime
has focused on the circumvention of state laws and procedures,'9
.bostonreview.net/forum/nright-fight (describing this dynamic). In other circumstances,
joint anti-terrorism enforcement efforts by federal, state and local law enforcement
authorities has burnished the reputational standing of each; a recent example of this
phenomenon is the successful search for the Boston Marathon bombing suspects. See
Katharine Q. Seele, William K. Rashbaum & Michael Cooper, 2nd Bombing Suspect Caught
After Frenzied Hunt Paralyzes Boston, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 19, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com
/201 3/0 4/20/us/boston-marathon-bombings.html.
296. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
297. A number of states have enacted laws similar to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), the federal prohibition
that carries a minimum five-year sentence of imprisonment for possession of a firearm in
connection with a drug trafficking or violent crime. (The five-year minimum penalty was
enacted in 1971 pursuant to Public Law Number 91-644.) Such states include California, see
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 12022, 12022.53 (West 2010) (3, 4, or io year minimum, depending on
coordinate offense); Florida, see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.o87(2)(a) (West 1999) (minimum of
io or 20 years, depending on coordinate offense); New York, see N.Y. PENAL LAW S
265.09(2) (McKinney 1980) (five year minimum); and Pennsylvania, see 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 9712.1(a) (West 1994) (five year minimum).
298. See sources cited supra notes io-ii.
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circumvention also occurs on a more fundamental level. Federal intervention
bypasses the essence of localized criminal justice: beat policing, community-
delineated jury pools, local courthouse norms. Is this sort of evasion of the local
desirable? 29 9 To be sure, there are good arguments on both sides. But given the
structural and political dynamics of our system, these arguments are largely
futile. So long as urban crime persists and localities feel unequipped to handle
it, Congress and the Justice Department will respond. And so long as there are
limited federal budgets and a lack of political appetite to expand them, the
federal role in street crime enforcement will remain a supporting one.
Focusing on legitimacy thus presents a different, and ultimately more
answerable, question: Is there a way to achieve legitimacy in street crime
enforcement without circumventing localism? This Part argues that the answer
to this question is yes and that, counterintuitively, the lesson we should draw
from the federal system is the need for more localism in criminal justice, not
less. Because if we distill federal legitimacy to its elements -enhanced citizen
trust, juror cohesion, greater norm diversity, and public agreement with
written law-we can see that the best way to translate these features into local
systems is to embrace localism: by enhancing community voice and
participation, and local law enforcement credibility. Not only will this
approach stem the impetus for federal street-crime prosecutions, it will also
result in a more substantively just system overall -a system that embodies the
desires and beliefs of the communities most affected by street crimes and their
enforcement.
A. A Legitimacy-Based Reform Agenda
By understanding the sources of legitimacy in federal street crime
enforcement, we can theorize how to incorporate these features into local
systems. In the federal system, legitimacy is derived in four principal ways: (i)
enhanced citizen trust, arising from federal oversight of local policing, witness
protection, and an absence of citizen policing; (ii) juror cohesion, arising from
the relationship between the jury and the prosecuting authority, as well as the
jury and the larger electorate; (iii) an empowerment of law over norms, arising
299. Some may argue that the federal system's circumvention of localism makes it illegitimate. My
use of the term "legitimacy" is not in the normative sense, but rather in the descriptive
theoretical sense: federal prosecutors achieve success relative to their local counterparts
because interactions of authority, community, and personal morality play out to
prosecutors' advantage in the federal system.
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from the breadth and diversity of participants in the justice system; and (iv)
moral credibility, arising from an alignment between the laws and the
adjudicative audience for those laws (judges and juries) and trust in the
relevant penalty-drafting institutions.
Not all of these sources can be emulated in local systems. As long as there
are police-citizen encounters, there will always be some level of citizen
discontent, no matter how fair the encounter's process or the officer's motives.
And self-identification with one's country, for example, can't necessarily be
replicated on the local level. Nevertheless, some sources of federal legitimacy
can be translated to local systems. I suggest three principal areas of focus. First,
improving local policing and redirecting federal intervention towards
investigation and witness protection in local cases can enhance citizen trust.
Second, increasing local community voice in the formulation of sentencing
policy and criminal laws can contribute to both juror cohesion with the
lawmaking electorate and moral credibility. Third, increasing local voice at
sentencing and resorting to more, but substantially less severe, mandatory
penalties can help empower law over norms.
i. Enhancing Citizen Trust
Building citizen trust in law enforcement should be done at two levels:
first, by strengthening and reforming local policing and, second, by
reinventing the federal role in street crime investigations.
The need for policing reform is hardly a novel cry,3 oo but insufficient
attention has been given to the attendant law enforcement benefits. Explaining
away federal prosecutorial success as a product of laws, procedures, or
resources diminishes the importance of the law's enforcers in the successful
enforcement of the law. Rooting out police misconduct - in all its forms, from
misuse of force to discourtesy- should not be the agenda only of inner-city
communities, activists, and civil rights prosecutors. It should be a principal
priority of law enforcement and, critically, of local police forces themselves.
Police department focus on these issues will not only improve police-citizen
relations on an individual level, but will also enhance credibility more
systemically. Visible, department-wide focus on police-citizen relations will
engender citizen trust, just as the federal government engenders trust by virtue
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Simmons, Cooperative Federalism and Police Reform: Using Congressional Spending Power to
Promote Police Accountability, 62 ALA. L. REv. 351, 383-85 (2011).
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of its role in local policing oversight. Some police departments are beginning to
make active efforts in this regard, but far more must be done.
At the same time, the federal government should reimagine its role in street
crime enforcement as one of support for local prosecutions, rather than the
inverse. Over the last several decades, "joint task forces" (law enforcement
teams comprised of federal, state, and local officers) have been created to
investigate crimes ranging from drug trafficking to violent gangs to human
trafficking to terrorism."o' These groups have been organized with an eye to
making federal cases. But why operate only under that model? Joint task forces
can be utilized to prosecute local cases too. Local police and prosecutors could
then rely on these task forces to help them investigate and bring stronger cases.
One example of this model is New York City's Office of the Special Narcotics
Prosecutor, which collaborates with and frequently brings cases investigated by
federal agencies and joint task forces.3o2 This model could be expanded more
broadly.
This new federal role would have two principal benefits. First, more cross-
pollination between federal and local law enforcers might benefit local policing
and thereby enhance citizen trust. Of course, there are risks to greater federal
involvement in local investigations.3 03 As federal agents play greater
community-facing roles, they risk losing some of the credibility that inures by
virtue of their rarefied position. And a larger law enforcement role for any
authority carries the potential for abuse.3o4 But currently, at least, federal
agents are far from reaching that point in street crime investigations; they
could play a greater role while still retaining their reputational benefits. And a
greater diversity of sovereign authorities in criminal investigations might serve
to mitigate the potential for abuse or misconduct that sometimes accompanies
301. See sources cited supra note 91; see also Protecting America from Terrorist Attack, FED. BUREAU
INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/terrorism/terrorismjttfs (last
visited Jan. 28, 2014) (describing the Joint Terrorism Task Force); Violent Gang Task Forces,
FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/vc-majorthefts
/gangs/violent-gangs-task-forces (last visited Jan. 28, 2014) (describing violent gang task
forces); Human Trafficking - FBI Initiatives, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, http://www
.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/civilrights/human trafficking/initiatives (last visited Jan. 28,
2014) (descrbing human trafficking task forces).
302. See 2012 Annual Report, OFF. OF THE SPECIAL NARCOTICS PROSECUTOR OF THE CITY OF NEW
YORK, http://www.nyc.gov/htmVsnp/downloads/pdf/ar_2o12.pdf.
303. For discussion of the risks of increased federal policing, see William J. Stuntz, Terrorism,
Federalism, and Police Misconduct, 25 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y, 665, 670-74 (2002).
304. J. Edgar Hoover's FBI is a historical example. See generally ATHAN G. THEOHARIS & JOHN
STUART Cox, THE Boss: J. EDGAR HOOVER AND THE GREAT AMERIcAN INQUISITION (2012).
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consolidated sovereign power. In this sense, dual-sovereign criminal
investigations would serve, on a very grassroots level, one of federalism's
fundamental aims.30 s Given the absence of effective law enforcement oversight
from coordinate government branches,3o6 more functional oversight through a
"cooperative federalism" model might do a great deal of good.
Second, a larger federal investigative presence will significantly enhance
both the protection of witnesses in local cases and those witnesses' perceptions
of security. As it now stands, federal agencies protect witnesses in federal cases;
witnesses in local cases virtually never receive federal protection. In line with
that model, the last Congress's proposed fix for local witness intimidation was
to make it a federal crime. 307 The proposed bill was well-intentioned, but its
approach one-dimensional. Why engage federal protection only through
federal prosecution? And why engage it only after the fact, by prosecution of
past threats or harms to witnesses? By then, the harm to the local case has
already been done, and federal prosecution serves merely as a deterrent against
future crimes. If local law enforcement were able to leverage federal witness
protection at the outset, before threats are made -by having federal agents take
the lead on witness security, interface with and provide a federal point-of-
contact for witnesses on security matters - the effects of witness intimidation
would decrease. Would-be intimidators would be deterred at the outset simply
by knowing the feds are on the case; witnesses would both be and feel safer,
engendering greater witness trust and cooperation. And unlike federal
prosecution, which requires a federal jurisdictional hook,30 federal law
305. See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1495 (1987) ("[I]n
separating and dividing power, whether horizontally or vertically, the Federalists pursued
the same strategy: Vest power in different sets of agents who will have personal incentives
to monitor and enforce limitations on each other's powers.").
306. See Harmon, supra note 300 (discussing the inability of constitutional criminal procedure to
constrain unlawful policing practices and arguing in favor of new legal paradigms for
regulating police conduct); Debra Livingston, The Unfulflled Promise of Citizen Review, I
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 653, 661-69 (2004) (discussing the importance of remedying minor
police misconduct and the challenges of doing so through standard rule enforcement
methods); William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and
Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1 (1997) (discussing how the Warren Court's constitutional
criminal procedure doctrines have incentivized many of the police abuses we see today).
307. State Witness Protection Act of 2012, S. 2127, 112th Cong. (2012).
308. The proposed bill, for example, would have reached only witness tampering with a specified
connection to interstate commerce. See id. § (c). Practically speaking, this means it could be
used only in cases involving threats made over the phone or Internet, through the mail, or
by persons who, in the course or in furtherance of the witness tampering offense, crossed
state lines or used a firearm transported over state lines.
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enforcement assistance requires no jurisdictional nexus, thus permitting
broader federal aid.
Encouraging more federal-local collaboration at the pre-charging stage
would strengthen local cases, thus reducing the need for federal prosecutions.
Fewer resources would be spent on federal prosecutions and federal prisons,
and the resulting savings could be devoted instead to federal law enforcement
agencies. Localities would retain jurisdiction and control over their criminal
prosecutions, and cases would be adjudicated by residents of the cities where
the crimes, and the law enforcement response to them, occur.
2. Legislative-Adjudicative Alignment and Moral Credibility
We should also strive to enhance both juror cohesion with the lawmaking
electorate (what I've called legislative-adjudicative alignment) and the moral
credibility of laws. Greater local voice in criminal lawmaking and penalty-
drafting can bring us closer to both goals. And we can strengthen local voice at
two levels: in the formulation of sentencing policy and in criminal lawmaking.
States that use sentencing commissions can make more concerted efforts to
incorporate the views of urban localities when formulating penalties. This
could involve deliberate outreach or, better yet, reconstituting sentencing
commission membership to ensure participation by local inner-city community
leaders personally familiar with the tolls of both crime and punishment. As it
now stands, many states' commissions call for membership by members of the
judiciary, the prosecution and defense bars, and sentencing experts from
academia and elsewhere.30 9 A few allow a seat for non-lawyer citizens, and
some for crime victims. But none expressly call for membership from a broader
group of citizens from the state's urban centers. If sentencing commissions'
recommendations were the product of input from the localities most affected
by those crimes, the recommendations would be more credible (and probably
more substantively just, as well). Credible recommendations are more likely to
be followed, further reinforcing their credibility. A ready illustration of the
potential of local voice in sentencing policy is the District of Columbia. Its
sentencing commission, comprised entirely of local community members, has
3og. For an overview of the membership criteria for each state's sentencing commission,
see Neil B. Kauder & Brian J. Ostrom, State Sentencing Guidelines: Profiles and
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made concerted efforts to develop sentencing policy in line with the views of
local judges and residents. 30 As the commission continues to develop and
amend its policies in line with local views, judicial compliance with the
sentencing guidelines has increased; in 2012, Superior Court judges complied
with the advisory guidelines in 98% of felony cases.311
With respect to lawmaking, localities should consider more robust use of
local laws. In the mid-199os, cities inundated with gang violence passed public
order ordinances designed to reclaim public spaces for communities.312 Many
of these ordinances did not survive constitutional vagueness challenges, and
the exercise was largely abandoned.313 But the idea of empowering localities to
legislate (or lobby state legislatures) on issues of urban crime should not be
cast aside. City ordinances, or state laws that apply uniquely to certain cities,
permit local prosecutors to enforce laws with strong local support. Chicago, for
instance, has passed a series of firearms ordinances; while some have been
struck down on Second Amendment grounds,314 the city council has retooled
these laws to survive Second Amendment challenges.315 Philadelphia was able
to lobby the Pennsylvania legislature to mandate stricter requirements for gun
possession in that city. Thus, under Pennsylvania law, it is illegal to carry a
concealed firearm in the city of Philadelphia.3'6 Currently, local laws like these
310. See 2012 Annual Report, DC SENTENCING AND CRIMINAL CODE REVISION COMMISSION, at i, iii
(Apr. 26, 2013), http://acs.dc.gov/acs/frames.asp?doc=/acsAib/acs/annual-report-2012.pdf
(listing membership and noting continual modifications to the guidelines based on
assessments of judicial compliance with the guidelines, to insure that the guidelines'
sentencing recommendations are appropriate).
311. Id. at iii, 53.
312. Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Foreword: The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86
GEO. L.J. 1153, 1153-54 (1998); Livingston, supra note 195, at 554-56.
313. E.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999); see Kim Strosnider, Anti-Gang
Ordinances After City of Chicago v. Morales: The Intersection of Race, Vagueness Doctrine, and
Equal Protection in the Criminal Law, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 101 (2002).
314. E.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
315. John Byrne & Hal Dardick, City Council Passes Daley Gun Restrictions 45-o, CHI. TRIB.:
CLOUT STREET (July 2, 2010, 11:26 AM), http://newsblogs.chicagotribune.com/clout-st
/2010/07/city-council-passes-daley-gun-restrictions-450.html. A number of lawsuits
challenging Chicago's gun ordinances are winding their way through the courts. For a list of
cases, see Gun Rights Lawsuits: Court Status of 9 Challenges to City, State and County Rules,
CHI. TRIB., Mar. 8, 2012, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-03-o8/news/ct-met-gun
-lawsuit-box -201203o8_lsecond-amendment-arms-firearms-retailers-gun-rights.
316. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 61o8 (West 2000). In Pennsylvania, unlike in Illinois, state
firearms laws preempt conflicting local laws. As a result, city-specific firearms offenses must
be enacted by the state legislature.
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have gone largely unenforced because they do not entail prison time:
prosecutors prefer to spend their resources on "serious" crimes, and the
absence of a custodial penalty sends a strong message that the crime is not
serious.317 Strengthening the penalties for these laws, even by small amounts,
will result in more enforcement; enforcement, in turn, might be more
successful when juries and judges feel more personal allegiance to the laws."'
Of course, locally applicable laws can only do so much to combat the sorts of
crimes (such as gun and drug trafficking) that easily cross city lines. But the
crimes that most immediately and directly impact communities -street-level
drug sales, shootings, robberies, homicides, gun brandishing-tend to be
geographically confined. For these types of crimes, local laws can be effective
and can impart a message to the public, judges, and juries that the penal law
has not been foisted upon them by a governing body with little understanding
of the issues surrounding urban street crime and its enforcement.
Greater local voice in penalty-drafting will not only strengthen trust in the
laws themselves but will also engender more confidence in the institutional
frameworks of criminal lawmaking. As we have seen in the federal system with
the examples of crack and child pornography, sentencing courts are more likely
to adhere to law when there is trust that the system will work to rectify
perceived injustices. 319 Where, in contrast, trust in lawmaking institutions to
remedy injustice is eroded, legitimacy suffers.32 o Fair process in penalty-
317. In Pennsylvania, for instance, carrying a concealed weapon in Philadelphia is a
misdemeanor, see id. §§ 61o8, 6119, and carrying a firearm at all in any public park,
playground or recreation center in Philadelphia constitutes a violation that results in a
maximum $2,000 fine. See PHIIA., PA CODE § 16-306 (2011) (criminalizing carrying a
firearm in government-owned buildings). In Chicago, the penalties for gun ordinance
violations are similarly lenient. See Monica Davey, Strict Gun Laws in Chicago Can't Stem
Fatal Shots, N.Y. TiMEs, Jan. 29, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2o13/ol/3o/us/strict
-chicago-gun-laws-cant-stem-fatal-shots.html (discussing how lax penalties result in
anemic enforcement of Chicago's gun ordinances).
318. For instance, currently under consideration by the Pennsylvania legislature-a result of
sustained lobbying by Philadelphia's mayor, police commissioner, and city council -is a bill
that would mandate a two-year prison term for anyone carrying a gun illegally in
Philadelphia. See Allison Steele & Amy Worden, Mandatory 2-Year Prison Term Proposed for
Illegal Firearm Users in Phila., PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 6, 2013, http://articles.philly.coM/2o13
-04-06/news/38309721_1 gun-purchase-gun-violence-gun-control. The genesis of this
proposal lies more in the complicated politics of gun regulation than in ideals of local
empowerment. Nevertheless, the concept is worth serious consideration.
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drafting thus not only generates fairer penalties, it also generates greater
support for those penalties.
Enhancing localism at the penalty-drafting level is critical. While some
scholars have articulated a vision of criminal justice localism based on less
federal prosecution and more narrowly-drawn local districts,21 these proposals
address only the adjudicatory piece. Yet the need for localism in criminal
lawmaking and penalty drafting is equally important; without it, we see the
sort of dysfunction that exists in some consolidated city-counties, where local
voice is robust in the courthouses but diluted in statehouses and sentencing
commissions.322 It is worth noting that in these cities, reforms, when they have
finally come, have arisen not as a result of local adjudicative voice (in the form
of low conviction rates and sentences that depart significantly from those
legislated or advised), but rather from political forces outside the criminal
justice system. Such was the case in the New York, where policing and drug
law reforms came not from the message sent by distrustful juries in isolated
local jurisdictions,323 but rather from the political attention spurred by a federal
civil rights class action 3s and budgetary pressures on the state level.325 In
321. See Stuntz, supra note 3, at 2034-36 (advocating for more narrowly-drawn urban jury
districts separated from suburban communities); cf Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court
2oo9 Term-Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARv. L. REV. 4, 30-33 (2010) (more
broadly advancing a theory of localism as a means of dissent from sovereign power, using
the local jury- either criminal or civil- as an example).
322. See supra notes 196-203, 211-214, and accompanying text.
323. See Clyde Haberman, Fix a Ticket, Alienate a Bronx Jury, N.Y. TIMEs: CITY ROOM (June
6, 20i1, 8:35 AM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.comf/2oni/o6/o6/fix-a-ticket-alienate-a
-bronx-jury ("[T]he Bronx has long been rough going for [prosecutors], especially when
police testimony is pivotal."); Chris Herring, Bronx Acquittals Set Record, WAu ST. J., May 4,
2010, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1ooo14240527487o46o8o45752212717628o6324
(reporting a jury conviction rate of only 43% in 2009, which many attribute to "tensions
between the police and the community"); cf William Glaberson, Faltering Courts, Mired in
Delays, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2ol3/o4/i4/nyregion/justice
-denied-bronx-court-system-mired-in-delays.htrnl (reporting a jury conviction rate in
Bronx criminal court that has declined from 67% in 1989 to 46% in 2011, and discussing the
deleterious effects of trial delays on conviction rates).
324. The case, Floyd v. City of New York, No. 08 Civ. 1034, 2013 WL 4046209 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12,
2013), raised public awareness of the New York City Police Department's stop-and-frisk
practices' impact on minorities, catapulting the issue onto the political stage. The case
precipitated legislation by the New York City Council, reforms by the NYPD, and a
landslide victory by a mayoral candidate whose promises to end the practices became
a centerpiece of his campaign. See Michael Barbaro & David W. Chen, De Blasio
Is Elected New York City Mayor in Landslide, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 5, 2013, http://
www.nytimes.conV2ol3/u/o6/nyregion/de-blasio-is-elected-new-york-city-mayor.html; Jim
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Philadelphia, it was likewise not low conviction rates, but rather a federal civil
rights class action that finally yielded reforms to policing practices.326 In New
Orleans, policing reforms were spurred not by messages from the city's
courthouse, but by the intervention of the Justice Department's Civil Rights
Division.32 7 In California, despite decades of trial-level dissent in San Francisco
Dwyer, Vowing to Slay the (Already Subdued) Stop-and-Frisk Dragon, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
5, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/06/nyregion/de-blasio-and-bratton-promise-to
-deliver-on-goals-but-give-no-credit.html; J. David Goodman, City Council Votes to Increase
Oversight of New York Police, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com
/2ol3/o6/27/nyregion/new-york-city-council-votes-to-increase-oversight-of-police-dept.html
(reporting passage of the Community Safety Act, which would, among other things, create
an independent inspector general to monitor NYPD policies and practices and make it easier
for plaintiffs to sue the NYPD for bias-based profiling); Wendy Ruderman, Number of
Frisks Fell in '12, Police Data Show, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com
/2ol3/o2/9/nyregiorVnumber-of-frisks-fell-in-12-police-data-show.htmI (reporting that "[a]fter
criticism from a federal judge last spring and widening political protests," new police officer
stop-and-frisk training was instituted, resulting in a 34% decrease in stops in the last three
quarters of 2012 compared to the same period in 2011).
Although the district judge's findings and remedies were initially stayed pending the
City's appeal, Mayor De Blasio has reversed the New York City Law Department's course in
the case, vowing to reform the NYPD's stop-and-frisk practices largely in accordance with
the district court's ruling, to settle the case, and to dismiss the City's appeal. See Benjamin
Weiser & Joseph Goldstein, Mayor Says New York City Will Settle Suits on Stop and Frisk
Practices, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2ol4/ol/31/nyregion/de
-blasio-stop-and-frisk.html. In that vein, it is no accident that De Blasio picked Zachary
Carter to lead the City's legal department; as the United States Attorney in Brooklyn in the
1990s, Carter had overseen the federal civil rights prosecution in the Abner Louima matter.
See supra notes 169-173 and accompanying text; Annie Correal, De Blasio Names City's Top
Lawyer, Appearing to Signal a Further Shift in Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2013, http://
www.nytimes.com/2oi3/12/3o/nyregion/de-blasio-announces-pick-for-new-york-citys-top
-lawyer.html.
325. Jeremy W. Peters, Albany Reaches Deal to Repeal '7os Drug Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25,
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2oo9/o3/26/nyregion/26rockefeller.html (describing how
budgetary pressure to reduce imprisonment rates and shifting political winds combined to
permit legislation to reduce drug penalties).
326. Consent Decree, Bailey v. City of Philadelphia (E.D. Pa. June 21, 2011) (No. 10-5952), http://
www.aclupa.org/downloadfile/view_inline/744/198; see also Erica Goode, Philadelphia
Defends Policy on Frisking, with Limits, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com
/2o2/o7/12/us/stop-and-frisk-controls-praised-in-philadelphia.html (describing the class
action lawsuit's role in altering the Philadelphia Police Department's approach to citizen
stops); Phillips, McCoy & Purcell, supra note 158 (describing city's low conviction rates).
327. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Announces Consent Decree with
City of New Orleans to Resolve Allegations of Unlawful Misconduct by New Orleans
Police Department (July 24, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2o12/July/12-ag-917.html
(detailing DOJ's suit against NOPD under 42 U.S.C. § 14141). Jury conviction rates in New
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courthouses, reforms to the three strikes law came only after a U.S. Supreme
Court order to relieve prison overcrowding coincided with a mounting state
debt crisis and plunging crime rates.328 Indeed, the recent reforms to many
states' criminal laws are the product not of local adjudicative voice but rather
changing political realities at the state level, spurred by fiscal constraints on
state budgets, new evidence-based research on the effects of imprisonment,
and decreasing levels of crime. 9
Making criminal justice systems more accountable to the local citizenry is a
laudable goal. To get there, we must focus not only on localizing adjudication,
but on localizing lawmaking and penalty-drafting as well.
3. Empowering Laws over Norms
Finally, we should focus on ways to empower laws over norms. This is of a
piece with the prior goal -aligning the legislative and adjudicative institutions
and written law with moral beliefs -because community involvement in
lawmaking will result in laws that more closely align with community norms.
But we must also strive to empower adherence to those community-sanctioned
laws in the face of conflicting street norms (among the much smaller, non-law
abiding community), and the courthouse norms that those street norms
engender.
One relatively recent project tilts in that direction. Project Safe
Neighborhoods (PSN), a billion-dollar program operated by the Department
of Justice, is a federal-state-local collaboration in major cities across the United
States. The PSN approach varies by locality, but, in some cities, violent
offenders and gang members are brought to "offender notification meetings"
where a range of community members - religious leaders, parents, social
Orleans are notoriously low, a circumstance that many observers attribute to jurors' mistrust
of police testimony. John Simerman, Orleans Parish Conviction Rates in Jury Trials Hold
Steady, and Relatively Low, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Jan. 16, 2012, http://www.nola.com/crime
/index.ssf/2o2/o/orleans-parish-conviction rate.html (reporting a conviction rate in tried
cases that has "perennially hovered around 55 percent to 60 percent," which many observers
have attributed to jurors' mistrust of police testimony).
328. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011). See generally Barkow, supra note io, at 1285 (arguing
that cost constraints have a salutary effect on states' sentencing policies).
329. See Adrienne Austin, Criminal Justice Trends: Key Legislative Changes in Sentencing Policy,
2001-2010, VERA INST. JUST. 4 (Sept. 2010), http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/ccp
-sentencingtrends.pdf (attributing states' recent sentencing reforms to a combination of
lower crime rates, fiscal pressures, concerns about over-burgeoning prison populations, and
new, evidence-based research on behavioral modification).
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workers, and reformed offenders -impress upon offenders that the norms of
street life will no longer be tolerated and federal law enforcers advise that
future criminal conduct will be prosecuted federally.330 This particular PSN
approach, which has been used in some parts of Chicago, Indianapolis, and
cities in North Carolina and, most recently, Connecticut, has been lauded as
highly effective.33' The model relies on the threat of federal prosecution, but its
fundamental approach to norm-shifting-by giving voice to the norms of the
broader community-can be translated to local forums too.332
One way to do that is to give community members and leaders a role in
criminal sentencing hearings. A program called "Ceasefire PA" is an effort
along those lines in local Philadelphia gun cases.333 The group, formed in
response to gun violence in Pennsylvania, has initiated a "courtwatch"
program, in which local community members and leaders attend and testify on
behalf of the local community at sentencing hearings.334 Early anecdotal
evidence indicates that the program has been successful at impressing upon
judges the gravity with which the community views gun-related crimes. 335 This
330. See Jack McDevitt et al., Offender Notification Meetings: Case Study 2, in PROJECT SAFE
NEIGHBORHOODS: STRATEGIC INTERVENTIONS, U.S. DEP'T JUST., https://www.bja.gov
/Publications/Offender Notification Meetings.pdf. In some offender meetings, reformed
ex-gang members are brought in to speak to offenders, as well. Id.
331. See Andrew V. Papachristos, Tracey L. Meares & Jeffrey Fagan, Attention Felons: Evaluating
Project Safe Neighborhoods in Chicago, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 223 (2007) (presenting
empirical evidence demonstrating that homicide levels have decreased in Chicago
neighborhoods that have instituted PSN relative to those that have not).
332. One of the brilliant successes of the offender notification meetings tactic is that it seeks to
pre-empt criminal conduct, thus reducing the need for prosecution at all. My proposals, in
contrast, are aimed at making local criminal prosecution more effective in instances where it
is needed. But as local criminal prosecution becomes more effective (in the sense that
outcomes are more certain and transparent, and align more closely with written law), it, too,
might be used as a tool for crime-reduction in the way that PSN uses the threat of federal
prosecution.
333. See Alex Wigglesworth, CeaseFirePA: Advocates Take to Courtrooms to Tip Scales of Justice
Against Gun Felons, PHILA. METRO, Sept. 30, 2012, http://www.metro.us/philadelphia/news
/local/2012/o9/30/ceasefirepa-advocates-take-to-courtrooms-to-tip-scales-of-justice-against
-gun-felons.
334. Id.; see also Courtwatch, CEASEFIREPA, http://www.ceasefirepa.dreamhosters.com/programs
/court-watch (last visited Feb. 1, 2013) (describing the Courtwatch program and listing
recent Courtwatch reports).
335. See Wigglesworth, supra note 333. Among the most notable achievements was the
resentencing of Kevin Pickard, a defendant who, in the process of shooting his intended 19-
year-old target, also shot two brothers, aged 2 and 8, who were playing outside in the street.
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sort of broader community involvement might serve to shift courthouse norms
in courts where violent crimes and gun-related cases have become routine.
Another method of empowering law over norms is through a more effective
use of mandatory minimum penalties. Legislatures have largely operated at the
extremes, with most criminal penalties carrying either no mandatory term or a
mandatory term of at least five or ten years. But there is a middle ground, and
much to be said for a more graduated approach to shifting sentencing
norms."' Local judges used to giving probationary terms for gun crimes may
balk when told the legislature has suddenly mandated a sentence of five years.
But a one- or two-year mandatory penalty is a less drastic change. Washington,
D.C. undertook precisely this tactic in gun cases. In 2007, the city council
passed a law mandating a one-year sentence of imprisonment for any
defendant in possession of a firearm who has a prior felony conviction, and a
three-year sentence of imprisonment for any such defendant with a prior
violent felony conviction.337 In the years following, federal prosecutions of
firearms offenses in the city decreased by eighty-five percent.33' This legislative
tactic could be applied to any number of street crimes for which sentencing
The brothers survived after extended hospitalization. At Pickard's initial sentencing, the
local judge assigned to his case sentenced him to three concurrent terms of five to ten
years' imprisonment. Craig R. McCoy, Minimum Sentence for Gunman in Shooting of
2 Children, PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. n1, 2012, http://articles.philly.com/2ol2-o8-11/news
/ 3313825 o._kevin-pickard-three-concurrent-sentences-minimum-sentence. The District
Attorney's Office moved for reconsideration and resentencing, which the judge granted. At
the resentencing hearing one week later, the courtroom was filled with community members
expressing outrage over the initial sentence. At his resentencing, Pickard was sentenced to 17
to 34 years' imprisonment. See Mensah M. Dean, Community Anger Leads to Stricter Sentence
for Man Who Shot Kids, PHILA. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 19, 2012, http://articles.philly.con/2o12
-o8-1 9/news/ 33273288_Ilcommunity-work-shot-kids-court-sessions.
336. Cf Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U.
CHI. L. REv. 607 (2000) (discussing the tension between criminal law and social norms in
the context of date rape, drunk driving, and domestic violence, and arguing that the law can
better shift social norms through a more graduated approach).
337. Omnibus Public Safety Amendment Act, 20o6 D.C. Legis. Serv. 16-3o6 (Act 16-482) (West)
(codified at D.C. CODE § 22-4503 (2013)).
338. According to data from the Federal Judicial Center, in the five years preceding the 20o6 law,
federal prosecutors in the District of Columbia prosecuted 353 cases in which 18 U.S.C. §
922(g) (2012) was the most severe count, an average of approximately 71 cases per year; in
the five years following the law, federal prosecutors prosecuted only 53 such cases, an
average of just lo per year. (Datasets for FJC and USSC data are available at http://www
.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/series/ooo72 and http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb
/ICPSR/series/83 subject to restricted use agreement; data analysis is on file with author.)
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data indicates a significant difference between the sentence suggested by
statute or guidelines and the sentences most often imposed in actual cases.
Of course, this approach must go hand-in-hand with localities'
involvement in criminal lawmaking; mandatory penalties should only be used
as a method of implementing localities' desires with respect to sentencing. If the
communities most affected by street crime want to ensure that judges imprison
criminals for certain crimes, tempered mandatory penalties can and should be
used to achieve that objective. Washington, D.C., Philadelphia, Chicago, New
York, and Baltimore are all examples of localities that are seeking (and in the
case of Washington, D.C., have achieved) mandatory minimum terms for
certain gun crimes. When the communities most affected by crime ask for
specific laws, state legislatures should listen. Similarly, if the communities
affected by crime ask to repeal mandatory sentences for certain crimes - and
this will probably be the case for many non-violent drug offenses -legislatures
should listen to that too.
To be sure, there are costs to this strategy. Mandatory minimum penalties
achieve uniformity at the expense of individualized sentencing, a tradeoff that
can result in unfair outcomes. 39 The penalties do not eliminate discretion but
merely transfer it, from judges to prosecutors and from sentencing decisions to
charging decisions. 34o And in our current state of mass incarceration, increased
use of mandatory penalties in many ways seems directed at precisely the wrong
goal. But by accompanying mandatory minimums with other reforms, we can
reduce these costs. Lessening the severity of mandatory minimum penalties
mitigates the effects of overbreadth and reduces prosecutors' incentive to use
penalties as bargaining chips. Increased local voice in criminal lawmaking and
administration will ensure that the penalties, and prosecutors' charging
decisions, align with local desires. And over the long term, imprisonment rates
might well decrease. More mandatory minimums, but with lesser terms, will
reduce the distance between written and applied law. Laws applied as written
engender trust in and compliance with the written law, resulting in fewer
39. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury's Constitutional Role in an
Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33, 85-86 (2003); Rachel E. Barkow,
Sentencing Guidelines at the Crossroads ofPolitics and Expertise, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1599, 1620-
21 (2012) [hereinafter Barkow, Sentencing Guidelines].
340. See Barkow, Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 339, at 1620 & n.103; Kate Stith, The Arc of the
Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420, 1430 (20o8)
(discussing the transfer of discretionary power from judges to prosecutors under a
mandatory guidelines regime, which is effectively similar in this respect to legislatively-
mandated penalties).
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arrests, convictions, and punishments. Moreover, to the extent that federal
sentences contribute to nationwide incarceration rates,341 more, yet tempered,
mandatory minimum penalties at the state or local level will help lessen
penalties overall. If local law enforcement could better trust in local systems to
effectively deal with street crime, requests for federal intervention- and the
hefty prison sentences that come with it -would recede.
The proposals set forth here entail high up-front outlays, in that significant
resources must be spent on strengthening local justice systems before a
diminution of federal prosecution could be politically acceptable. Yet
continuing on our current trajectory is far more costly-not just in terms of
resources over the long term but, more fundamentally, in the tax on our
collective trust in the justice system. The key is to refocus our approach. Rather
than debating which sovereign should enforce which criminal laws, we should
instead turn our efforts to thinking about how to engender legitimacy in local
criminal justice systems. And rather than relying on criminal adjudication as
the primary vehicle for local voice and participation, we should strive for a
system that incorporates local voice elsewhere too - a system that functions
more collaboratively at the outset, through the trust and confidence of the
governed.
CONCLUSION
Forum disparities in street crime cases have been conceptualized primarily
as the product of tangible differences among sovereigns' legal rules (penalties,
procedures, evidentiary rules) and in resources and caseloads. This
understanding is accurate, but it neglects to account for the intangible features
that also fuel federal prosecutorial success: enhanced citizen trust, the jury's
identification with the prosecuting authority and relation to the larger
electorate, greater diversity of social norms, and moral credibility. These
features arise from the unique ways that the components of legitimacy-
authority, community, and personal morality -interact in the federal criminal
justice system.
This understanding of federal criminal power has a number of
implications. First, it puts outcome disparities in a new light. They are not
341. See Rachel E. Barkow, Prosecutorial Administration: Prosecutor Bias and the Department of
Justice, 99 VA. L. REV. 271, 272 (2013) (noting that over the last decade, the federal prison
population has increased 40o%, a rate nearly three times that of the states, and that federal
prisons currently house more inmates than the prisons of any single state).
2331
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
necessarily (or not only) the natural outgrowth of our federalist order, but also
reflections of less intended dynamics of urban crime and policing. In this
respect, criminal outcome disparities should be understood less as an inevitable
feature of federalism, and more as a symptom of dysfunction.
Second, the federal system achieves its legitimacy-based features largely
through circumventing the local in criminal justice systems: beat policing,
community-delineated jury pools, and entrenched courthouse norms. But
legitimacy need not only be had in these ways. Once we appreciate the
legitimacy-based features of the federal system, we can theorize means of
translating these features into local systems in ways that preserve, and even
enhance, localism.
It is here that we should focus our intellectual efforts. Let us put aside for
now the debates on which crimes should be prosecuted by which sovereign.
Instead, let us envision how we might rebuild local criminal justice systems so
as to enhance legitimacy. If we do this, forum disparities will naturally recede,
making questions of forum and sovereign power allocation ultimately less
important. This, in turn, will enhance the legitimacy of our larger, multi-
jurisdictional system of criminal justice.
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